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An Overview of the Disciplinary Process
I. A BRIEF AND UNEASY LOOK AT THE DEVELOPMENT AND PRESENT
STATE OF THE BAR AND THE BASIS OF LAWYER DISCIPLINE
A. Our "Scandalous Situation"
In the past decade the prestige of the legal profession in the
United States has sustained an unprecedented series of blows. As
a result, the bar has been forced to reconsider the attitudes and
the criteria by which it regulates itself. Nineteen-seventy gave us
the Clark Report,' a culmination of three years of study that
revealed "a scandalous situation" both in the attitudes of lawyers
toward disciplinary enforcement and in the ineffectiveness (often
the nonexistence) of disciplinary agencies.
2
As if to confirm this alarm, at the very time the Clark Report
was being released, a theretofore obscure twenty-nine year old
White House aide named Tom Charles Huston was organizing an
intelligence and security scheme involving a number of the coun-
try's most conspicuous lawyers in, among other things, the
"clearly illegal" device of surreptitious entry.' On June 17, 1972,
the Watergate burglary was discovered, and thus began the as-
tonishing disclosures that led to the disgrace and discipline of
lawyers including the President and two Attorneys General of the
United States, and a variety of other high-ranking government
and party officials.' Almost incidentally, in October of 1973, the
Vice President, who also happened to be a lawyer, resigned under
threat of felony conviction for misconduct unrelated to Water-
1. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SPECIAL COMMITEE ON EVALUATION OF DiscrPUNARY EN-
FORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (Hon. Tom C.
Clark, Chairman 1970) [hereinafter cited as CLARK REPORT].
2. Id. at 1. The CLARK REPORT warned that "[u]nless the piofession as a whole is
itself prepared to initiate radical reforms promptly, fundamental changes in the discipli-
nary structure, imposed by those outside the profession, can be expected." Id. at 9. See
also Mr. Justice Powell's article, The President's Annual Address: The State of the Legal
Profession, 51 A.B.A.J. 821 (1965), for a slightly earlier admonition.
3. See B. SUSSMAN, THE GREAT COvER-UP: NIXON AND THE SCANDAL OF WATERGATE 207
(1974). While it was never absolutely established whether the Huston plan was approved
in all its detail by the President, it clearly was the prototype if not the direct ancestor of
the Watergate break-in. Id. at 208.
4. The ABA Standing Committee on Professional Discipline and Center for Profes-
sional Discipline has compiled a table entitled "Public Disciplinary Action Against Attor-
neys Named as Defendants or Co-Conspirators in Watergate and Related Criminal Pro-
ceedings" that may be obtained from the American Bar Association office in Chicago. See
generally An Awful Lot of Lawyers Involved, TIME, July 9, 1973; NEW YORK Tm, THE
END OF A PRESmDENCY 128-29 (1974); Hertzberg, Watergate: Has the Image of the Lawyer
Been Diminished?, 79 CoM. L.J. 73 (1974); Thomason, What the Public Thinks of
Lawyers, 46 N.Y.S.B.J. 151 (1974).
[Vol. 30364
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gate,5 and a year later was disbarred in Maryland where he had
taught and practiced law and held the highest public office.'
Nor was the bench immune in these years from its own hu-
miliations. Just before the decade began, Clement Haynsworth,
the respected Chief Judge of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals,
was denied a Supreme Court seat because of his alleged insensi-
tivity to conflicts of interest,7 and in early 1970 Judge Harold
Carswell of the Fifth Circuit was dramatically rejected by the
Senate for reasons ranging from symptoms of racism to signs of
incompetence.' The seat to which these men aspired, of course,
was vacated by the resignation of Justice Abe Fortas, who had
earlier been unsuccessfully nominated for the position of Chief
Justice, amidst allegations of his own impropriety Judge Otto
Kerner of the Seventh Circuit, war hero, former United States
Attorney, former governor of Illinois, and head of the Presidential
Commission on Civil Disorders, was convicted of bribery, conspir-
5. R. CoHiN & J. WrrcOVER, A HEARTBEAT AWAY 329-56 (1974).
6. Maryland State Bar Association v. Agnew, 271 Md. 543, 318 A.2d 811 (1974). The
court said, apropos Agnew's arguments that his misconduct was not in his capacity as a
lawyer, and that disbarment was excessive punishment:
The professional ethical obligations of an attorney, as long as he remains a
member of the bar, are not affected by a decision to pursue his livelihood by
practicing law, entering the business world, becoming a public servant, or em-
barking upon any other endeavor. If a lawyer elects to become a business man
[sic], he brings to his merchantry the professional requirements of honesty,
uprightness, and fair dealing. Equally, a lawyer who enters public life does not
leave behind the canons of legal ethics. A willful and serious malefaction com-
mitted by a lawyer-public servant brings dishonor to both the bar and the
democratic institutions of our nation, and its destructive effect is thereby mag-
nified.
Id. at 550-51, 318 A.2d at 815.
7. See D. HARms, DECISION 5-6 passim (1971). In fairness to Judge Haynsworth, and
for a sense of perspective, we might recall that blatant conflicts of interest were common
among our earliest and some of our greatest judges. Marshall was for a time both Secretary
of State and Chief Justice, was a militant Federalist while on the court, and together with
his brother was heavily involved in land speculation affected by the decision in Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), which, though Marshall officially ab-
stained, was announced by Justice Story, but generally is believed to have been written
by Marshall. L. PFEFFER, TnIs HoNoRALE CoUir, 54, 89, 101-04 (1965). The Harris book
provides an excellent portrait of the forces at work when a controversial federal judicial
nomination is under consideration. See also J. ALsoP & T. CATLEDGE, TaE 168 DAYS (1938)
(the F. Roosevelt court-packing attempt); D. DAvELSKI, A SUPREME COURT JusTIcE is
APPOINTED (1964) (the appointment of Pierce Butler).
8. D. HARms supra note 7, at 21-29, passim.
9. C. ASHMAN, THE FINEST JUDGES MONEY CAN Buy, 211-20 (1973). For a detailed
study of the Fortas incident and its aftermath, see R. SHOGAN, A QUESTION OF JUDGMENr
(1972). See also President Johnson's nomination of Homer Thornberry to replace Justice
Fortas was also rejected. R. SHOGAN, 149-52, 171-72.
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acy, mail fraud, perjury, and tax evasion, and was forced to resign
the bench, jailed, and disbarred.10
In 1975 the profession itself was in effect found guilty of
widespread antitrust violations in the use of minimum fee sched-
ules," and two years later application of the long-standing and
widely enforced provisions of the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility regulating lawyer advertising was struck down as violating
the Constitution."2 Throughout all this we have been told by the
Chief Justice that a staggering percentage of trial lawyers are, in
his judgment, incompetent.13 For the bar these have undeniably
been, in the words of the Chinese curse, interesting times. 4
B. The Development of the Bar in a Nutshell
Recent scandal does not, of course, mean that until recently
lawyers have always enjoyed universal approbation. It might be
said, and not altogether figuratively, that the profession itself got
off on the wrong foot. Among the earliest forms of litigation was
the battle, which the Normans probably introduced to England.'
The hired champion, a product of the system of trial by battle
and one progenitor of the modem lawyer, was early if not always
illegal in England, but flourished for a time anyway." Indeed, in
what might be called the earliest Anglo-American lawyer discipli-
nary case, Bracton tells us that one Elias Piggun was convicted
10. United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
See C. Asmm, THE FINEST JUDGES MONEY CAN Buy, 200-206 (1973). Ashman lists some
74 judges who have been accused of, though not necessarily proved to have committed,
serious misconduct.
11. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
12. Bates v. Arizona State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
13. Chief Justice Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, Midyear
Meeting of the American Bar Association (February 12, 1978), 64 A.B.A.J. 211 (1978). The
Chief Justice's persistent remarks are both troubling and puzzling. If it is true that half
our trial lawyers are incompetent, it is a matter of the gravest concern. The Chief Justice,
however, does not seem to have produced authority or sources for his estimate, and he
has been challenged by bar groups and trial judges. Perhaps he is merely attempting to
be provocative, but surely by virtue of his position his remarks can reasonably be expected
to diminish public confidence in the profession, to encourage lawsuits against lawyers
(both civil malpractice actions, and habeas corpus petitions by prisoners who conclude
their lawyers must have been in the tainted half) and to affect pending malpractice cases.
Though the profession certainly needs and deserves more critical scrutiny than it has had,
see J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE (1976), the remarks of the Chief Justice seem a pecu-
liarly inappropriate source.
14. The curse, "May you live in interesting times," was said to be among the worst
fates to be wished on anyone. This phrase is no less telling even if it is apocryphal.
15. T. PLUCKNErr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 111-16 417-18 (1956).
16. See H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 11-13 (1953).
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of being a hired champion and in consequence lost a foot and a
fistY
The earliest true prototypes of the modem lawyer, that is,
men who appeared as advocates for others' interests, were clergy-
men, for the good reason that at the time only they were literate."s
The church proscribed the practice of law by priests in the thir-
teenth century, however. 9 About the same time lay pleaders pro-
liferated, and the first secular regulation of lawyers appeared in
the First Statute of Westminster" providing that any "Serjeant,
Pleader or other" who should .practice "Deceit or Collusion" or
"beguile the Court" would be imprisoned for a year and a day and
banished from the court.2 ' In England regulation of lawyers fell
increasingly to the profession itself, particularly after the devel-
opment of the Inns of Court, from which barristers (and, there-
fore, judges) emerged. This power of self-regulation depended
upon judicial sanction, and the authority was said from early
times to be ultimately and inherently judicial.2
The American bar did not simply transplant English prac-
tice, and the barrister-solicitor distinction never took root here.23
From the earliest colonial days through and after the Revolution
the profession was generally unpopular, perhaps partly because
the bar was in disrepute in England in those times' and partly
because the first lawyers were English and thus in appearance if
not in fact were Tories. 2 Paradoxically, although about half of
those who signed the Declaration of Independence and half of
these same men, most notably John Adams and Alexander Ham-
ilton, became prominent representing Tory interests as lawyers. 26
17. Id. at 12. See also G. NEILSON, TRIAL BY COMBAT 48-49 (1909). The American bar's
closet has some skeletons as well. Many of our early immigrants were banished convicts;
in 1736 one of these was "a Gentlemen of Fortune, and a Barrister at Law" who had been
convicted of the curious offense of stealing books from Trinity CoUege Library. P. SMrrT,
A NEw AGE Now BEoms 39 (1976).
18. A. BALusTEN & C. PoRTER, THE AmmcAN LAwYER 284 (1954).
19. Id.
20. 3 Edw. 1, c. 29 (1275).
21. Id. See also E. COKE, SECOND INSTrrUTES "1 Another statute forbidding practice by
"Attorneys, ignorant and not learned in the Law" was enacted in 1402. 4 Henry IV, c. 18.
22. See R. v. Benches of Gray's Inn, 99 Eng. Rep. 227 (K.B. 1780)
23. H. DRInKER, supra note 16, at 13-20; H. COHEN, HISTORY OF THE ENGUSH BAR 181
passim (1929).
24. R. PouND, THE LAWYER FROM ANIQurrY TO MODERN Twms, 135-39 (1953).
25. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw, 265 (1973).
26. John Adams (with Josiah Quincy), is one of the greatest examples of the lawyer's
duty to represent the rights of the unpopular, defended the British soldiers charged with
murder for their part in the "Boston Massacre" of 1770. Adams here used the principle
1979]
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One observer wrote in 1782 that
[l]awyers are plants that will grow in any soil that is culti-
vated by the hands of others; and when once they have taken
root they will extinguish every other vegetable that grows
around them. The fortunes they daily acquire in every province,
from the misfortunes of their fellow citizens, are surprising! 2
These early lawyers were trained largely by working with
English-educated lawyers and, in the later Eighteenth Century,
by reading Blackstone's Commentaries, which appeared in Eng-
land between 1765 and 1768 and promptly in America as well.28
The first American professorship of "law and police" was estab-
lished by Thomas Jefferson at William and Mary College in 1779
and chaired by Judge George Wythe, under whom John Marshall
studied briefly in 1779-1780.21 A private law school was estab-
lished at Litchfield, Connecticut, in 1784 and flourished until
1833, and other law professorships came into being in these
years." The most notable development during this period was the
founding of the Harvard Law School in 1817.31
C. The Judiciary's Inherent Power Over the Profession
With the uniformity created by common and indigenous
American legal education, the bar as an organized entity began
to emerge, and with it came the mechanisms for admission, regu-
lation, and removal. Roscoe Pound describes four periods in this
development:
(1) the attempt to get on without lawyers,
(2) the stage of irresponsible filling out of writs by court offi-
cials and pettifoggers,
that underlies most of the rudimentary constitutional protectioni of the rights of guilty
and innocent alike: "It is better ... five guilty persons should escape unpunished, than
one innocent person should die." P. SMITH, supra note 17, at 352. Smith's account of the
entire episode is excellent. Id. at 331-63.
27. ST. JOHN CREVECOEUR, LgrrERs FROM AN AEImcAN FARMER 196-97 (1904), quoted
in L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 25 at 265-66. Yet Friedman notes the fascinating fact that as
late as 1700 there were so few trained lawyers in New York that one party could on
occasion retain them all, leaving his opponent without available counsel. Id. at 87.
28. The COMMENTARIES were originally lectures delivered by Blackstone who, in 1758,
was the only lecturer on the common law at any university. A. SUMRLAND, THE LAW AT
HARvARD 20-27 (1967).
29. Id. at 26-27.
30. Id. at 27-32.
31. Id. at 59.
[Vol. 30
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(3) the era of admitted practitioners in permanent judicial or-
ganizations, and
(4) the era of trained lawyers.2
Note that Pound refers to permanent judicial organizations.
This emphasis is important because the notion of exclusive judi-
cial power to regulate the profession was an early development of
great and continuing importance. In 1824 Justice Marshall wrote
that the power to suspend and disbar is "incidental to all courts,
and is necessary for the preservation of decorum, and for the
respectability of the profession."33 This dictum did not settle the
matter, however, and as late as 1864 some courts perceived the
right to practice law as statutory and the power to regulate as
legislative rather than judicial .3  But in 1866, in Ex parte
Garland,35 a divided Supreme Court struck down a statute pur-
porting to regulate admission to federal court as an unconstitu-
tional invasion of the judicial sphere by Congress. Since that time
it has been all but unanimously agreed that lawyer regulation is
an inherently judicial function.
3 8
This notion of the inherently judicial nature of lawyer regula-
tion is important to keep in mind as the attitudes, criteria, and
machinery with which the function is performed are examined.
D. The Development of Codes of Ethics and Disciplinary Rules
in America
The original Canons of Professional Ethics 3 were not pro-
mulgated by the American Bar Association until 1908 after some
years of study,38 inspired principally by a 1905 Harvard address
32. R. POUND, supra note 24, at 135.
33. Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529 (1824).
34. See, e.g., Ex parte Yale, 24 Cal. 242 (1864).
35. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
36. Beardsley, The Judicial Claim to Inherent Power Over the Bar, 19 A.B.A.J. 509
(1933); Note, The Inherent Power of the Judiciary to Regulate the Practiced Law: A
Proposed Delineation, 60 MINN. L. REv. 783 (1976). Texas seems to be the only exception
among courts that have spoken on the issue. See Scott v. State, 86 Tex. 321, 24 S.W. 789
(1894).
37. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908). There were 32 canons, which were
based substantially on the Code of Ethics adopted in 1887 by the Alabama State Bar
Association, the latter drawing heavily on Judge Sharswood's book PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
(1854).
38. An ABA Grievance Committee was established in 1878, but did virtually nothing.
See 27 ABA Rep. 446 (1904). A special committee to study canons of ethics was formed
in 1905, 29 ABA REP. 1906 (1904) and in 1913 the Standing Committee on Professional
Ethics was established, 38 ABA REP. 140, 147 (1913).
1979]
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by President Theodore Roosevelt in which he accused corporate
lawyers of defeating regulation of their clients. 9 The ABA, heed-
ing the criticism, managed to include a plethora of congratulation
for the profession in the same breath in which it recognized the
need for ethical guidance:
Our profession is necessarily the keystone of the republican arch
of government. Weaken this keystone by allowing it to be in-
creasingly subject to the corroding and demoralizing influence
of those who are controlled by graft, greed and gain, or other
unworthy motive, and sooner or later the arch must fall."
Ironically, as Professor Auerbach notes, the ABA promptly
diverted the focus President Roosevelt had placed on corporate
lawyers to their less-prominent colleagues:
Although Roosevelt had denounced those who counseled
the malefactors of wealth, and the cry of "commercialization"
bracketed lawyers in the highest and lowest professional strata,
the committee report was more selective. Indeed, once bar asso-
ciations exerted control over the campaign for canons of ethics,
corporate lawyers, who were disproportionately represented in
their councils, shifted the onus to "ambulance chasers" and
"shysters," who were disproportionately excluded.41
The Canons thereafter adopted remained the principal ethical
guidelines until the adoption in 1969 of the greatly revised and
expanded Code of Professional Responsibility.
In 1947 the ABA published The Survey of the Legal
Profession, which found little uniformity in either adherence to
or enforcement of ethical considerations." Accordingly, a restate-
ment of ethical standards and disciplinary procedures was com-
missioned and resulted in the publication in 1956 of the Model
Disciplinary Rules. The Model Rules recognized explicitly the
inherent power of the courts to regulate the profession and stated
that "[t]he purpose of discipline of lawyers is the protection of
the public, the profession and the administration of justice, and
not the punishment of the person disciplined." 3 While the Model
Rules were not binding or even widely adopted, they gave further
39. J. AUERBACH, supra note 13, at 40.
40. 29 ABA REP. 600-01 (1906).
41. J. AUERBACH, supra note 13, at 41.
42. Vanderbilt, The Survey of the Legal Profession, 31 JuDicATURa 7 (1947). See
generally, 0. PHILLIPS & P. McCoY, CONDUCT OF JUDGES AND LAWYERS 1-6 (1952).
43. MODEL RuLES OF COURT FOR DIScIPLINARY PRocEzDINGS, 81 ABA RE'. 396 (1956)
[hereinafter cited as MODEL RULES].
[Vol. 30
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authority to the concept of professional self-regulation for the
good of the public and the bar.
In 1967 the Clark Committee began its study of the discipli-
nary process and in 1970 reported that matters were in great
disarray." At the same time the Committee proposed a five-step
process for disciplinary proceedings, which differed appreciably
from the Model Rules, and included:
(1) Investigation and Screening;
(2) Probable Cause Hearing;
(3) Formal Hearing;
(4) Administrative Review; and
(5) Judicial Review.45
The Report led to review and modification of the disciplinary
structures in almost every state.46 The ABA had created a Stand-
ing Committee on Professional Discipline as well as a Center for
Professional Discipline, and in 1974 these agencies published
their Suggested Guidelines for Rules of Disciplinary Enforce-
ment,4" which adhered for the most part to the Model Rules, but
eliminated the probable cause stage. The Guidelines also ac-
knowledged the desirability of naming nonlawyers to disciplinary
boards, retained the emphasis on self-regulation, and reaffirmed
the inherently judicial nature of the proceedings."
Although neither the Code of Professional Responsibility nor
the Suggested Guidelines are automatically binding upon indi-
vidual jurisdictions, 9 they are being widely and increasingly
adopted, and even where they are not official in force, they may
carry substantial weight. Disciplinary counsel, therefore, should
be familiar with them and expect that in the absence of a differ-
ent local procedure they will be likely to control. Indeed it might
fairly be said that in addition to mastery of the jurisdiction's
44. CLARK REPORT, supra note 1, at 1.
45. Id. at xiv-xvi.
46. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL COOR-
DINATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (1972).
47. ABA STANDING COMMITrEE ON PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE AND CENTER FOR PROFES-
SIONAL DISCIPLINE, SUGGESTED GUIDELINES FOR RULES OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (rev.
1975) [hereinafter cited as SUGGESTED GUIDELINES]. See also SUGGESTED GUIDELINES (3d
ed. 1977).
48. Id.
49. Compare In re Taylor, 66 Ill. 2d 567, 363 N.E.2d 845 (1977) (describes the Code
as a "safe guide" though not legally binding) with In re Colorado Bar Ass'n, 137 Colo. 357,
325 P.2d 932 (1958) (states that discipline cannot be imposed merely for violation of the
Canons even though they have been adopted in the jurisdiction).
1979]
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ethical rules and procedures every lawyer acting in a disciplinary
proceeding should have a working knowledge of the Code and the
Guidelines.
E. Working with Present Code of Professional Responsibility
The present Code comprises three sets of provisions. The
nine Canons are described as "statements of axiomatic norms,
expressing in general terms the standards of professional conduct
expected of lawyers."' 0 A group of Ethical Considerations follow
each Canon; they are "aspirational" standards "towards which
every member of the profession should strive."'" Finally, and
most importantly for present purposes, there are the Disciplinary
Rules, which are "mandatory" statements of "the minimum level
of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject
to disciplinary action."" Among the Disciplinary Rules we find
these provisions, which illustrate the breadth of the Code's appli-
cation:
DR 1-102...
(A) A lawyer shall not:
(1) Violate a Disciplinary Rule.
(5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration
of justice.
(6) Engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects upon
his fitness to practice law.
The lofty aspirations underlying this general injunctions are sug-
gested by the following language of the Supreme Court, which the
ABA Committed cited in support of DR 1-102(A)(6);
It is a fair characterization of the lawyer's responsibility in our
society that he stands "as a shield,". . . in defense of right and
to ward off wrong. From a profession charged with these respon-
sibilities there must be exacted those qualities of truthspeaking,
of a high sense of honor, of granite discretion, of the strictest
observance of fiduciary responsibility, that have, throughout the
centuries, been compendiously described as "moral charac-
ter."53
50. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, PRELIMINARY STATEMENT (1976)
[hereinafter cited as ABA CODE].
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. ABA CODE, Disciplinary Rule [hereinafter D.R.] 1-102(A)(6) n.14 (quoting
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 247 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
[Vol. 30
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These well-phrased and salutary sentiments are, unfortunately,
not a very useful guide to retrospective or prospective evaluation
of specific instances of conduct. Despite the prolixity of the pres-
ent Code, it has been criticized for this overgenerality, as well as
for a misplaced emphasis in its priorities. Indeed there are princi-
pally three areas in which the Code is subject to legitimate criti-
cism.
First, like its predecessor, the Canons of Professional Ethics,
the Code is said to be excessively protective of the bar's self-
interest in "outmoded laissez-faire precepts," at the expense of
adequate incentives to the bar to make legal services more readily
available to all." The recent demise of the Code's restrictions
upon lawyer advertising may presage a substantial change in this
area. 5
Second, a more important and abiding problem from the
point of view of disciplinary procedure is the extreme breadth and
vagueness of the Code in provisions such as those set forth above.
Because the language is so broad, virtually any foible might be
subjectively construed to be a violation of the Code or an
apparent violation. Canon 9 enjoins that "[a] Lawyer Should
Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety."5 Such
generality could not survive, of course, in criminal legislation,
particularly when free speech is implicated.57 But in the realm of
regulatory provisions a good deal more breadth is tolerated, as in
the Supreme Court's approval of the military condemnation of
"conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman." ' The ques-
tion is ultimately one of notice, that is, whether the person af-
fected could reasonably foresee that his conduct was proscribed.
If it clearly was, then he probably lacks standing to challenge the
54. J: AUERBACH, supra note 13, at 286.
55. J. LmBERMAN, Cisus AT THE BAR 87-106 (1978). Despite the melodramatic sub-
title, Lawyer's Unethical Ethics and What To Do About It, Lieberman's book is a bal-
anced critique of the subject.
The prohibitions placed on lawyer advertising by the organized bar were first chal-
lenged in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). The subsequent cases of In
re Primus 436 U.S. 412 (1978), and Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978),
further clarified the limits of in-person solicitation, but further litigation can be expected
before the outer boundaries of permissible solicitation are firmly established.
56. ABA CODE, CANON 9.
57. E.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) ("fighting" words).
58. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974); cf. In re Bithoney, 486 F.2d 319, 324 (1st Cir.
1973) (even though the Code may be vague or general, there are still core areas of conduct
that are clearly prohibited).
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facial overbreadth of a rule. 9 Respondent's counsel, however,
should be alert to this problem when the charges are under the
broader disciplinary rules. The Supreme Court has held, albeit
not on a question of vagueness, that a disciplinary respondent has
a constitutional due process right to fair notice of the charges
against him."0 Particularly when the misconduct is malum
prohibitum rather than malum in se, and the defense is that the
respondent acted in good faith, it may be persuasive that the
Code does not give adequate guidance. The opening wedge for the
argument upon vagueness of a rule is ordinarly an affirmative
answer to the question of whether "men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning," 1 and that can validly be
said of many of the Code's provisions.
Third, even when individual provisions of the Code are rea-
sonably definite they may be in conflict with other provisions.
Indeed Jethro Lieberman writes in his recent and lucid Crisis at
the Bar that "the code remains confusing, ambiguous, and incon-
sistent."62 For this and other reasons he concludes that the
"pastiche of loquacious moralisms and obscure footnotes" should
be "scrapped." 3 Monroe Freedman, an early and outspoken critic
of the Code, sees three duties that frequently conflict with one
another, a "trilemma" consisting of the duties (1) to ascertain all
the facts from his client, (2) to keep his client's confidences, and
(3) to be candid with the court.64 The lawyer, says Freedman, "is
required to know everything, to keep it in confidence, and to
reveal it to the court."65 One might add as well, to complicate the
situation further, the injunction of Canon 7 that "[a] Lawyer
Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the
59. Compare Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) (when free speech is likely to
be chilled, a defendant may challenge overbroad legislation even though his conduct was
clearly forbidden) with Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) (one has no standing
to challenge a statute if his conduct falls within the "hard core" of its proscriptions).
60. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968). See also Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.)
505 (1873).
61. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 607 (1973) (quoting Connaly v. General
Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
62. J. LIEBERMAN, supra note 55, at 65.
63. Id. at 213.
64. M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHics IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 28 (1975). This is an
excellent and provocative book by an articulate champion of the view that a lawyer's
primary duty is to his client and that this duty is an unbending one, particularly in
criminal cases.
65. Id. See J. LIEBERMAN supra note 55, at 153-56 for a critique of Freedman's argu-
ment. And see In re A., 276 Or. 225, 554 P.2d 479 (1976), for an example of a conflict
between the attorney-client privilege and the duty to disclose.
[Vol. 30
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Law.""6 Especially in criminal cases it is often defense counsel's
clear duty to obstruct the truth-finding process by asserting and
protecting his client's fourth and fifth amendment rights to sup-
press illegally obtained but highly relevant and probative evi-
dence. 7 Indeed, some courts that have traditionally required a
showing that a "mockery of justice" resulted from ineffective
assistance of counsel,6 have shown a new willingness to reverse
criminal convictions because of incompetent counsel when de-
fense counsel did not "exercise the customary skills and diligence
that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under simi-
lar circumstances."69 Obviously keeping damaging evidence from
the factfinder by assertion of constitutional rights and rules of
evidence is one of the most rudimentary skills of the trial lawyer.
Another area of clear collision between conflicting duties is
in advertising and solicitation, which, though until recently con-
demned in virtually all respects, might quite arguably be required
by the duty "to educate laymen to recognize their problems, to
facilitate the process of intelligent selection of lawyers, and to
assist in making legal services fully available."70 This is one of the
grounds on which the Supreme Court scuttled the advertising ban
in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.7"
Other examples are readily envisioned. For the moment it is
sufficient to emphasize that although in most disciplinary pro-
ceedings the Code will be implicated and ostensibly violated,
counsel should consider whether the Code gives adequate notice
of asserted proscription and whether violation of one provision
can be justified by adherence to another. The value of the Code
to the practicing lawyer has been likened with some justice and
66. ABA CODE, CANON 7; cf. Daniel v. Penrod Drilling Co., 393 F. Supp. 1056 (D.
La. 1975) (while lawyers owe a duty to their clients to wage a vigorous struggle, they owe
a primary duty to the administration of justice, and as officers of the court it is their duty
not to dissimulate).
67. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961).
68. E.g., McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 214 (8th Cir. 1974).
69. United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 1976), aff'd on second appeal,
552 F.2d 230 (8th Cir. 1977); accord, McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770 (1970).
70. ABA CODE, Ethical Consideration [hereinafter E.C.] 2-1. The decision in Gold-
farb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), striking down minimum fee schedules as
antitrust violations, had the potential effect of encouraging fee competition. Reduced fees
and greater availability and knowledge of this availability, of counsel to nonprosperous
prospective litigants follows from the encouragement of fee competition. See generally M.
PIRSIG & K. KmwiN, PROFESSIONAL REsPONSEBIUY: CAsES AND MATERIALS 153-254 (1976).
71. 433 U.S. 350, 377 (1977).
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hyperbole to the value of a valentine to a heart surgeon.72 But I
would not be understood to encourage disregard of the Code, any
more than I counsel abject surrender to it. Some, perhaps even
most of the aspirations embodied by the Code are not subject to
debate since they envision an effective, zealous, and competent
bar consisting of largely autonomous lawyers. In its particulars,
and especially in combinations of its particulars, the Code is not
always workable. If applied with the required flexibility and with
a receptive sympathy for good faith and human fallibility, it is
certainly a useful repository of our ethical history. The Code itself
recognizes that not all situations can be foreseen, and that with
each situation the lawyer must evaluate the competing demands
in light of his role.
73
Finally, the Code does not contain either disciplinary proce-
dures, sanctions for violations, or standards for civil liability.
74
These important matters are left to individual jurisdictions and
specific cases, and great diversity is the result. As to sanctions,
the Code does note that the "severity of judgment against one
found guilty of violating a Disciplinary Rule should be deter-
mined by the character of the offense and the attendant circum-
stances."", Broad as it is, this is probably as good a general de-
scription as any of the factors with which counsel must be con-
cerned in the disciplinary process.
Effective work in the area of lawyer discipline presupposes,
of course, knowledge of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and other substantive law sources, as well as intimate familiarity
with the procedural rules of the jurisdiction involved. This body
of substantive and procedural law is immensely diverse," and it
is not the purpose of this article to examine either the standards
of professional conduct or all details of the procedures by which
they are enforced. Rather, for the most part, practical advice is
72. M. FREEDMAN, supra note 64, at vii.
73. ABA CODE, Preamble (incorporating by footnote the position expressed in
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: REPORT OF THE JOINT CONFERENCE, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159, 1218
(1968)).
74. ABA CODE, Preliminary Statement.
75. Id. (citing Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Steiner, 204 La. 1073, 1092-93, 16 So. 2d
843, 850 (1944) (Higgins, J., concurring)); accord, In re Smith, 67 Cal. 2d 460, 461-62, 432
P.2d 231-32, 62 Cal. Rptr. 615-16 (1967); see In re Harrington, 134 Vt. 549, 367 A.2d 161-
62 (1976).
76. Mr Justice Clark, who chaired the ABA Special Committee on Evaluation of
Disciplinary Enforcement, found a great lack of uniformity, a "hodge-podge," in the
states' disciplinary procedures. Clark, Address to the Nebraska State Bar Association
Annual Association Dinner, Oct. 19, 1967, 47 NEB. L. REv. 359, 367 (1968).
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offered that is designed to be helpful to the lawyer's lawyer who
has already mastered the operative substantive law and proce-
dural rules. Attention is first given in the following sections of this
article to the broad considerations that the lawyer's advocate
should keep in mind: the nature and purpose of disciplinary pro-
ceedings and the pertinent constitutional rights of the respon-
dent. The balance of the article is then focused on the nuts and
bolts of representing lawyers within the existing framework of the
disciplinary system.
II. THE NATURE OF DIScIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
A disciplinary action against a lawyer is unlike any other
form of litigation. It includes elements conscripted more or less
arbitrarily from criminal law, civil practice, administrative pro-
ceedings, and even arbitration. It is unique, too, because it in-
volves the legal profession at work upon itself; the bar, which is
understood to include the bench, acts at once as accuser, accused,
judge, jury, probation officer, and court of last resort. 7 The goal
is the seemingly internecine one of preserving or "purifying" the
bar by condemning and purging individual members;" yet the
proceeding is, or should be, motivated as well by a genuine and
effective concern to help the errant lawyer.79 It contrives at once
to be both narcissistic and masochistic, self-defensive and self-
destructive, stoical and lugubrious. The familiar adversary sys-
tem becomes confused in these circumstances and the confusion
demands a rethinking of roles and a rearrangement of priorities.
It is correct, but inadequate, to describe a disciplinary proceeding
as sui generis.80
77. This combination 6f functions in a single body has been held not to violate due
process. Mendicino v. Whitchurch, 565 P.2d 460 (Wyo. 1977). See also Withrow v. Larkin,
421 U.S. 35 (1975) (medical board may hold adversary hearing on doctor's suspension on
charges arising from its own investigation). But see In re Schlesinger, 404 Pa. 584, 172 A.2d
835 (1961).
78. See, e.g., In re Makowski, 374 A.2d 458 (N.J. 1977). The courts have articulated
the purposes for discipline in a great variety of ways, but common to most of them is the
notion of protecting the judicial process by preserving the "purity" of the bar, a curiously
moralistic notion which, of course, presupposes an inherent or predominant "purity" to
be preserved. For a recent'critique of the standards by which the bar has traditionally
evaluated itself, see J. AUERBACH, supra note 13, at 14-39.
79. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Hirsch, 342 So. 2d 970 (Fla. 1977); Grievance Comm. v.
Howe, 257 N.W.2d 420 (N.D. 1977); In re Alexander, 321 Pa. 125, 184 A. 77 (1936). The
view taken by various courts of the proper purposes to be served by the disciplinary process
is discussed in a separate section of this article.
80. See, e.g., In re Eucheles, 430 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1970); McComb v. Comm'n on
Judicial Performance, 19 Cal. 3d 51, 564 P.2d 1, 138 Cal. Rptr. 459 81977); In re Sparrow,
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One might expect that something as rudimentary as the pro-
cess of self-regulation would long since have settled into a uni-
form mode of procedure with uniform criteria for discipline. But
this is not the case. Procedures, unfortunately, are not homogen-
ous, degrees of discipline are not consistent for similar kinds of
misconduct, and even the constitutional desiderata of discipline
and disbarment are not agreed upon.' The courts are often ambi-
valent in their perceptions of the very nature of the disciplinary
function: "The handling of disciplinary matters is an unwelcome
and unpleasant task for members of the Bench and Bar, but if
any semblance of an ethical profession is to be maintained, the
responsibility therefore is clear and inescapable.
8 2
We find here a sense of the necessary evil, of the bar biting
the bullet as it operates upon itself, not a sense of the mobiliza-
tion of well-tested and well-oiled machinery. Despite the central
and continuing importance of the matter to bench and bar, there
is not even agreement on whether the disciplinary process is civil 3
or criminal,8 ' quasi-civil" or quasi-criminal,86 neither civil nor
criminal, or quasi-judicial.8 The United States Supreme Court,
which has rarely ventured into the area,88 referred to the discipli-
338 Mo. 203, 90 S.W.2d 401 (1935); In re Ries, 131 N.J.L. 559, 37 A.2d 417 (1944).
81. For an excellent collection of data analyzing the present status of disciplinary
procedures in the United States, see Disbarment in the United States: Who Shall Do the
Noisome Work?, 12 COLUM J.L. & Soc. PROB. 1 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Disbarment].
82. Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Fleck, 172 Ohio St. 467, 471-72, 178 N.E.2d 782, 785
(1961). See also Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 162 N.E. 487, 493 (where Justice (then
Judge) Cardozo refers to the disciplinary process as "the noisome work").
83. See In re McCullough, 97 Utah 533, 537, 95 P.2d 13, 14-15 (1939). See also Hurst
v. Bar Rules Comm., 202 Ark. 1101, 155 S.W.2d 697 (1941); In re Kettles, 365 Ill. 168, 6
N.E.2d 146 (1937); In re Stem, 299 Mass. 107, 12 N.E.2d 100 (1938); State Bar Ass'n v.
Bachelor, 139 Neb. 253, 297 N.W. 138 (1941). See generally Disbarment, supra note 81,
at 18-21.
84. E.g., McCord v. State, 220 Ala. 466, 470-71, 126 So. 873, 877 (1930).
85. E.g., Houtchens v. State, 63 S.W.2d 1011 (Tex. Crim. App. 1933).
86. See, e.g., Goodrich v. Supreme Court, 511 F.2d 316 (8th Cir. 1975); Erdmann v.
Stevens, 458 F.2d 1205 (2d Cir. 1972); Furman v. State Bar, 12 Cal. 2d 212, 83 P.2d 12
(1938). See also Lenihan v. Commonwealth, 165 Ky. 93, 102, 176 S.W. 948, 954 (1915);
Sessner v. Commonwealth, 268 Ky. 127, 103 S.W.2d 647 (1937); In re Wall, 387 Mich. 154,
194 N.W.2d 835 (1972).
87. See Ex parte Montgomery, 244 Ala. 91, 12 So. 2d 314 (1943); Werner v. State Bar,
24 Cal. 2d 611, 150 P.2d 892 (1944); Grievance Comm. v. Sinn, 128 Conn. 419, 23 A.2d
516 (1942); In re Rerat, 224 Minn. 124, 28 N.W.2d 168 (1947); State v. Brown, 53 Wyo.
42, 77 P.2d 626 (1938).
88. E.g., State ex rel. Florida Bar v. Dawson, 111 So. 2d 427, 431 (Fla. 1959).
89. Review of a disciplinary action by the United States Supreme Court is available
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nary proceeding nearly a century ago in Ex parte Wall" as "in its
nature civil" and "not for the purpose of punishment, but for the
purpose of preserving the courts of justice from the official minis-
tration of persons unfit to practice in them;"91 yet the Court in
1968 in In re Ruffalol2 called disbarment "a punishment or pen-
alty imposed on the lawyer" to protect the public, and described
the action as "adversary proceedings of a quasi-criminal na-
ture." 93 Neither the characterization of the proceedings in Wall
nor the one in Ruffalo has been adopted or applied with consist-
ency by the lower courts. 4 This article will not attempt to resolve
the uncertainty on this question, important though it is. When,
however, the concern is with the respondent's procedural rights,
the criminal or quasi-criminal label will supposedly command
greater protections than are available in civil actions. But when
the concern is with the disposition of the matter, such a charac-
terization may justify punitive sanctions not available in civil or
remedial proceedings. Respondent's counsel is probably best ad-
vised not to dwell upon the civil-criminal distinction as such, but
to emphasize throughout the proceedings that the grave conse-
quences of disbarment require the courts to extend careful protec-
tion to the respondent's right to due process, remembering that
there is no universal answer to the-crucial question: "What pro-
cess is due?"95 If Ruffalo stands for nothing more, it at least
90. 107 U.S. 265 (1882).
91. 107 U.S. at 288.
92. 390 U.S. 544 (1968).
93. 390 U.S. at 550-51.
94. E.g., Polk v. State Bar, 480 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1973) (where the court states that
if it were to decide the question of categorization it would characterize the action as quasi-
criminal); In re Echeles, 430 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1970) (disbarments are neither civil nor
criminal, but are special proceedings); Yokozeki v. State Bar, 11 Cal. 3d 436, 521 P.2d
858, 113 Cal. Rptr. 602 (1974) (neither civil nor criminal); State v. Pastorino, 53 Wis. 2d
412, 193 N.W.2d 1 (1972) (disciplinary proceedings are civil and not criminal). In addition,
In re Kelly, 23 N.Y.2d 368, 296 N.Y.S.2d 932 (1968), and Black v. State Bar, 7 Cal. 3d
676, 499 P.2d 968, 103 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1972), directly addressed the precedent set by
Ruffalo and found it "most unlikely" that Ruffalo meant to equate disciplinary proceed-
ings and criminal cases.
95. See K. Kirwin, Constitutional, Statutory and Judicial Controls on the Practice
of Law I (1976). Professor Kirwin's concise guide was published in conjunction with a
seminar on lawyer discipline sponsored by the Hamline University School of Law, Ad-
vanced Legal Education, St. Paul Minnesota, but deserves wider circulation. This guide
can be obtained from either of these organization:
Carol A. Noteboom, Director Frank Harris, Director
Advanced Legal Education Continuing Legal Education
Hamline University School of Law A Division of the Minnesota State
1536 Hewitt Avenue Bar Association
St. Paul, Minnesota 55104 40 North Milton
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represents recent and authoritative recognition that when there
is doubt whether a right to privilege is available in a disciplinary
matter, the respondent should have the benefit of that doubt.'
III. THE PURPOSE OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
Notwithstanding Mr. Justice Douglas' language in Ruffalo,
few courts have been willing to describe the disciplinary process
as criminal or quasi-criminal. The rationale for this rejection is
ordinarily that the purpose of the process is not to punish (again,
despite Ruffalo), but to protect the public, the profession, and the
administration of justice from persons unqualified." It has been
called, in what seems to betray a certain self-righteousness and
cathartic vision characteristic of many disciplinary opinions, a
means for "purification" of the bar." Deterrence of future mis-
conduct by the respondent and others is an often-recognized pur-
pose,99 and courts occasionally, but too rarely, recognize an obli-
gation to the accused lawyer, a duty to "reclaim" the errant."'0
96. The Supreme Court held that Mr. Ruffalo bad been denied procedural due pro-
cess because in the state disbarment proceeding he had no notice that his employment of
a certain person would be considered a disbarment offense until after both he and that
person had testified at length on all material facts pertaining to that phase of the case.
390 U.S. at 550.
97. The courts are inconsistent on this point and there is no consensus of agreement
on the proper purpose of disciplinary proceedings. E.g., In re Spicer, 126 F.2d 288 (6th
Cir. 1942) (preservation of the courts); In re MacDonald, 56 Ariz. 120, 105 P.2d 1114 (1940)
(protection of the public); Dudney v. State Bar, 8 Cal. 2d 555, 66 P.2d 1199 (1937)
(protection of public, profession, and courts); In re Felton, 60 Idaho 540, 94 P.2d 166 (1939)
(purpose is to exact justice and purge the profession); In re Melnick, 383 Ill. 200, 48 N.E.2d
935 (1943) (maintain integrity of the profession and dignity of the court); Maryland State
Bar Ass'n v. Agnew, 271 Md. 543, 318 A.2d 811, 814 (1974) ("Disciplinary procedures have
been established. . . as a catharsis for the profession and a prophylacticfor the public.");
In re Kennan, 313 Mass. 186, 47 N.E.2d 12 (1943) (to maintain purity and dignity of the
court); In re Welansky, 319 Mass. 205, 64 N.E.2d 202 (1946) (security and advancement
of public justice); Wright v. Sowards, 134 Neb. 159, 278 N.W. 148 (1938) (to determine
whether attorney is fit to practice); In re Ries, 131 N.J.L. 559, 37 A.2d 417 (1944) (to
compel attorney to deal fairly and honestly with clients); Campbell v. Third Dist. Comm.
of Va. State Bar, 179 Va. 244, 18 S.E.2d 883 (Va. 1942) (to give effect to attorney's oath).
98. E.g., In re Makowski, 73 N.J. 265, 271, 374 A.2d 458, 461 (1977).
99. Id.
100. Florida Bar v. Hirsch, 342 So. 2d 970, 971 (Fla. 1977). Few opinions discuss the
bar's obligation to its own members to assist them in practicing ethically and profession-
ally not by ignoring or minimizing misconduct, but by fashioning remedies when possible
to eliminate the cause of the misconduct without depriving the respondent of his liveli-
hood and self-respect. In Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46 (1917), the Court indeed ex-
pressed sympathy for the disciplinary authority, stating "we unselfishly understand their
sense of pain" at having to do their duty. And while courts occasionally recognize an
obligation to be fair to respondents, or as the Selling Court put it, "the duty which rests
18
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Finally, the courts will be concerned not only with actual protec-
tion of the bar, public, and respondent, but with the appearance
of effective and fair regulation."0 '
This preoccupation with appearances is troublesome. Wide-
spread sentiment to the contrary notwithstanding, something is
singularly inappropriate in the spectacle of the legal profession
(whose proper business is reaching proper results in individual
cases) sacrificing its members to mollify a suspicious and cynical
public. The profession always has been and always will be viewed
antagonistically by a certain segment of society simply because
of its inescapable intellectual elitism, its relative wealth, and its
apparently disproportionate power. Yet none of these characteris-
tics is evil; nor does dishonesty or dishonor necessarily accom-
pany them. Those who believe all or virtually all lawyers are
scoundrels will not be persuaded otherwise by any number of
purges. Indeed, publicized discipline certainly tends to confirm
the suspicions of the bar's detractors, not to disarm them. This,
too, is inescapable, and I do not say that it would justify a failure
of diligent regulation. The point is that there is no persuasive
evidence that conspicuous discipline serves any salutary abstract
purpose or has a demonstrable effect beyond the consequences to
the individual respondent in the individual case. Even if it did,
it is unfair, unproductive, and unconstitutional to determine ei-
ther the desirability or the degree of discipline by reference to the
uncommitted and undetected wrongs of others. The deterrent
effect of discipline as of criminal sentencing, upon future wrong-
doers, is largely a myth (though we may admit of some excep-
tions), and no discipline should be imposed or enhanced solely for
that purpose.
The truly legitimate aims of discipline are, first, the protec-
upon us not to disbar except upon the conviction that, under the principles of right and
justice, we were constrained so to do," 243 U.S. at 51, still no opinion has been found that
speaks of a duty in the disciplinary authority to protect and assist accused members of
the bar. The result is unfortunately, but inevitably, that the bar sees disciplinary author-
ity as a potential enemy, much perhaps as most citizens view the Internal Revenue
Service. Justice Cardozo recognized this possibility in Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 162
N.E. 487, 493 (1928):
In discharging a function so responsible and delicate, the courts will refrain, we
may be sure, from a surveillance of the profession that would be merely odious
or arbitrary. They will act considerately and cautiously, mindful at all times of
the dignity of the bar and of the resentment certain to be engendered by any
tyrannous intervention.
101. E.g., Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Fleck, 172 Ohio St. 467, 471-72, 178 N.E.2d 782,
785 (1961), modified, In re Fleck, 29 Ohio St. 2d 82, 278 N.E.2d 669 (1972).
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tion of clients in particular and the administration of justice in
general from lawyers who are intellectually, physically, or mor-
ally unqualified to perform the difficult and important functions
that the license to practice law proclaims them qualified to per-
form; second, repair and restitution to the degree possible of any
damage, financial or otherwise, resulting from the respondent's
misconduct; and, third, rehabilitation of the respondent when it
is feasible. Deterrence by example is not a proper ingredient of
the disciplinary formula; to the extent it is a natural consequence
of discipline imposed for other reasons, of course, it neither can
nor shall be avoided, but that is quite a different matter.
All of these factors are important in formulating an approach
to the disciplinary process, for they dictate in large part not only
the procedural rights to which the respondent is entitled, but also
the decision on whether discipline is required and, if it is, the
appropriate form of discipline. Whatever the stated purpose of
the process, and whether the proceeding is called civil, criminal,
or otherwise, respondent's counsel should strive to extract the
greatest procedural safeguards and the least damaging form of
discipline by emphasizing the importance of the right to practice.
The grave consequences of disbarment or suspension, whether it
is called punishment or purgation, should be asserted to impress
the disciplinary body with the need for procedural fairness and
the minimal discipline consistent with the legitimate concerns of
the disciplinary authority. As the Supreme Court observed over
a century ago:
Admission as an attorney is not obtained without years of
labor and study. The office which the party thus acquires is one
of value, and often becomes the source of great honor and emo-
lument to its possessor. To most persons who enter the profes-
sion, it is the means of support to themselves and their families.
To deprive one of an office of this character would often be to
decree poverty to himself and destitution to his family. A re-
moval from the Bar should, therefore never be decreed where
any punishment less severe-such as reprimand, temporary sus-
pension, or fine-would accomplish the end desired. 2
102. Bradley v. Fisher, 89 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 355 (1872). For a discussion of an out-
of-state attorney's right to appear pro hoc vice, see Leis v. Flynt, 99 S. Ct. 698 (1979).
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IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER MINIMUM RIGHTS OF
RESPONDENTS
It has already been noted that disciplinary procedures will be
dictated in part by the court's characterization of the proceeding
as criminal, civil, or something in between. The applicability of
constitutional protections, particularly the right to due process,
also depends upon how the courts characterize the practice of
law. Here, too, we have no real consensus. Although it seems
never to have been held that there is an absolute right to practice
law, the courts generally see it as more than just a mere privilege.
It is not a mere reward for good behavior,"3 "not a matter of grace,
but of right for one who is qualified by his learning and his moral
character.""'' It has been called a "qualified right,"'u 5 a "matter
of license and high privilege,"'' 6 "in the nature of a franchise, to
the enjoyment of which one is admitted only upon proof of fitness
and qualification, which must be maintained,"'0 7 a "privilege
burdened with conditions."'0 8 However characterized, the ability
to practice law, once attained, is at least a property right that
cannot be removed without due process: "The issue is not, of
course, whether lawyers are entitled to due process of law in mat-
ters of this kind, but, rather, what process is constitutionally due
them in such circumstances.""'
Lawyers are often called "officers of the court,""' but this
"special and muddy""' appellation has seldom been used as the
103. In re Milne, 134 Vt. 416, 365 A.2d 133 (1976).
104. Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 8 (1971) (plurality opinion) (emphasis
added); cf. In re Ronwin 113 Ariz. 357, 555 P.2d 315 (1976) (holding that the practice of
law is a right, not a privilege, conditioned only on mental physical, and moral qualifica-
tions).
105. Henington v. State Bd. of Bar Examiners, 60 N.M. 393, 398, 291 P.2d 1108, 1112
(1956) (admission case); accord, Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Richards, 165 Neb. 80, 84
N.W.2d 136 (1957). See also Charlton v. FTC, 543 F.2d 903, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (a right
that cannot be "lightly" or "capriciously" taken away).
106. In re Smith, 220 Minn. 197, 199, 19 N.W.2d 324, 325 (1945).
107. Id.
108. In re Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 84, 116 N.E. 782, 783 (1971); accord, Baker v. Kreisker,
236 Ind. 617, 142 N.E.2d 432 (1957); Mississippi State Bar Ass'n v. Wade, 250 Miss. 625,
167 So. 2d 648 (1964); In re Downs, 363 S.W.2d 679 (Mo. 1963).
109. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 129 (1961) (emphasis in original). The Cohen
court concluded that the process due in a disciplinary hearing did not include the right
against self-incrimination and that the attorney could be disciplined for asserting that
right. Cohen was overruled in this respect by Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
110. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 728-29 (1973); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
333, 378 (1867).
111. 0. MELux OKF, LAwYEis AND THE SYSTEM O JusvmE 600-01 (1976).
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touchstone for handling of disciplinary matters. Though the sta-
tus of "officer of the court" may arguably carry with it certain
duties and rights, the Supreme Court has clearly distinguished
the lawyer from other officers such as marshalls, bailiffs, clerks,
and judges, essentially on the ground that the lawyer is an inde-
pendent operator, not retained by or otherwise an agent or em-
ployee of the court."' Therefore, though the phrase is common
and may have consequences, it is not part of the necessary vocab-
ulary of the disciplinary process, which would indeed probably
benefit by its banishment. Its most common and not altogether
inaccurate implication is probably that the lawyer by virtue of his
position enjoys, or labors under, a "special status in society"
1 3
and as a result will be held to higher standards of competency and
integrity than a nonlawyer.'"
From this situation emerges mostly confusion. For our pur-
poses it is important only to note that the practice of law simulta-
neously vests the lawyer with certain significant but not clearly
delineated rights and places him under certain equally elusive
obligations. It is in the respondent's interest, of course, to empha-
size the former during disciplinary proceedings and to counter the
argument that he may be shorn of his elevated status for conduct
that would be unexceptionable in a nonlawyer. Though violation
of fiduciary duties arising from membership in the bar will nor-
mally and rightly have serious consequences, the mere status of
being a lawyer should not subject one to unreasonable scrutiny
or sanctions.
We have a lawyer named Wall to thank for the judicial ac-
ceptance of relatively summary disciplinary procedures.- ' As is
so often the case, an extreme factual situation resulted in a pre-
cedent bringing hardship to future litigants. Wall participated in
112. Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399, 405 (1956) (holding that lawyers are not
officers of the court for purposes of the contempt statute in question). See also In re
Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 728-29 (1973) (in holding that aliens could not per se be excluded
from the legal profession, the court noted that lawyers are not "officials of the govern-
ment" by virtue of their membership in the bar).
113. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 130 (1961), overruled on other grounds, Spevack
v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
114. See, e.g., Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 355 (1872); Maryland State
Bar Ass'n v. Agnew, 271 Md. 543, 318 A.2d 811 (1974) (in disbarring the former Vice
President, the court quoted with approval this pronouncement by G. Sharswood, whose
early book PROFESSIONAL ETHics (1844) was an important source of the original canons:
"No man can ever be a truly great lawyer, who is not in every sense of the word, a good
man." 318 A.2d at 814.
115. Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1882).
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a lynching in full view of the federal courthouse and the judge,
who the next day summarily disbarred him' (whether to his
surprise is not recorded). From that egregious episode we have the
general rule that due process and summary disciplinary measures
are not necessarily incompatible. Some elementary protections
are, however, constitutionally required, and the rules of most
jurisdictions embody some if not all of the elements generally
thought to constitute due -process.
A. Notice and Hearing
Even before the Wall decision the Supreme Court had held
in Ex parte Garland"7 that a respondent lawyer has a right to
notice of the charges against him. This holding was reaffirmed in
Bradley v. Fisher"' and Ex parte Robinson,"9 but the latter deci-
sion anticipated "cases . . .of such gross and outrageous con-
duct"'20 (such as Wall) when summary discipline may be justi-
fied. In the recent and important Ruffalo decision, however, the
Court reaffirmed the right to specific notice of the charges and
struck down discipline imposed for conduct revealed by the res-
pondent's testimony on other charges that were not proved. 2'
This is an extremely important point for respondent's counsel to
know, particularly since in this respect too, the inferior courts
have been willing rather cavalierly to disregard Ruffalo. 2
Even in Wall the respondent was given an opportunity to be
heard (of which he did not avail himself),2' and this right has
never, in modem times at least, been questioned. 4 It is really
part and parcel of the right to notice, since notice is of no value
if it does not carry with it a right to respond. It has been said:
[T]he charges of professional misconduct, though infor-
mal, should be sufficiently clear and specific, in the light of the
circumstances of each case, to afford the respondent an oppor-
116. Id.
117. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867).
118. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872).
119. 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505 (1873).
120. Id. at 512.
121. See note 96 supra.
122. Disbarment, supra note 81, at 24-25; see, e.g., State v. Alvey, 215 Kan. 460, 466,
524 P.2d 747, 752 (1974) (finding it sufficient that the "basic factual situation" was
alleged).
123. 107 U.S. at 269-70.
124. See Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963); Burkett
v. Chandler, 505 F.2d 217 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1975).
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tunity to anticipate, prepare, and present his defense. . . .He
is entitled to a fair and impartial hearing and to a reasonable
opportunity to meet the charges brought against him. 12
At least one court has upheld discipline imposed without the
respondent's presence at the hearing, but even there he had full
notice, had been granted several continuances, and was repre-
sented by counsel who consented to proceed without the respon-
dent, who was ill.2' In many jurisdictions a respondent who has
been convicted of a crime is not permitted to introduce evidence
of innocence or to attack his conviction collaterally at disciplinary
hearings,'1 but even in such cases he may ordinarily offer in
mitigation at least "circumstances not inconsistent with the es-
sential elements of the crime. 128 When felony convictions result
automatically and unavoidably in disbarment, notably in New
York,' 9 even this may be denied.3 " There is no independent con-
stitutional right to appeal from a disciplinary decision.1 3' In gen-
eral, however, it can be said that the respondent has an absolute
due process right to know the charges and to be heard in response
to them. This right supposedly goes not only to evidence of his
innocence of the charges, but evidence and argument bearing
upon the purposes of discipline, for example, whether he is mor-
ally fit and competent to practice or whether the public or profes-
sion is endangered by him.
B. The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
In Cohen v. Hurley 32 the Supreme Court upheld disbarment
based upon a lawyer's assertion of his fifth amendment privilege
125. In re Rerat, 224 Minn. 124, 129, 28 N.W.2d 168, 172-73 (1947).
126. In re Gudmundson, 556 P.2d 212 (Utah 1976).
127. E.g., Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Loridans, 338 So. 2d 1338 (La. 1976).
128. Id. at 1344; accord, Turco v. Monroe County Bar Ass'n, 554 F.2d 515, 518 n.5
(2d Cir. 1977); In re Rothrock, 16 Cal. 2d 449, 106 P.2d 907 (1940); In re Andros, 64 Ill. 2d
419, 356 N.E.2d 153 (1976). See also Attorney General v. Laska, 101 Colo. 221, 72 P.2d
693 (1937) (conviction in a different jurisdiction).
129. N.Y. JuD. LAW (McKinney 1968). But cf. In re Greenberg v. Committee on Prof.
Standards, 58 A.D.2d 965, 397 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1977) (conviction for a felony under federal
law (mail fraud) that was not a felony under New York law did not result in disbarment).
130. Rules providing for automatic disbarment following the conviction of a felony
have been successfully challenged. In the case of In re Jones, 506 F.2d 527 (8th Cir. 1974),
the Court of Appeals ruled that the District Court rule, which provided that anyone
convicted of a felony "shall ipso facto be disbarred," was a denial of due process and that
the attorney must be given a hearing to present evidence of mitigating circumstances.
131. Mildner v. Gulotta, 405 F. Supp. 182 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), affl'd, 425 U.S. 901. See
notes 175-80 and accompanying text infra.
132. 366 U.S. 117 (1961).
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in a judicial inquiry.133 But in Spevack v. Klein'34 the Cohen deci-
sion was explicitly overruled and the Court held that the privilege
"should not be diluted by imposing the dishonor of disbarment
and the deprivation of a livelihood as a price for exerting it.'
' 13
5
Though Spevack has caused strong reaction, including a move to
amend the fifth amendment, 36 for the moment at least the princi-
ple is secure. It does not necessarily follow, however, that adverse
inferences, as opposed to automatic discipline, from the failure to
testify are forbidden 37 as they would be in a criminal case. 3 At
the same time, moreover, the respondent's cooperation with disci-
plinary authorities is frequently cited to his credit in mitiga-
tion,'39 and by implication at least a failure to cooperate would
seem to count against him.' Thus respondent's counsel must
carefully weigh the value of the cooperation against the dangers
of self-incrimination in deciding upon his approach to each case.
Note that testimony given under a grant of immunity in a crimi-
nal case may be available for use in disciplinary proceedings
without violation of the privilege.''
C. The Right To Confrontation
Jurisdictions vary greatly in their evaluations of the exist-
ence and extent of the right to confrontation in disciplinary pro-
ceedings, and the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the
subject.' Apparently only Louisiana' and Kentucky' have
133. Justice Harlan for the majority based the decision upon the lawyer's duty of
"full, honest and loyal co-operation" in disciplinary proceedings. Id. at 126.
134. 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
135. Id. at 514.
136. Disbarment, supra note 81, at 26-27.
137. Cf. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976) (case contesting several points of
procedure in prison inmate's disciplinary hearings and the court held that permitting
adverse inference to be drawn from an inmate's silence at his disciplinary proceeding is
not an invalid practice).
138. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
139. See, e.g., In re Rerat, 224 Minn. 124, 130-31, 28 N.W.2d 168, 173-74 (1947); In
re Quigley, 206 Minn. 20, 287 N.W.2d 105 (1939).
140. See, e.g., In re Peterson, 260 Minn. 339, 345, 110 N.W.2d 9, 13 (1961) (holding
tht "the furnishing of pertinent evidentiary facts is a duty which the respondent owes to
the court, as well as to himself, to aid in effecting a full and fair investigation of the
charges of professional misconduct.").
141. See In re Epstein, 37 A.D.2d 333, 325 N.Y.S.2d 657 (1971); cf. Gardner v. Broder-
ick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968) (discharge of public employees).
142. Disbarment, supra note 81, at 27-30. But cf. Willner v. Committee on Character
& Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 103 (1963) (regarding admission to the bar, "procedural due
process often requires confrontation and cross-examination").
143. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Levy, 292 So. 2d 492, 494 (La. 1974).
144. Lenihan v. Commonwealth, 165 Ky. 93, 176 S.W. 948 (1915).
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expressly recognized the right; both California"' and New York'
have rejected it despite the assertion in an early New York case
that when a respondent denies the charges he is entitled to a trial,
and on that trial the accused is not to be buried under affidavits
and swamped with hearsay, but is entitled to confront the wit-
nesses, to subject them to cross-examination, and to invoke the
protection of wise and settled rules of evidence. In adopting this
conclusion we only secure to the members of the bar the com-
mon rights and ordinary privileges of the citizen. 4 '
Respondent's counsel should, of course, assert the right since
it is ordinarily in his client's interest to confront and cross-
examine his accuser unless the facts are stipulated or testimony
is likely to be more damaging than another form of proof such as
by affidavit.
D. The Right to Trial by Jury
Another unfortunate consequence of lawyer Wall's misdeed
is the Supreme Court's conclusion in that opinion that there is
no constitutional right to a jury trial in disciplinary proceed-
ings.'48 Only Texas' and Georgia'50 provide for jury trials, and
absent either specific state constitutional provision, statute, rule,
or a holding that disciplinary proceedings are criminal in nature,
there seems little likelihood that other jurisdictions will recognize
such a right. The Clark Committee's conclusion that jury trials
serve "only to delay and weaken effective disciplinary treat-
ment"' ' seems to miss the point. Trial by jury is not an economi-
cal or prompt way of resolving any kind of dispute, civil or crimi-
nal; its crucial importance is its fairness, always an incalculably
more important concern. If mere monetary disputes, including
legal malpractice lawsuits, entitle litigants to a jury trial, the
extreme potential trauma of disbarment should deserve that
right. But the courts, often so ready to preserve the right to jury
trial in other areas, find it curiously dispensible when they, the
145. McGrath v. State Bar, 21 Cal. 2d 737, 740, 135 P.2d 1, 3 (1943).
146. In re Young, 284 A.D. 406, 131 N.Y.S.2d 499 (1954).
147. In re Eldridge, 82 N.Y. 161, 168 (1880).
148. Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 288 (1883).
149. Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 320a-1, § 5 (1973), discussed in Potts, Trial by
Jury in Disbarment Proceedings, 11 Tax. L. REv. 28, 51 (1932).
150. GA. CoDE ANN. § 9-703 (1973); Rules and Regulations for Organization of the
State Bar of Georgia 4-208 (1974).
151. CLARK REPORT, supra note 1, at 136-37.
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judiciary, are the accusers in disciplinary and contempt proceed-
ings. Mr. Justice Black, dissenting from denial of the right to jury
trial for direct contempts used this language, which would seem
to apply with equal force to disciplinary proceedings:
It is high time, in my judgment, to wipe out root and branch
the judge-invented and judge-maintained notion that judges
can try criminal contempt cases without a jury. It will be a fine
day for the constitutional liberty of individuals in the country
when that at last is done."2
At least in the area of contempt, a few thoughtful and courageous
courts have refused to rely upon the minimal federal constitu-
tional requirements recognized by the Supreme Court and have
extended the right to jury trial under state constitutions. The
Alaska Court, for example, said these wise words, which should
apply to disciplinary proceedings as well:
While we must enforce the minimum constitutional standards
imposed upon us by the United States Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, we are free, and we are
under a duty, to develop additional constitutional rights and
privileges to be within the intention and spirit of our local con-
stitutional language and to be necessary for the kind of civilized
life and ordered liberty which is at the core of our constitutional
heritage. We need not stand by idly and passively, waiting for
constitutional direction from the highest court of the land. In-
stead, we should be moving concurrently to develop and ex-
pound the principles embedded in our constitutional law.153
E. The Right To Counsel
Although many jurisdictions' rules provide that the respon-
dent may be represented by counsel, no case has been found that
holds that this is either a federal or state constitutional right. A
determination that the proceeding is criminal, as Ruffalo seems
to establish, would, of course, invoke the sixth amendment right
to counsel. But, as we have seen, the courts have been peculiarly
indifferent to the Ruffalo decision, 54 and no confidence can be
placed in the probability of a federal constitutional right to coun-
sel being discovered here.
152. United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 724 (1964).
153. Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.d 386, 401-02 (Alas. 1970) (footnotes omitted).
See also Peterson v. Peterson, 278 Minn. 275, 153 N.W.2d 825 (1967) (jury trial for con-
structive criminal contempts).
154. See note 94 and accompanying text supra.
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The observations in the previous section on application of
state constitutions apply here with equal force, although it is
unlikely that the right to counsel would today be directly denied
to any respondent.
F. The Right to an Impartial Tribunal
It has been held that there is no due process deprivation by
virtue of the judicary performing the combined functions of accu-
ser, prosecutor, fact-finder, dispenser of sanctions, and rule-
maker in disciplinary matters.155 Here, as in the law of contempt,
the bench tends to regard itself as above the influence of personal
animosity. Henry Cecil, the English judge and author, nicely il-
lustrated the absurdity of this notion in the retelling of an inci-
dent when he found it necessary to hold a man in contempt for
conduct committed in his presence: "The accused denies that he
did it, but I prefer my own evidence on the matter. I have known
myself for many years as a most reliable witness."'56
Ordinarily, of course, the wronged party will not be part of
the disciplinary body, and the few courts that have faced the
issue have recognized that any judge, or other official for that
matter, holding personal or professional animosity toward a res-
pondent lawyer, should disqualify himself from sitting in any
disciplinary proceeding against that lawyer. 57 This may well ex-
tend to the situation in which a member of the disciplinary board
or others in his law firm were or are adversary counsel on cases
in which the respondent was or is involved.'58
In any event, the fifth and fourteenth amendments do re-
quire a fair and impartial tribunal as an essential element of due
process,' and respondent's counsel should not hesitate to assert
this right when he has reason to doubt its existence in disciplinary
matters.
G. The Presumption of Innocence
As might be expected from the uncertainty about the nature
of disciplinary proceedings, there is no uniform policy governing
the application of the presumption of innocence. Although it has
155. See cases in note 77 supra.
156. H. CECIL, THE ENGLISH JUDGE, 98 (1972).
157. Snyder's Case, 301 Pa. 276, 152 A. 33 (1930).
158. In re Heirich, 10 Ill. 2d 357, 140 N.E.2d 825, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 805 (1957).
159. E.g., Hasty v. Crouse, 308 F. Supp. 590 (D. Kan. 1968); United States v. Valen-
tine, 288 F. Supp. 957 (D. Puerto Rico 1968).
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sometimes been said the respondent enjoys such a presumption,1 60
it has also been held that unless the respondent explains his
allegedly improper conduct adequately he will be presumed un-
able to do so. ' It is generally assumed, if not explicitly provided,
that the burden of proof is on bar counsel."' Because of the seri-
ous consequences of disbarment coupled with the likelihood of
malicious accusations by disgruntled clients, it seems reasonable
that the respondent should be presumed innocent at least until
such time as a prima facie case is made against him and, that the
presumption is part of what the Ruffalo court contemplated as
part of the criminal nature of a disciplinary proceeding." 3
In reinstatement proceedings, however, it is uniformly held
that the lawyer has the burden of showing a restored good moral
character."4
H. The Burden of Proof
The burden of proof to justify discipline is described as var-
iously as the nature of the proceeding: a "fair preponderance,"'65
a "clear undoubted preponderance,"' 66 a "higher degree of proof'
than a preponderance,' 7 "such proof as clearly and satisfactorily
establishes guilt," '  "clear and convincing" evidence,' proof to
a "reasonable certainty,"'' 0 evidence that is "clear and free from
doubt,"' "cogent and compelling" evidence,"' and a "strong and
160. Dodd v. Board of Comm'rs, 350 So. 2d 700 (Ala. 1977); Nebraska State Bar Ass'n
v. Fisher, 170 Neb. 483,103 N.W.2d 325 (1960); In re Reily, 75 Okla. 192,183 P. 728 (1919).
See generally Annot., 7 A.L.R. 93 (1920).
161. Colorado Bar Ass'n v. Webster, 28 Colo. 223, 64 P. 207 (1901); In re Shufer, 12
A.D.2d 208, 209 N.Y.S.2d 545 (1961).
162. E.g., In re Duncan, 541 S.W.2d 564 (Mo. 1976); In re Sears, 71 N.J. 175, 364 A.2d
777 (1976); In re Rook, 276 Or. 695, 556 P.2d 1351 (1976).
163. Cf. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that charges against juveniles
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (recognizing
other constitutional rights in juvenile delinquency proceedings).
164. In re Dawson, 131 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 1961); In re Stump, 272 Ky. 593, 114 S.W.2d
1094 (1938); In re Trombley, 398 Mich. 377, 247 N.W.2d 873 (1976); Nebraska State Bar
Ass'n v. Butterfield, 172 Neb. 645, 111 N.W.2d 543 (1961).
165. In re Mayberry, 295 Mass. 155, 167, 3 N.E.2d 248, 258 (1936).
166. In re Hertz, 139 Minn. 504, 511, 166 N.W. 397, 400 (1918); In re Sherin, 27 S.D.
232, 130 N.W. 761, 762 (1911).
167. Copren v. State Bar, 64 Nev. 364, 183 P.2d 833, 840 (1947).
168. San Francisco Bar Ass'n v. Sullivan, 185 Cal. 621, 624, 198 P. 7, 8 (1921).
169. In re Otterness, 181 Minn. 254, 255, 232 N.W. 318, 319 (1930).
170. In re Reily, 75 Okla. 192, 194, 183 P. 728, 730 (1919).
171. Miller v. Harvey, 41111. 277, 278 (1866). Note that the Miller court required such
proof of motive as well as misconduct.
172. In re Peterson, 260 Minn. 339, 345, 110 N.W.2d 9, 13 (1961).
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convincing" showing.7 3 Here, as with the presumption of inno-
cence, the Ruffalo court's characterization of the process as crimi-
nal would justify, indeed require, proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. But, the courts have shown no willingness to apply that
standard. Realistically, the following description by the Minne-
sota court is probably as good as can presently be expected, but
the respondent should be entitled to no less:
While it is not necessary to establish a charge against an
attorney at law which will result in his disbarment beyond a
reasonable doubt, yet such a charge is so grave, and the conse-
quences of a conviction so serious, that something more than a
preponderance of the evidence-the rule in civil actions-is re-
quired. The rule in such a case is that, to justify a conviction,
the evidence must be full, clear and convincing. 7 '
I. The Right to Review: Collateral Challenges; Appeal by
Complainant
Since there is no federal constitutional right to appeal even
a criminal conviction, 7 5 we cannot expect to find such a right to
review of disciplinary sanctions. 17 It appears, however, that all
American jurisdictions provide by statute or rule for judicial re-
view of disbarment and discipline;'77 so, there is no immediate
need to find constitutional assurance. The difficulty is not so
much the lack of review, but the intramural nature of it-each
court is the ultimate authority over admission and removal of
lawyers to practice before it.17
Lawyers disbarred or refused readmittance by state courts
may obtain review of constitutional defects in the proceedings
collaterally in federal court, 7' at least when the respondent's con-
173. In re Palarine, 220 Minn. 257, 273, 19 N.W.2d 439, 446 (1945).
174. State Bd. of Examiners v. Dodge, 93 Minn. 160, 171-72, 100 N.W. 684, 689
(1904).
175. See, e.g., Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962); Cobbledick v. United
States, 309 U.S. 323 (1940).
176. Javits v. Stevens, 382 F. Supp. 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
177. See Disbarment, supra note 81, at 67. Frequently the highest court's function is
not so much to review discipline imposed as to impose discipline on the basis of the
recommendation of the primary or lower disciplinary body.
178. In several jurisdictions the court's review is de novo, which at least gives the
respondent the right to argue the merits without presumptions against him. See, e.g.,
Committee on Professional Ethics v. Roberts, 246 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 1976); Office Discipli-
nary Counsel v. Walker, 469 Pa. 432, 366 A.2d 563 (1976).
179. E.g., Javits v. Stevens, 382 F. Supp. 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Jones v. Hulse, 267
F. Supp. 37 (E.D. Mo. 1967). Federal intervention may be sought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976) (federal equitable intervention rights by state action); see 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)
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stitutional claims were not fully and fairly litigated in the state
proceedings. 80
But relief is rare, and the increasing reluctance of federal
courts to intervene even on constitutional questions litigated in
state criminal cases does not make the outlook for federal reme-
dies promising. 8'
About half of the states permit review to be sought by either
the respondent or the disciplinary authority. 8 2 In Minnesota a
recent provision allows a complainant who is dissatisfied with the
disciplinary result to take his complaint to the attorney general,
who may then petition to reopen the proceeding for further or
different discipline.' 3 Clearly this practice, if frequently em-
ployed, could cause a great deal of mischief for disciplinary
boards and respondents alike and is not to be encouraged; since
it is doubtless at odds with the notion of exclusive judicial control
of the bar, no court needs either to adopt or acquiesce in such a
procedure.
J. The Outlook
The prevailing uncertainty about the very nature and pur-
poses of disciplinary proceedings permits no clear conclusion con-
cerning the all-important rights and procedures available. Courts
will frequently be caught saying unhelpfully, and injudiciously,
(1976) for jurisdiction. Due process is denied when the evidence does not rationally sup-
port the disciplinary action. E.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); Schware
v. Board of Law Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957). See also Peterson v. Sheran, No. 5-76
Civ. 73 (D. Minn., filed Feb. 13, 1978) (an opinion by Judge Miles Lord recognizing the
propriety or relief under § 1983).
180. E.g., Goodrich v. Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota, 511 F.2d 316 (8th
Cir. 1975).
181. Cf. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (indicating that the federal courts need
not consider even constitutional claims of criminal defendants who had fair hearings in
the state courts).
182. Disbarment, supra note 81, at 66-67 (indicating tht 20 states permit the prosecu-
tion to appeal, though a substantial number of jurisdictions specifically exclude this
procedure).
183. MINN. R. ON LAWYERS' PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILrrY 6(c). The rule also requires
notice to the complainant of this right, and although the procedure apparently has not
yet been used in Minnesota, it could be a source of considerable grief for respondents,
disciplinary bodies, and the attorney general if litigious clients begin to exploit it. The
rule was first enacted as statute that doubtless was an unconstitutional invasion of the
judiciary's exclusive domain, (see, e.g., Sharwood v. Hatfield, 296 Minn. 416, 210 N.W.2d
275 (1973), and the discussion in Part I(C) of this article), but that defect was cured by
the Minnesota Supreme Court's adoption of the rule, supposedly as a gesture of comity
to the legislature.
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that "technicalities" need not be observed, '84 that there is no
"fixed formula" for resolution of these matters,18 5 that each case
must be treated on its own facts,'86 and, of course, that perennial
resort for the rationalization of fuzzy thinking and inconsis-
tency-that disciplinary proceedings are sui generis.57
There is no need for this Micawberism, nor any justification
for the supercilious disregard of Ruffalo's relatively clear and
comparatively workable description of a quasi-criminal process.
Given the acknowledged importance of discipline to the profes-
sion, its individual members, and the public, and considering
the ostensible and potential unfairness of the self-regulating func-
tion, it is not unreasonable to expect doubts to be resolved in
favor of long-established rights, privileges, immunities and proce-
dures: the presumption of innocence, the rights to trial by jury,
to counsel, and to confrontation. If only these rights were ac-
corded, neither the bench, the bar, the public, the profession's
harshest critics, nor the individual respondent could persuasively
complain that cases were not being fully and fairly litigated-at
least as fully and fairly as we have yet learned to do.
Meanwhile, to return to the mundane reality, respondent's
counsel must struggle as best he can in a constitutional wonder-
land where a petty criminal is vouchsafed the full panoply of
constitutional protections, where the state and federal courts and
juries can be mobilized to resolve a few dollars in dispute, but
where a colleague threatened with ruin looks in vain for similar
facilities. We turn now to consideration of some of the more pract-
ical aspects of working in this system.
V. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF TYPICAL DISCIPLINARY BODIES AND
PROCEDURES
A. The Disciplinary Authorities
In virtually all jurisdictions the courts have pronounced the
judiciary as the ultimate authority of lawyer discipline.' 8 The
184. E.g., In re Rook, 276 Or. 695, 705, 556 P.2d 1351, 1357 (1976).
185. E.g., Spindell v. State Bar, 13 Cal. 3d 253, 530 P.2d 168, 118 Cal. Rptr. 280
(1975).
186. E.g., In re Smith, 67 Cal. 2d 460, 432 P.2d 231, 62 Cal. Rptr. 615 (1967); In re
Harrington, 367 A.2d 161 (Vt. 1976), (where the court noted that since each case is unique
there is not much precedential value in disciplinary decisions).
187. E.g., In re Alonzo, 223 So. 2d 585 (Ala. 1969); McComb v. Committee on Judicial
Performance, 19 Cal. 3d 1, 564 P.2d 1, 138 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1977).
188. See notes 32-36 and accompanying text supra.
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Clark Committee supported this doctrine,"9 and the only percep-
tible departures from it are cases in which the courts defer to the
legislature as a matter of comity."' Thus, the jurisdiction's high-
est court ordinarily makes and enforces both ethical standards
and disciplinary rules and is the ultimate resort for their con-
struction.'9' Disciplinary authorities in states with integrated bars
may enjoy more independence of the judiciary, but it has been
suggested this leaves an adverse impression upon the public, who
may see self-regulation as the action of an "elite" and self-
protective group in these circumstances.'92
Great diversity is found among the states concerning whether
disciplinary agencies and staff are appointed by the courts or the
bar association, whether they are part-time or full-time, whether
they are paid or volunteer, whether nonlawyers are represented,
and, of course, whether a sufficient number of lawyers and sup-
port personnel are on the disciplinary staff. 9' At the time of the
Clark Report, the disciplinary bodies in nearly all jurisdictions
were found to be badly understaffed both in legal and investiga-
tive personnel, and funding was often grossly inadequate for
effective enforcement.' 94 Present experience seems to indicate
that a salaried, full-time staff of professional lawyers and investi-
gators tends to assure a desirable independence from undue pres-
sures of the bench, the bar, and the public; and that a mixture
of lawyers and nonlawyers on a voluntary disciplinary board at
the adjudicative stage tends to promote both fairness and the
appearance of fairness to both the bar and the public."-' The
189. CLARK REPORT, supra note 1, at 10.
190. Courts will strike down statutes that are found incompatible with the inherently
judicial function of lawyer regulation, e.g., Wallace v. Wallace, 225 Ga. 102, 166 S.E.2d
718, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 939 (1969); Sharood v. Hatfield, 296 Minn. 416, 424-26, 210
N.W.2d 275, 280-81 (1973). In the absence of such a conflict courts will sometimes accept
statutory provisions as a matter of comity and deference to a coordinate branch of govern-
ment. E.g., State v. Cannon, 196 Wis. 534, 221 N.W. 603 (1928). See generally Note, The
Inherent Power of the Judiciary to Regulate the Practice of Law-A Proposed Delineation,
60 MINN. L. REv. 783 (1976).
191. See Disbarment, supra note 81, at 31 n.218, for citation of all states' disciplinary
rules. The same article also provides comparative tables of the elements of the process in
the states. Id. at 38-39, 44-45, 52-53, 62-63, 68-69. This section of the present article is
drawn primarily from these tables.
192. See generally D. McKEAN, THE INTEGRATED BAR (1963). See also Lathrop v.
Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961) (holding that a state may constitutionally condition the
right to practice law on membership in an integrated bar).
193. Disbarment, supra note 81, at 38-39; Steele & Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients and
Professional Regulation, 1976 AM. B. RESEARCH J. 919, 924.
194. CLARK REPORT, supra note 1, at 19-20, 48-49.
195. See generally Steely & Nimmer, supra note 193, at 921-35.
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Clark Committee found that since many disciplinary complaints
are against sole practitioners and members of small firms, the
frequent presence of only lawyers from large and prestigious firms
on disciplinary boards should be balanced with representatives of
small firms and solo lawyers.9 6 This will tend both to assure
understanding consideration of the problems of the small lawyer
and to remove the appearance of a self-appointed elite sitting in
judgment of inferiors.
Jerold Auerbach's recent and excellent study, Unequal
Justice,'97 persuasively demonstrates the longstanding and quite
inflexible class structure within the American bar. Although he
is more concerned with social conscience and performance of the
bar than with ethical rules and disciplinary procedures, all per-
sons who are concerned with the disciplinary process should read
the book since it challenges some of the most rudimentary as-
sumptions made of the system. In the early nineteenth century
Alexis de Tocqueville saw the entire bar as an American elite:
In America there are no nobles or literary men, and the
people is apt to mistrust the wealthy; lawyers consequently form
the highest political class, and the most cultivated circle of
society .... If I were asked where I place the American aristoc-
racy, I should reply without hesitation, that it is not composed
of the rich, who are united together by no common tie, but that
it occupies the judicial bench and bar.'9
Auerbach, in turn, sees an elite within this elite:
The maldistribution of professional power makes it neces-
sary to focus on bar leaders, who have exerted enormous influ-
ence within the profession and, as spokesman to the public,
outside it. At elite levels the bar . . . has not been heteroge-
neous in its composition or purpose. It has represented identifia-
ble interests and values which have guided the pursuit of certain
objectives at the expense of others."9
In an even more recent study, Jethro Lieberman addresses
more directly the effect of this elitism upon questions of ethics
and harshly concludes that the present system should be rejected
altogether."'0 Lieberman's diatribe is provocative and offers a
196. CLARK REPORT, supra note 1, at 46.
197. J. AUERBACH, note 13 supra.
198. 2 A. DEToCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY i AMERICA 109-10 (3d ed. Reeve Trans. 1838),
cited in Steele & Nimmer, supra note 193, at 927 n.16.
199. J. AUERBACH, supra note 13, at 9-10.
200. J. LIEBERMAN, supra note 55, at 213.
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perspective so different from that which informs the vast majority
of judicial opinions on ethical questions that it, too, is recom-
mended reading, especially for respondent's counsel. Of course,
ordinarily it will not make good tactical sense for the respondent
to attack the disciplinary authorities as supercilious prigs given
to rodomontade, which most of them actually are not. But it is
important for respondent's counsel to be aware of the nature of
the creators -and enforcers of ethical rules so that he can present
the respondent's plight in terms that are comprehensible and
sympathetic. A partner in a large law firm, or any nonlawyer,
perhaps will not be able to appreciate the problems of a sole
practitioner who for financial reasons has taken on rather more
work than he can handle speedily, whose presence is demanded
in two or three courts at once, and who has no staff of partners,
eager associates, clerks, paralegal personnel, or others to whom
he may delegate tasks. Yet many lawyers face these difficulties
with regularity, and sole practitioners and small law firms should
not be made to suffer merely because of their size. 21 1 In an age of
rampant growth and pedantic specialization we should encourage
individualism in a profession that, in its adversary aspects at
least pits contestants one on one and requires absolute independ-
ence of action and judgment.
B. Disciplinary Procedures
All states, all federal district courts and courts of appeals and
the United States Supreme Court have their own disciplinary
rules; none appear to be identical to any of the others. 212 It is not
feasible, therefore, to discuss the disciplinary system. Most have
enough elements in common, however, so that some general ob-
servations may safely be made.
Procedures in virtually all jurisdictions may be broken into
three phases: (1) the investigative and complaint (or accusatory)
phase, (2) the hearing or trial phase, and (3) the review or appeal
phase."3 A majority of states requires complaints to be in writing,
201. See M. MAYER, THE LAWYERS 13-26, 57-70 (1967), for an interesting discussion
of the difficulties of becoming established in the practice of law.
202. Disbarment, supra note 81, at 44-45, 52-53, 62-63, 68-69.
203. The SUGGESTED GUEDELNES, note 47 supra, which many states follow, actually
envisioned a four-stage procedure consisting of investigation, hearing, administrative re-
view, and judicial review. It appears, however, that the system is best if broken into three
categories. Many further sub-stages, of course, can be discerned. These would consist of
the following: (1) Complaint by aggrieved party to local ethics committee, (2) assignment
of the complaint to a member for investigation, (3) notification of respondent, (4) response
1979]
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some require the complaint be either signed or verified, and a few
will accept telephoned complaints." 4 Most disciplinary bodies
provide assistance or forms, or both, to complainants. All but a
handful notify the complainant of the action taken, but few make
the complainant a party or give a copy of the respondent's reply
to the complaint.2"' The disciplinary machinery may be activated
by a complaint from an aggrieved client,"0 6 from another lawyer, 20
from the disciplinary body itself,218 or from the court.29
Receipt of the complaint is followed by investigation, during
which evidence is collected under oath or otherwise. In most
states the proceeding remains confidential at the investigative
stage, and in almost all states the respondent is given the right
to be heard.2 10 The closest parallel to the investigative and accu-
satory process is the grand jury investigation .2 1  The United
States Supreme Court has approved this analogy 2 2 over the
from respondent, (5) hearing before member, panel, or full local committee, (6) reference
to state or other higher disciplinary body, (7) formal complaint, (8) formal answer, (9)
private hearing before disciplinary body, (10) recommendation of discipline to state's
highest court, (11) reference to referee or judicial officer for public hearing, (12) hearing,
(13) report and recommendation of referee or judicial officer to the court, (14) review (on
the record or de novo) before the court, (15) judgment of the court imposing discipline,
(16) further proceedings by request of complainant,(17) challenge to result by respondent
in federal court or by certiorari in U.S. Supreme Court. All of these stages, for example,
are available under Minnesota procedure, though in few cases are all stages employed.
MINN. R. ON LAWYERS' PROFESSIONAL RESPONSMILrrY 1-23.
204. Disbarment, supra note 81, at 44-45. The Clark Report strongly disapproved the
requirement of verification because the drafters believed that potential complaints would
be intimidated and that their "fears and doubts" about liability for errors in the complaint
would dissuade them from proceeding. CLARK REPORT, supra note 1, at 72. Two states,
Alabama and South Dakota, require complainants to post a bond and pay costs if disci-
pline is not imposed. See Disbarment, supra note 81, at 47.
205. Disbarment, supra note 81, at 44-45.
206. E.g., State v. Peck, 88 Conn. 447, 91 A. 274 (1914).
207. E.g., Fairfield County Bar v. Taylor, 60 Conn. 11, 22 A. 441 (1891).
208. E.g., Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Fleck, 172 Ohio St. 467, 178 N.E.2d 782, cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 861 (1961), rehearing denied, 370 U.S. 914 (1962); MINN. R. ON LAWYERS'
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILmY 8(b) (enabling disciplinary counsel "[a]t any time, with or
without a complaint" to "make such investigation as he deems appropriate as to the
conduct of any lawyer or lawyers").
209. E.g., Lenihan v. Commonwealth, 165 Ky. 93, 176 S.W. 948 (1915).
210. About half the states have time limits ranging from two days to four weeks
between receipt of the complaint and initiation of the investigation, from twenty days to
a year between complaint and completion of the investigation, and from twenty days to a
year between complaint and referral for further action. Most states make subpoena avail-
able at this stage, and witnesses testify under oath subject to penalty for perjury.
Disbarment, supra note 81, at 52-53.
211. People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 497, 162 N.E. 487, 492 (1928).
212. Anonymous Nos. 6 & 7 v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287 (1959).
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objections of four justices who saw a danger of return of the grand
jury.
213
At the hearing or trial phase there is also much diversity on
whether one or two hearing stages are available, 24 whether rules
of procedure 215 or evidence are enforced, 26 and whether ex parte
proceedings or defaults are permitted. 217 A majority of the states
follow the rules of civil procedure and provide for confidentiality
at the hearing stage. 218 In all states the initial burden of proof is
on the disciplinary body,219 but as previously noted there is no
uniform definition of the degree of proof required. 22 In many
jurisdictions, once discipline has been recommended or imposed
the burden is upon the respondent to show that it is erroneous or
unlawful at the review stage.
221
Nine jurisdictions permit amendment of the charges after
commencement of the hearing, 22 despite the Supreme Court's
condemnation of this practice in Ruffalo. 23 The hearing board or
referee in about two-thirds of the states can impose discipline,
such as a reprimand or warning, but the respondent can request
213. Id. at 299 (Black, J., dissenting).
214. Slightly less than half the states have two hearing stages, and about as many
have one. The others provide another hearing as an option. Disbarment, supra note 81,
at 62-63.
215. In twenty-eight states rules of civil procedure apply. Half a dozen states apply
rules of "equity" or "chancery". Id.
216. Nineteen states specifically allow otherwise inadmissible evidence to be received
in disciplinary matters. Id. See, e.g., Berke v. Chattanooga Bar Ass'n, 58 Tenn. App. 636,
436 S.W.2d 296 (1968) (noting inter alia that where the disciplinary charge is based on a
prior lawsuit the full record of that proceeding is admissible). But cf. Paradiso v. Board
of Comm'rs of Ala. State Bar, 225 So. 2d 855 (Ala. 1969) (holding depositions admissible);
State Bar of Mich. v. Pillon, 383 Mich. 735, 179 N.W.2d 20 (1970) (upholding rejection of
evidence of similar actions by other lawyers); In re Moyer, 77 N.M. 253, 421 P.2d 781
(1966) (holding polygraph test inadmisible).
217. Disbarment, supra note 81, at 62-63.
218. Id. In Minnesota, for example, the hearing before the disciplinary body is confi-
dential. If, however, that body directs the filing of a disciplinary petition in the supreme
court, the petition and all further proceedings become public. See MINN. R. ON LAWYERS'
PROFESSIONAL RESPoNSIILITY 20.
219. E.g., Smith v. Board of Comm'rs of Ala. State Bar, 284 Ala. 420, 225 So. 2d 829
(1969); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Brown, 291 So. 2d 385 (La. 1976); In re Feltman, 51
N.J. 27, 237 A.2d 4733 (1968).
220. See notes 165-74 and accompanying text supra.
221. E.g., Taylor v. State Bar, 11 Cal. 3d 424, 521 P.2d 470, 113 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1974);
In re Wright, 131 Vt. 473, 310 A.2d 1 (1973) (holding that once a prima facie case is
established the burden shifts to the respondent).
222. Disbarment, supra note 81 at 62-63, 65-66.
223. See note 96 supra. The charges against Mr. Ruffalo were amended to include
conduct that was revealed by his own testimony given in defense of other charges that
were not proved.
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further review if the disposition is not acceptable; 24 otherwise the
disposition is left to the state's highest court.
Almost all states provide for judicial review of the discipli-
nary action and a smaller number also allow administrative re-
view of the proceedings.2 Somewhat less than half the states
permit both sides to appeal the disciplinary board's decision.22 In
Minnesota, at least, a complainant dissatisfied with the sanction
ultimately imposed may reactivate the proceedings through ap-
plication to the Attorney General.22 As noted earlier, collateral
review in federal court may be available to respondents who be-
lieve their constitutional rights have been infringed.
28
C. The Ideal Structure and a Word on Confidentiality and
Anonymity
If a "typical" and desirable disciplinary structure is hypoth-
esized from the disparate provisions of the states, it would proba-
bly consist of (1) an independent full-time legal and investigative
staff, (2) a provision for informal and unverified initial com-
plaints,29 (3) a confidential and informal investigation at which
the respondent has the right to be heard, (4) a right to specific
notice of the formal charges, (5) an adversary hearing, before a
board composed of lawyers from diverse practices and a cross-
section of nonlawyers, at which the rules of procedure and evi-
dence apply but not strictly or pendantically,2ss (6) and a de novo
judicial review of the entire proceeding.
224. Disbarment, supra note 81, at 66. In Minnesota a lawyer given a warning by the
Director of the Lawyers Board of Professional Responsibility may, if he wishes, demand
that the charges be presented to a panel of the Board. MINN. R. ON LAWYERS' PROFEsSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY 8(c) (2)(ii).
225. Disbarment, supra note 81, at 68-69.
226. Id.
227. MINN. R. ON LAWYERS' PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 6(c). This provision began
as a statute that the Minnesota Supreme Court accepted as a matter of comity. MINN.
STAT. § 481.15(3) (1977); see note 183 and accompanying text supra.
228. See cases cited in notes 179-81 supra.
229. Many would also suggest immunity for complainants, despite the serious ques-
tions of fairness and public desirability that are raised by absolute immunity. E.g., Stone
v. Rosen, 348 So. 2d 387 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) ("absolute" privilege); Sinnett v.
Albert, 188 Neb. 176, 195 N.W.2d 506 (1972) (immunity from libel action); Taft v. Ket-
chum, 18 N.J. 280, 113 A.2d 671 (1955) (complainants are immune from malicious prose-
cution action).
230. The best view is that all rules of criminal procedure and evidence should apply
in view of the seriousness of the action and the suspect nature of the combined functions
of the disciplinary body. Though In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968) seems to require this,
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Two provisions that would be important for fairness to res-
pondents should be added. First, the adversary hearing and all
procedure prior to the hearing should be confidential to protect
respondents from the devastation of unproved accusations, with
public judicial review available at respondent's request.2 3' Sec-
ond, disciplinary proceedings should be captioned anonymously,
such as by number, to save respondents the perpetual ignominy
of having their names forever imbedded in the law reports, a
continuing disgrace visited upon no other profession, not even
upon criminal convicts who do not appeal. 2 The legitimate inter-
est in having the public informed of the respondent's proved
transgressions and the effectiveness of self-regulation will be sat-
isfied by making the review proceeding and the disciplinary
board's records of final discipline public; no legitimate further
interest is served by having the respondent's name attached to a
reported opinion since the precedential value of the opinion in no
way depends upon this.
Anonymity in the reports would also doubtless remove an
appreciable factor deterring lawyers from voluntarily disclosing
and cooperating in the investigation of their own problems. This
is especially true in cases of alcoholism. An important obstacle
to the recognition and resolution of this tragic problem would be
removed by adopting the anonymity principle of alcoholics Anon-
ymous. Minnesota' has adopted an excellent rule designed to
cover such situations. The rule provides for a stay of all proceed-
ings at the stage of confidentiality for a specified period with the
possibility of dismissal upon a showing of compliance with rea-
sonable conditions.
23
It is important that disciplinary authorities and procedures
not only be fair, but also that they convey an impression of fair-
ness to the bar. This would ensure a minimum of adversariness
231. But cf. Sadler v. Oregon State Bar, 275 Or. 279, 550 P.2d 1218 (1976) (applying
public records law to allow inspection of disciplinary records).
232. Interestingly, in Minnesota, as in most jurisdictions, lawyers' names are used in
the captions of disciplinary proceedings, but disciplinary actions against judges are styled
by number. MINN. R. OF BOARD ON JUDICIAL STANDARDS E(1). See In re Nordstrom, 264
N.W.2d 629 (Minn. 1978) for an example of an opinion that could well have omitted the
respondent's name.
233. MIr. R. ON LAWYERS' PROFESSIONAL REsPONsIIIrr 9(d). The rule does not refer
to alcoholism or any other condition as prerequisite to application of the stay and thus is
flexible enough to cover diverse situations. In Minnesota there is also an independent
organization called Lawyers Concerned for Lawyers, which assists troubled lawyers in
coming to terms with problems such as alcoholism.
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and would encourage cooperation of respondents by alleviating
their legitimate fears of the disastrous consequences of public
discipline.
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Factors in the Disciplinary Equation
Just as procedures and rights are uncertain and flexible in
disciplinary actions, the necessity for, and degrees of, discipline
are not usually prescribed with any definition. With a few excep-
tions in a few jurisdictions 4 it can be said that (1) no particular
form of misconduct requires any particular form of discipline,25
and that (2) there are no absolute defenses to or ways to be certain
of avoiding discipline for any kind of misconduct.236 Therefore,
dispositions of disciplinary complaints are virtually as various as
the fact giving rise to them. Enormous and largely uncontrolled
discretion suffuses the entire process. The uncertainty is frustrat-
ing and perilous to the extent that it precludes accurate predic-
tion of consequences, but it is also advantageous in that it may
enable the respondent to achieve better results by an intelligent
and conscientious defense tailored precisely to the facts of the
case.
Because of the lack of prescribed sanctions, discussion of
specific defenses to, or dispositions of, particular forms of miscon-
duct is impossible. Identification can be made, however, of the
forms of discipline ordinarily available, the categories of conduct
usually giving rise to them, and the considerations that may occa-
sionally dictate, and more often aggravate or mitigate, the disci-
plinary measures imposed. The task of respondent's counsel, of
course, is first to exonerate the accused lawyer of the charges. If
this is not possible, however, counsel should strive to obtain the
least damaging form of discipline consistent with the evidence. 17
234. E.g., the provision for mandatory disbarment in New York for conviction of a
felony. N.Y. Jun. LAw § 90(4) (presently codified in McKinney 1968), discussed in Barash
v. Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, 20 N.Y. 2d 154, 228 N.E.2d 896, 281 N.Y.S.2d
997 (1967) (application for reinstatement after reversal of felony conviction).
235. E.g., In re Dedman, 17 Cal. 3d 229, 550 P.2d 1040, 130 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1976)
(since there are no rigid standards on the appropriate penalty to be imposed, similar
offenses may receive different degrees of punishment); Spindell v. State Bar, 13 Cal. 3d
253, 530 P.2d 168, 118 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1974) (there is no "fixed formula" in disciplinary
matters); In re Member of the Bar, 226 A.2d 705 (Del. 1967) (notes the "great latitude"
available to the court).
236. Even statutes of limitations specifically enacted to limit disbarment actions
have been held ineffective because the legislature has no power in the inherently judicial
area of lawyer discipline. E.g., In re Tracy, 197 Minn. 35, 266 N.W. 88 (1936). In most
jurisdictions even resignation is not a reliable avenue to avoid discipline for it will not be
automatically accepted. E.g., State ex rel. Florida Bar v. Englander, 118 So. 2d 625 (Fla.
1960). Former President Nixon's attempt to resign was rejected apparently because of his
failure to admit wrongdoing. See In re Nixon, 53 A.D. 850, 385 N.Y.S.2d 373 (1978).
237. Compare the general principle that exercises of the contempt power will be
limited to "the least possible power adequate to the end proposed." Anderson v. Dunn,
1979]
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The burden of proof and the processes by which it may be
enforced have been discussed previously. Since factual determi-
nations are made in disciplinary proceedings, as they are in other
forms of litigation, by the presentation, impeachment, and ex-
planation of relevant evidence, there is no need to review familiar
principles of evidence, cross-examination, and order of proof.
Remembering that rules of procedure and evidence tend not
to be strictly enforced in disciplinary proceedings, the following
analysis assumes that counsel understands the application of
these rules in his particular jurisdiction. The balance of this arti-
cle will be concerned with a variety of factors that individually
and in various combinations bear upon the evaluation of proved
misconduct or incapacity, and the determination of what, if any,
disciplinary or corrective measures should be imposed.
I. WORKING WITH THE STATED PURPOSES OF LAWYER DISCIPLINE
The purposes most often said to justify disciplinary proceed-
ings have been touched upon in broad terms earlier in this article.
Before the specific forms, bases, and criteria of discipline are
discussed, however, it may be useful to enumerate the interests
involved while considering the appropriateness of possible dispo-
sitions in given cases.
A. Protection of the Public
Protection of the public is the most generally recognized pur-
pose of discipline; a lawyer who is physically, mentally, or mor-
ally unfit to handle clients' affairs honestly and competently
must either be removed from the bar or have his deficiency cor-
rected. The Supreme Court has stated:
The power of disbarment is necessary for the protection of the
public in order to strip a man of the implied representation by
courts that a man who is allowed to hold himself out to practice
before them is in "good standing" to do so.2a
Note the focus even here upon. appearance. The concern is with
removing the bar's imprimatur from the errant lawyer, rather
than merely to remove the lawyer from the position where he can
deal as such with the public.
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821), cited in Crammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399, 404
(1955).
238. Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278 (1957).
[Vol. 30
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B. Protection of the Bar and the Administration of Justice
To the extent this purpose goes beyond protecting the public
and particular clients of the respondent, this concern may include
the rights of adversary parties and counsel, of judges and court
personnel, and the functioning of the judicial process in all re-
spects."9 It is difficult to quarrel with this proposition because it
is so broad and seems so salutary. It is well to remember, how-
ever, that other remedies are ordinarily available for misdeeds in
this area: contempt for disrespect toward or disobedience of a
court,"' criminal prosecution for obstruction of justice,241 and a
malpractice action for damage to a client."' Thus the disciplinary
authority should be reminded that its action is not the exclusive
protection against such abuses and should indeed be invoked only
when other remedies are unavilable or inadequate. Note, too, that
protective concerns are naturally prospective, that is, neither the
public, the bar, nor the administration of justice can be spared
what has already occurred. Thus if it is shown that the respon-
dent is not likely to repeat the misconduct there is no need to
protect anyone from him. Here again, of course, the concern with
appearance is likely to creep in.
C. The Appearance of Propriety
Appearance is often invoked as a reason for discipline. Espe-
cially when the misconduct was not related to legal business or
did not result in actual injury, appearance is often the unstated
primary concern. Although, as previously noted, mere appear-
ance is an invalid concern in such proceedings, in truth the bench
and bar are extremely self-conscious about their image and it
would be a serious mistake for respondent's counsel to ignore or
239. E.g., In re Streater, 262 Minn. 538, 543, 115 N.W.2d 729, 733 (1962) ("The
purpose of disciplining an attorney is not to punish him, but to guard the administration
of justice and to protect the courts, the profession, and the public").
240. E.g., United v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964). The law of contempt is itself
complex and inconsistent and cannot be reviewed here. Note that it has been held that
the judiciary's inherent power to punish for contempt and to impose discipline are not
coextensive. Duke v. Committee on Grievances, 82 F.2d 870 (D.C. Cir. 1936). See also
Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399, 403-04 (1955) (an attorney is not an "officer of
the court" for purposes of contempt legislation); In re Mixson, 258 S.C. 408, 189 S.E.2d
12 (1972) (civil contempt does not per se require disciplinary action).
241. Obstruction of justice may include crimes as diverse as bribery, perjury, embra-
cery, tampering with witnesses, interference with law enforcement officers or judicial
personnel, and concealment or destruction of evidence. See generally R. PERKINs, CRINNAL
LAW 494-500 (1969).
242. See generally R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRACicE (1977).
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underestimate this concern. Though a convicted murderer, for
example, might be the best and most honest of advocates, most
courts would find him unfit not because of any inability to prac-
tice law, but because such a serious conviction is thought to be
incompatible with the pervasive high standards to which it is
thought lawyers should aspire.243 Constantly lurking just off-stage
in disciplinary proceedings is a sententious voice asking: What
will the public think?
In a revealing passage the Maryland court spoke as follows
in arriving at its decision to disbar former Vice President Agnew:
A court has the duty, since attorneys are its officers, to
insist upon the maintenance of the integrity of the bar and to
prevent the transgressions of an individual lawyer from bringing
its image into disrepute. Disciplinary procedures have been es-
tablished for this purpose, not for punishment, but rather as a
catharsis for the profession and a prophylactic for the public. "
The rather medical diction is curious. "Catharsis" is a discharge
of pent-up emotions, strictly speaking, of destructive or socially
unacceptable emotions, through exposure to emotion-stimulating
psychotherapy, works of art, or other events.2As And the primary
definition of "prophylactic" is protection from disease. 246 This is
evidence of a tendency to see unethical lawyers as aberrant be-
cause of some unspecified but impliedly contagious disease of
body or mind and to see the benefits of removal in terms of
excision and purgation, as if the bar breathes a collective sigh of
relief when the malignancy is removed, the infected member
amputated.
This approach should not be scorned. It is perhaps a healthy
one, particularly if in each case it leads to exploration for the least
radical cure and encourages retention of the healed or healing.
D. Protection and Reparation of the Respondent's Clients and
Others
The disciplinary process usually begins with the complaint
of an injured client. Two of its most immediate goals are to pre-
vent any further damage to that client, or other present clients,
243. E.g., In re Thompson, 296 Minn. 466, 209 N.W.2d 412 (1973) (murder); In re
LaDuca, 62 N.J. 133, 299 A.2d 405 (1973) (extortion).
244. Maryland State Bar v. Agnew, 271 Md. 543, 318 A.2d 811, 814 (1974) (emphasis
added).
245, RM;DOM HousE DICnONAiY OF THE ENGLISH LAGUAGE 233 (unabridged ed. 1973).
246. Id. at 1153.
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and to repay any losses or remedy any injuries already suffered
by clients.247 If nonclients, such as creditors, have been wronged,
their satisfaction may also be more or less directly involved. Ac-
cordingly, counsel should determine what damage, financial or
otherwise, has been done and establish a plan to repay; and any
available immediate steps to prevent further or continuing injury
should of course be taken. It must be remembered, however, that
reparation, restitution, or satisfaction of the complainant is not
in itself a defense,248 and a client's approval of misconduct is not
a bar to discipline.
249
E. The Deterrence of Future Misconduct by Respondent and
Others
Beyond the facts of the individual case, the disciplinary pro-
cess has an eye to the future conduct of the respondent or others
facing similar situations .2  Each case thus has potentially an
exemplary and precedential effect. Particularly when the alleged
misconduct is ambiguous, the ethical implications unsettled, or
similar offenses have traditionally not been punished, respon-
dent's counsel should strive for a prospective ruling, avoiding
sanctions to respondent, but warning and guiding him and others
for the future.21 Such a prospective ruling will, if promulgated to
the bar, have the same deterrent effect whatever discipline is
imposed on the immediate respondent, and this will avoid the
two-fold unfairness of (1) punishing a lawyer for conduct not
previously punished, and (2) punishing a lawyer in part for the
uncommitted future transgressions of others.
F. The Rights and Welfare of the Respondent
Whether we call the license to practice law a right or privi-
lege, he who acquires it has undergone a lengthy and expensive
education, has probably invested most of his resources in it, and
247. See, e.g., In re Makowski, 73 N.J. 265, 374 A.2d 458 (1977).
248. E.g., Smiley v. Board of Comm'rs of Ala. State Bar, 286 Ala. 742, 238 So. 2d
716 (1970) (restitution under pressure no defense); In re Campbell, 108 Ariz. 200, 495 P.2d
131 (1972) (complainant's satisfaction no defense).
249. In re Thompson, 30 Ill. 2d 506, 198 N.E.2d 337 (1963).
250. E.g., In re Bunker, 297 Minn. 47, 199 N.W.2d 628 (1972) (where the court placed
respondent on probation, but declared that any future failure of lawyers to file tax returns
will lead to suspension or disbarment); In re Makowski, 73 N.J. 265, 374 A.2d 458 (1977)
(prevention of reoccurrences noted as one of the ultimate objectives of disciplinary mea-
sures).
251. E.g., In re Bunker, 297 Minn. 47, 199 N.W.2d 628 (1972).
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probably depends entirely upon it for his livelihood and the sup-
port of his family. It should not therefore be readily curtailed or
taken from him. 2s Particularly since most courts disavow the
criminal label or analogy in the disciplinary process, it should be
viewed as a remedial rather than punitive undertaking. In all but
the most egregious cases the likelihood that the respondent can
continue or resume the practice of law, consistent with the other
interests involved, should be given central importance,253 particu-
larly in an age when the courts and commentators show, quite
rightly, such great concern for the rehabilitation, as opposed to
the punishment, of even criminal defendants. 211 Over a century
ago, the Supreme Court observed:
Admission as an attorney is not obtained without years of labor
and study. The office which the party thus acquires is one of
value, .... To deprive one of an office of this character would
often be to decree poverty to himself and destitution to his fam-
ily. A removal from the bar should therefore never be decreed
where any punishment less severe-such as reprimand, tempo-
rary suspension, or fine-would accomplish the end desired.,'
Removing him will doubtless have a satisfying cathartic effect
and will reinforce the belief that lawyers are capable of cleaning
their own house, but it will also visit disastrous consequences not
only on the respondent, but his family, friends, associates, and
creditors.
G. Fairness and the Appearance of Fairness to the Bar
For self-regulation to be effective the bar must participate
and cooperate in it.25I Yet, lawyers should not live, or have to live,
in fear of an avenging and malevolent supervisory force. If indi-
vidual respondents or the bar in general fear, despise, or distrust
252. See Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 516 (1967) ("The threat of disbarment and
loss of professional standing, professional reputation, and of livelihood" are recognized as
"powerful forms of compulsion").
253. In re Reed, 207 La. 1011, 22 So. 2d 552 (1945).
254. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, SENTENCING ALTER-
NATIVES AND PROCEDURES (Approved Draft 1968); PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENcEs (Approved Draft 1968).
255. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (1 Wall.)'335, 355 (1870).
256. Both EC 1-4 and DR 1-103 require lawyers to disclose unprivileged knowledge
or evidence of ethical violations; see Report of the Special Committee on Disciplinary
Procedures, 80 A.B.A. REP. 463, 470 (1955) ("It is the obligation of the organized Bar and
the individual lawyer to give unstinted cooperation and assistance . with respect to
discipline and in purging the profession of the unworthy").
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the disciplinary authority, the necessary cooperation will fail and
some lawyers at least will inescapably become craven, dissem-
bling, or subversive. The adversary process involved in most legal
endeavors not only permits but requires advocacy of extreme pos-
itions, and the disciplinary process should never be permitted to
be abused or to chill proper zeal.27 Despite the lofty duties and
privileges of lawyers, they should not be held to a superhuman
or homogeneous standard of performance. The profession is not
served by excessive accusation of its members. Each disciplinary
action may demonstrate the bar's ability to police itself, but it
also declares the failure of one of its members.
H. Punishment
As noted, most courts disavow any penal purpose in disci-
pline despite the language of the Ruffalo decision calling it a
"punishment or penalty." 25s It is difficult, however, to read a
decision such as that in the Agnew case without detecting a mood
of outright retribution, and indeed the "catharsis" of which that
court speaks presupposes the infliction of a penalty or tragedy
upon another. It would be wrong to advocate the use of discipline
deliberately to impose pains or penalties, but at the same time
there is an unhealthy hypocrisy in the disavowal of a penal inten-
tion when the penal effect of the sanction is obvious. This is
especially distasteful when it is used to justify denial of proce-
dural rights to a respondent. The bar should either admit retribu-
tive intentions or withhold discipline when no purpose except
retribution is served by it.
II. THE FORMS OF DISCIPLINARY DIsPOSITIONS
Although imposition of discipline is chronologically the last
stage in the proceedings, it is important for respondent and his
counsel to know from the outset what disposition can be realisti-
cally sought and expected. Therefore, it may be helpful to set
forth and describe briefly the kinds of dispositions ordinarily
available, so that the purposes and criteria of discipline may
thereafter be discussed with an awareness of their tendency to
257. E.g., In re Wehrman, 327 S.W.2d 743, 744 (Ky. 1959) (discipline must not be
used as an avenue to personal; religious, or political reprisal); M. F tMAN, supra note
64, at vii (where the author notes that disciplinary measures were undertaken against him
for merely giving a speech advocating zeal in difficult positions on behalf of criminal
clients).
258. See note 97 supra and accompanying text.
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justify or exclude a given disposition. Keep in mind that different
jurisdictions provide for different forms of disposition and that
the following are compiled from various sources.
1. Acquittal or Dismissal.-A charge not proved, of course,
should be dismissed, or the respondent acquitted. 259 As in a civil
or criminal lawsuit, a failure of proof is not necessarily the same
as exoneration, and since even a dismissed charge will remain on
file, counsel should, when possible, attempt to have the record
show that the charge itself was unfounded or untrue so that it will
carry little or no weight in any later disciplinary proceedings.2""
2. Private warning.-A warning usually implies that res-
pondent did not knowingly engage in misconduct, but was care-
less or insensitive to his ethical obligations, or came dangerously
close to, or gave the appearance of, violating a disciplinary rule,
perhaps in ambiguous circumstances.28 ' The warning has no im-
mediate consequences, but in its nature will weigh rather heavily
against the respondent if he is later charged with a similar viola-
tion since it serves as clear notice of the rule in question.2"' It
follows that a private warning usually issues only on the first
offense; and it would be sensible and fair to expect that all first
offenses not involving moral turpitude should result only in pri-
vate warnings.
3. Public warning.-A warning made public will have an
adverse impact upon the respondent's practice to the extent it is
disseminated to present or potential clients, adverse counsel, and
judges. From the disciplinary agency's point of view, a public
disposition has the virtue of notifying the public both of an action
against a specific lawyer and of the existence and functioning of
259. E.g., In re Heirich, 10 Ill. 2d 357, 140 N.E.2d 825, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 805
(1957); In re Rerat, 232 Minn. 1, 44 N.W.2d 273 (1950).
260. In most jurisdictions previous proceedings may be considered even though no
discipline resulted. E.g., MiNN. R. ON LAWYERS' PROFESSIONAL REsPONSISLrIY 19(b);
(1) Conduct previously considered. Proceedings under these rules may be
based upon conduct considered in previous lawyer disciplinary proceedings of
any jurisdiction, even if it was determined in the previous proceedings that
discipline was not warranted or that the proceedings should be discontinued
after the lawyer's compliance with conditions.
261. In Minnesota private warnings can be given either by the district ethics com-
mittee or by the Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board; thereafter the filing of a
petition in the Supreme Court makes the proceeding public. See MiN. R. ON LAWYERS'
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 7(b)(2), 9(e)(2), 12(a).
262. E.g., In re McCallum, 391 Ill. 400, 64 N.E.2d 310 (1946) (continued soliciting
after previous censure resulted in disbarment); In re Moller, 248 A.D. 877, 290 N.Y.S. 257
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the agency itself. Against this must be balanced the potentially
serious impact upon the not-very-culpable respondent.
4. Private Reprimand.-A reprimand or censure implies a
finding of actual but not very serious misconduct, ordinarily a
lapse of judgment or a mishandling of a legal matter with little
or no injury, and no dishonesty or deceit. Although it is a more
severe disposition, a private reprimand may do less actual dam-
age to the respondent's practice than a public warning and may
be a desirable and negotiable result.
5. Public reprimand. -A reprimand made public, of course,
is more serious than any of the foregoing, but it still will have no
direct effect upon the respondent's ability to continue practicing.
6. Probation.-A respondent may be placed on probation
either publicly or privately, depending upon the jurisdiction and
the problems involved. Warnings and reprimands are in effect
forms of probation since they imply relatively more severe mea-
sures in the event of recurrence, 6 ' but formal probation usually
carries additional conditions for violation of which the respondent
will be suspended or disbarred. The conditions can be as diverse
as the imaginations of counsel and the disciplinary board and can
be tailored to fit the situation. Some common examples consist
of the following:
(a) Treatment for physical or mental illness or chemical
dependency." 4 This may include in-patient treatment and a
follow-up program such as Alcoholics Anonymous."5 A number of
courts have decided not to disbar lawyers pending rehabilitation
from mental illnesses. 266 But other courts have expressed the fear
that too ready a recognition of personality disorders as a defense
might lead to abuse of the notion.267
(b) Supervision of the respondent's practice by another
lawyer, who may report periodically upon respondent's handling
of his problems, such as bookkeeping and calendar procedures,
263. Note 262 supra.
264. E.g., In re Christ, 258 Or. 88,.481 P.2d 74 (1971) (probation was imposed on
condition that the accused continue his course of psychiatric treatment).
265. Cf. In re Constantine, 249 Minn. 599, 81 N.W.2d 711 (1957); In re Rice, 241
Minn. 386, 63 N.W.2d 41 (1954). Both cases concerned disbarments, but both opinions
recognized the possibility of readmission upon proof of recovery from alcoholism. See also
In re Neumeister, 180 Minn. 146, 230 N.W. 487 (1930) (suspension rather than disbarment
was ordered upon a felony conviction resulting from the lawyer's alcoholism).
266. E.g., Glenn v. State Bar, 14 Cal. 2d 318, 94 P.2d 43 (1939); In re McDonald, 28
A.D. 1141, 284 N.Y.S.2d 574 (1967). see generally Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d 749 (1964).
267. E.g., State v. Ledvina, 71 Wis. 2d 195, 237 N. W.2d 683 (1976). See generally
Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d 749 (1964).
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office and financial management, drinking, and gambling."' The
respondent's disciplinary counsel should not act as probation
supervision because of the obvious potential conflicts of interest.
(c) Assistance of other lawyers if the respondent has either
too heavy a workload or is involved in cases he lacks the training
or experience to handle.26 This, like supervision, is often desira-
ble since a large percentage of disciplinary complaints are against
sole practitioners or members of small firms who lack support
personnel or back-up lawyers.
(d). Restitution of any amounts owing in taxes, or to credi-
tors or clients. 0 Very often disciplinary matters involve financial
disputes or respondents who have financial problems. Whether
the charge is misappropriation of clients' funds, inability to sat-
isfy judgments, or failure to pay taxes, a program of repayment
must be worked out. Unrealistic commitments should not be
made in the heat of disciplinary actions, however. The respon-
dent's own needs and those of his family must be built into the
restitution program; an over-taking of his financial resources will
only lead to new difficulties.
(e) Education, when respondent has shown incompetence
in a given field of practice or ignorance of his ethical responsibili-
ties . 1 With the trend toward proliferation of programs of volun-
tary or mandatory continuing legal education, 2 it is often quite
possible and desirable to require respondents to renew or sharpen
deficient skills through attendance at seminars.
(f) Volunteer work, in providing legal services to the disad-
vantaged, for example, might be considered. This has the two-
fold advantage of penalizing the respondent but not at the same
time wasting or dulling his legal abilities. It may also give the
268. Cf. Bradpiece v. State Bar, 10 Cal. 3d 742, 518 P.2d 337, 111 Cal. Rptr. 905
(1974) (consideration given to the establishment of orderly office procedures and supervi-
sion of the respondent by other members of the firm in morifying the sanction imposed).
269. DR 6-101(A)(1) provides that a lawyer should not handle a matter he is not
competent to handle "without associating with him a lawyer who is competent to handle
it." See generally Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d 823 (1964).
270. E.g., In re Lothrop, 257 A.D. 297, 13 N.Y.S.2d 206 (1939).
271. E.g., Segretti v. State Bar, 15 Cal. 3d 878, 544 P.2d 929, 126 Cal. Rptr. 793
(1976). The California Supreme Court said that in the future all lawyers suspended or
placed on probation would be required to pass California's recently implemented Profes-
sional Responsibility Examination.
272. Heindenreich, Questions and Answers Concerning Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education, 32 BENCH & B. MINN. 11 (1974); Parker, Periodic Recertification of Lawyers:
A Comparative Study of Programs for Maintaining Professional Competence, 54 MICH. ST.
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respondent a new awareness of his obligations to the public and
serve the public both in fact and in appearance.
(g) Other conditions of probation may be designed to meet
specific cases. Since no precise conditions or dispositions are pre-
scribed in most jurisdictions, counsel can be quite creative in this
area, working with bar counsel to design a disposition accommo-
dating all of the interests involved in disciplinary actions.
7. Suspension.-A lawyer will be suspended when it ap-
pears he is incapable physically or mentally of serving his clients
properly, or when his misconduct is so serious that, though dis-
barment is not required, a relatively severe penalty seems neces-
sary. This usually means the respondent may not practice law or
hold himself out as practicing at all during the period of suspen-
Sion. His name might have to be removed from the office door and
stationery. He is for all practical purposes not a licensed lawyer
during suspension.7 3 The length of the suspension may vary
greatly and be either specifically set forth or indefinite. Rein-
statement may be either automatic at the expiration of a set
period or upon fulfillment of specific conditions, or may require
application by the respondent and place upon him a burden of
showing his renewed fitness to practice.
2 4
Some jurisdictions commonly impose periods of suspension,
but stay the execution of the suspending order. and place the
respondent on probation with the understanding that violation of
the conditions of probation will result more or less automatically
in activation of the period of suspension2 5 A period of actual
suspension is often followed by probation for an additional time.
8. Disbarment. -Removal from the roll of licensed attor-
neys is, of course, the most severe form of discipline, and is im-
posed when the welfare of clients and the integrity of the profes-
sion are inconsistent with the respondent's continued presence. It
usually results only from very serious misconduct involving moral
turpitude,26 and a rather heavy burden is on a disbarred lawyer
273. A suspended or disbarred lawyer, of course, not being a member of the bar, is
subject to proceedings for unauthorized practice of law if he continues to practice.
274. E.g., In re Christianson, 253 N.W.2d 410 (N.D. 1977).
275. E.g., Segretti v. State Bar, 15 Cal. 3d 544 P.2d, 929, 126 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1976).
Segretti, the dirty tricks specialist of the 1972 Nixon campaign, was suspended for five
years. The execution of the suspension was stayed, however, and he was placed on proba-
tion for five years. The conditions of probation included two years of actual suspension
and the passing of the ethics examination mentioned in note 271 supra before returning
to practice at the end of the two year period.
276. As has been noted, disbarment should be imposed only in extreme cases and as
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to show his fitness upon application for readmission.277 Except in
jurisdictions where felony convictions require disbarment, there
are-no specific prerequisites to the extreme sanction, nor does any
offense per se preclude eventual readmission.
9. Resignation. -Most jurisdictions have provisions allow-
ing for the discretionary acceptance of the resignation of an ac-
cused lawyer, but ordinarily there is no right to resign to avoid
discipline."' Acceptance of a resignation while charges are pend-
ing usually requires admission of the wrongdoing in question,7
and it has been held that resignation while charges are pending
is "tantamount" to admission. 20
10. Retirement. -For most practical purposes retirement is
the equivalent of resignation, except that its connotations are
somewhat less favorable. The latter suggests the giving up or
yielding of office under pressure, while retirement more often
suggests a voluntary withdrawal. The availability of retirement
will, of course, depend upon the rules of the particular jurisdic-
tion.
11. Reinstatement. -As mentioned before, reinstatement
will often turn upon either compliance with conditions of proba-
tion or suspension, or a showing of rehabilitation.2sI The burdens
of going forward and persuasion are upon the lawyer in reinstate-
ment proceedings, and the burden has been said to be a heavy
one. 22 In the very interesting decision ordering Alger Hiss rein-
stated,23 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, reviewing
the questions involved in reinstatement situations, made two
very significant departures from what seems to have been prevail-
a last resort. See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872); In re Reed, 207 La. 1011,
22 So. 2d 552 (1945) (the least severe form of discipline appropriate should be imposed).
277. E.g., In re Christianson, 253 N.W.2d 410 (N.D. 1977).
278. E.g., Peterson v. State Bar, 21 Cal. 2d 866, 136 P.2d 561 (1943); State ex rel.
Florida Bar v. Englander, 118 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1960); In re Wrabek, 113 P.2d 526 (Wash.
1941). See Disbarment supra note 81, at 67-71.
279. Former President Nixon's attempt to resign from the New York Bar was rejected
for failure to contain an admission of culpability. In re Nixon, 53 A.D.2d 850, 385 N.Y.S.2d
373 (1978). See Note, 26 Mo. L. REV. 90 (1961) for a general discussion of rules governing
resignation.
280. Ferer v. State Bar Ass'n, 53 A.D.2d 39, 386 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1976). The CLARK
REPoRT, note 1 supra, recognized the danger that permitting resignation may improperly
facilitate later admission, and prescribed a procedure to ensure against this. Id. at 102-
03, 105. \
281. In re Christianson, 253 N.W.2d 410 (N.D. 1977).
282. In re Hiss, 368 Mass. 447, 333 N.E.2d 428 (1975); In re Trombley, 398 Mich. 377,
247 N.W.2d 873 (1976).
283. In re Hiss, 368 Mass. 447, 333 N.E.2d 428 (1975).
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ing law before that decision. First, rejecting the argument that a
perjury conviction was so serious a matter that it should per se
forever bar readmission, the court said:
[W]e cannot now say that any offense is so grave that a dis-
barred attorney is automatically precluded from attempting to
demonstrate through ample and adequate proofs, drawn from
conduct and social interactions, that he has achieved a "present
fitness" . . . [citation omitted] to serve as an attorney and has
led a sufficiently exemplary life to inspire public confidence
once again, in spite of his previous actions.m
Second, the court also rejected the argument that one dis-
barred for conviction of a crime cannot be readmitted without a
showing of "repentance," which requires an admission of guilt.
The court stated:
Though we deem prior judgments dispositive of all factual
issues and deny attorneys subject to disciplinary proceedings
the right to relitigate issues of guilt, we recognize that a con-
victed person may on sincere reasoning believe himself to be
innocent...
Simple fairness and fundamental justice demand that the
person who believes he is innocent though convicted should not
be required to confess guilt to a criminal act he honestly believes
he did not commit. For him, a rule requiring admission of guilty
and repentance creates a cruel quandary: he may stand mute
and lose his opportunity; or he may cast aside his hard-retained
scruples and, paradoxically, commit what he regards as perjury
to prove his worthiness to practice law ....
Honest men would suffer permanent disbarment under such a
rule. Others, less sure of their moral positions, would be tempted
to commit perjury by admitting to a nonexistent offense (or to
an offense they believe is nonexistent) to secure reinstatement.
So regarded, this rule, intended to maintain the integrity of the
bar, would encourage corruption in these latter petitioners for
reinstatement and, again paradoxically, might permit reinstate-
ment of those least fit to serve.2
The result of a position such as the court took in Hiss is that
reinstatement turns not upon the basis for the disbarment, but
284. Id. at 452, 333 N.E.2d at 433 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The court
reviews the various authorities holding that disbarment for certain offenses is or is not
necessarily permanent. Id. at 452-53 n.9, 333 N.E.2d at 433.
285. Id. at 457-59, 333 N.E.2d at 436-37.
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upon the applicant's present fitness to practice law. It is an opin-
ion to be studied, and applauded, for its accurate focus upon the
truly legitimate concerns of lawyer discipline, its unself-righteous
recognition of the fallibility of the system, and its resistence to
the temptation of catering to the mere appearance of the bar.
12. Interim Suspension.-In some jurisdictions a lawyer
under disciplinary charges may be suspended from practice pend-
ing the result of the proceedings when he appears to pose a threat
to clients or the public if allowed to continue practicing.20 It has
been held, however, that an immediate, ex parte suspension, even
upon conviction of a serious felony, violates the due process
clause.2e?
13. Removal from Judicial Office.-Some collateral ques-
tions beyond the scope of this article include (1) the jurisdiction
of a lawyers' disciplinary body to impose sanctions upon a sitting
judge, and (2) the effect of disbarment upon a lawyer's right to
hold judicial office.2es Since most jurisdictions require judges to
be "learned in the law" and disbarred lawyers have been held not
to be,2 ' the practical effect of disbarment is to disqualify the
respondent from present or future judicial office.211 Many difficult
and interesting questions remain unanswered in this area.29 '
14. Summary.-The sanctions set out above are the most
286. See MN. R. ON LAWYEr' PROFEssioNAL RasPoNsiBmnLY 16 (which permits in-
terim suspension when it "appears" that the respondent's continued practice "may result
in risk of injury to the public").
287. E.g., Florida Bar v. Fussell, 179 So. 2d 852 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965), affl'd, 189
So. 2d 881 (Fla. 1966); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Ehmig, 277 So. 2d 137 (La. 1973).
288. E.g., In re Gillard, 260 N.W.2d 562 (Minn. 1977). In Gillard the Lawyers Profes-
sional Responsibility Board instituted proceedings against a sitting judge for conduct that
occurred prior to his appointment to the bench. The trial court stayed the proceedings
and referred the matter to the Board on Judicial Standards because disbarment would
result in removal from office without an adequate opportunity for the defendant to be
heard on the question of his fitness to remain a judge.
289. Peterson v. Knutson, 305 Minn. 53, 233 N.W.2d 716 (1975); State v. Mofort, 93
Wash. 4, 159 P. 889 (1916); State v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 1, 209 N.W. 693 (1926).
290. In re Candidacy of Daly, 294 Minn. 351, 200 N.W.2d 913, cert. denied sub nom.,
Daly v. McCarthy, 409 U.S. 1041 (1972).
291. The inter-relationship between disbarment, judicial misconduct, and qualifica-
tions for judicial office are complex and not well settled. E.g., In re Holland, 377 Ill. 346,
36 N.E.2d 543 (1941) (disciplinary proceedings against a judge for misconduct while in
practice affected only his status as a lawyer); In re Troy, 306 N.E.2d 203 (Mass. 1973)
(disbarment resulted from a judge's removal from the bench); In re Williams, 113 S.W.2d
353 (Mo. 1938), opinion quashed sub nom., State ex rel. Clark v. Shain, 343 Mo. 542, 122
S.W.2d'882 (1938), conformed on remand, 233 Mo. App. 1174, 128 S.W.2d 1098 (1939)
(disbarment proceedings were brought against a lawyer for prior misconduct while a
judge); Weston v. Board of Governors, 177 Okla. 467, 61 P.2d 228 (1936) (concerning a
lawyer's present fitness to practice based on his acts while a judge).
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common disciplinary dispositions, but it must be reemphasized
that rarely is any specific sanction required for any given form of
conduct. Respondent's counsel should estimate as early and as
accurately as possible what disposition will best serve the com-
peting interests of aggrieved clients, potential future clients, the
bar, the public, and the respondent, and tailor his approach to
the case with a view to demonstrating the justification and desir-
ability of the most lenient result consistent with those interests.
IH. MATTERS OF AGGRAVATION, MITIGATION, AND DEFENSE
A. Of Principle and Pragmatism
The relatively unstructured nature of the machinery for law-
yer discipline invites application of myriad considerations in ar-
riving at the proper disposition. Some of these have been touched
upon above, but it may be helpful now to enumerate the most
common factors that respondent's counsel should recognize and
evaluate as he prepares the strategy and tactics of his response
to the disciplinary charges. Often several of these factors will be
involved in a single case, and counsel should be alert to notice the
possible interplay between them.
For respondent's counsel the goal is always to achieve the
disposition least damaging to the respondent. Sometimes that
can be done by acquittal or vindication, but more often it is
accomplished by negotiating or arguing for a compromise that
satisfies numerous and diverse interests. Because lawyers tend to
be intelligent, strong willed, independent minded, and proud, it
may be difficult for the respondent to accept that he must make
concessions or admissions. But without doubt one of counsel's
most important and valuable services is to make an informed
prediction of a reasonably probable range of results and explain
to the respondent the reasons why the focus from the outset
should be upon a tolerable compromise rather than upon under-
taking a fiercely adversary and recalcitrant approach. The vague,
all-encompassing, and often conflicting dictates of ethical con-
sideration; the uncertainty of procedural rights; the relative infor-
mality of disciplinary proceedings, especially at the all-important
early stages; the great variety of available dispositions; and the
numerous and intricately interrelated collateral considerations
involved-all of these must be perceived and evaluated by coun-
sel, and explained to the respondent, before an intelligent ap-
proach to the case can be formulated. But the approach must be
formulated, and this must be done as early as possible. It is very
1979]
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often of great importance to the respondent to resolve the matter
short of a public, adversarial hearing, which, as is so often true
of the plaintiff in a defamation action, is likely to damage him
substantially even if he emerges ultimately victorious. 92
Of course, this should not be interpreted as encouraging sur-
render of principles or convictions to mere expediency or extor-
tion. Some cases are groundless and simply must be fought at
every step. But most disciplinary complaints have some sub-
stance, even if founded on nothing firmer than a client's misun-
derstanding or a harried lawyer's failure to hold conscientiously
enough the hand of an unreasonably demanding client. Resent it
though he may, the respondent must understand that he is on
trial not solely as an individual lawyer for an individual deed of
what is often at worst an ambiguous texture, but as a representa-
tive of the profession itself. By virtue of his very membership in
that profession, he is held to a higher standard of conduct than
laymen"3 and is in some danger of being sacrificed by his col-
leagues at the altar of appearance.
This does not necessarily make any more philosophical sense
or coincide any more closely with absolute standards of justice,
than to treat a criminal defendant more, or less, leniently because
he represents a race that has suffered, or sinned, more than an-
other. It is as much sheer presumptuousness as anything that
leads the bar to treat its members as a privileged elite 94 and,
therefore, to make them answerable for foibles that would go
unnoticed, or at least unpunished, in others, even in other more
or less lofty professions. It does not necessarily make sense, but
it is a fact of the lawyer's life. A respondent needs and hires legal
counsel, not a philosopher, and while thoughtfulness and even a
touch of righteous indignation will not necessarily disserve the
lawyer's lawyer, he needs a more than normal share of pragma-
tism seasoned with a dash of deference and pinch of diffidence to
be effective.
If we leave aside the complaints that are so baseless or trivial
that no discipline can follow, and those that are so grave that
anything but disbarment is unthinkable, we find that in the great
292. Although any defamation action takes its toll on the plaintiff, the story of Alger
Hiss provides a particularly vivid example. Having sued Whitaker Chambers of a libel,
he himself was later indicted and convicted of perjury, jailed, and disbarred. A. WEIN-
STEIN, PERJURY (1978).
293. E.g., In re Tracy, 197 Minn. 35, 266 N.W.88 (1936).
294. See AUERBACH, note 13 supra; J. LIEBERMAN, note 55 supra.
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majority of cases in which counsel can assist a respondent the
task is to understand the various interests involved-the victim's,
the complainant's, the bar's, the public's, the respondent's-and
to sponsor a disposition acceptable to all though perhaps not
perfectly satisfactory to any.
In the following section it is assumed that the alleged mis-
conduct is admitted or can certainly be proved. This is not to
suggest that charges cannot be defended on the merits, as of
course they often can and should be. But defense on the facts, on
the question of guilt or innocence, is essentially the same as in
other proceedings, and there is no point in attempting to add to
the voluminous literature on how to litigate factual issues
whether in civil, criminal, or administrative proceedings.
B. The Character of the Misconduct or Other Grounds for
Discipline
Since there are usually no specifically prescribed sanctions
for any given form of misconduct, disposition will turn upon the
relative importance of a variety of considerations, the most com-
mon and important of which are set out below. Note, however,
that different jurisdictions may give different weights to similar
factors, and even the same jurisdiction may change approaches
at different times. Moreover, significant and generally applicable
changes in ethical criteria occur from time to time, of late most
notably in the area of advertising and solicitation. 295 Stare decisis
is said to play a relatively unimportant role in discipline,2"6 but
nevertheless some uniformity in dispositions is desirable,2  and
respondent's counsel should be familiar with the spectrum of
sanctions imposed for any given violation.
1. Violations of the Code.-Most disciplinary cases involve
violation of some provision of the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility as adopted or otherwise recognized in the jurisdiction in
question. The Code is generally said not to be the equivalent of a
criminal code, the provisions of which must be construed in favor
of lenity."'5 The problems endountered in the application of the
295. See cases cited and discussed in note 55 supra.
296. E.g., In re Harrington, 134 Vt. 549, 367 A.2d 161 (1976).
297. E.g., In re Andros, 64 Ill. 2d 419, 356 N.E.2d 513 (1976).
298. This is consistent with the refusal to characterize the disciplinary proceeding as
criminal. Some courts, however, have held that disbarment statutes are "penal" and,
therefore, must be strictly construed. Thomas v. State ex reL. Stepney, 58 Ala. 365, 368
(1877); Wayland v. City of Chicago, 369 Ill. 43, 47, 15 N.E.2d 516, 518 (1938); In re Baluss,
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present Code of Professional Responsibility have been discussed
earlier in this article."' Basically those problems involve conflict-
ing dictates of different provisions of the Code. Certain provisions
of the Code are so vague and broad that virtually any foible may
be construed to fall within their proscriptions."' Yet, most exam-
ples of misconduct will fit more or less reasonably under one of
the Canons or Disciplinary Rules that can be assumed to have
given reasonable notice to the respondent of what is expected of
him.3"' Even a clear violation of the Code, however, does not tell
one much about the appropriate sanction, and, as has been noted,
the Code itself contains no sanctions. But the Code is explicitly
designed "as a basis of a disciplinary action when the conduct of
a lawyer falls below the required minimum standards stated in
the Disciplinary Rules."3 Once a violation of the Code is found,
other factors are used to determine the appropriate disciplinary
measure, if any, to be imposed.
2. Conduct Violating Criminal Statutes.-It is clearly not
a prerequisite to discipline that the respondent have violated a
criminal law or have been convicted of a crime.0 3 Conversely, a
criminal conviction, whether misdemeanor or felony, will not,
with some exceptions, result automatically in disbarment or dis-
cipline,"0 4 although cases are probably few in which some form of
discipline does not result from felony convictions.0 5 Neither ac-
quittal of a criminal charge,"' the running of the statute of limita-
28 Mich. 507, 508 (1874); In re Donegan, 282 N.Y. 285, 282, 26 N.E.2d 260, 263 (1940); In
re Chappell, 12 Ohio Op. 499, 502, 33 N.E.2d 393, 397 (1938).
299. See notes 50-73 and accompanying text supra.
300. E.g., DR 1-102, discussed in note 53 and accompanying text supra.
301. E.g., In re Daly, 291 Minn. 488, 490-91, 189 N.W.2d 176, 179 (1971).
302. ABA CODE, Preliminary Statement.
303. E.g., Williford v. State, 56 Ga. App. 840, 847, 194 S.E. 384, 388 (1937); In re
Alochuler, 388 Ill. 492, 502, 58 N.E.2d 563, 567 (1945); In re Needham, 364 Ill. 65, 70, 4
N.E.2d 19, 21 (1936); State Bar of Mich. v. Hartford, 282 Mich. 124, 128, 275 N.W. 791,
792 (1937).
304. E.g., Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278 (1957) (disbarment from state court
does not automatically result in disbarment from federal courts); In re Neumeister, 180
Minn. 146, 230 N.W. 487 (1930) (embezzlement conviction resulted in 18 months suspen-
sion, but not disbarment).
305. No reported decisions have been found in which discipline of some kind was not
imposed after a final felony conviction.
306. E.g., Zitny v. State Bar, 64 Cal. 2d 787, 415 P.2d 521, 51 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1966);
Iowa State Bar Ass'n v. Kraschel, 260 Iowa 187, 148 N.W.2d 621 (1967); Ohio State Bar
Ass'n v. Weaver, 40 Ohio St. 2d 97, 322 N.E.2d 665 (1975). But ef. KeeWong v. State Bar,
15 Cal. 3d 528, 542 P.2d 642, 125 Cal. Rptr. 482 (1975) (noting that the disciplinary body
will give serious consideration to the fact of acquittal).
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tions, °7 grant of immunity from prosecution," 8 or a pardon or
commutation3"' forecloses disciplinary action based upon the
underlying conduct.
Most jurisdictions consider a final criminal conviction as
conclusive evidence for disciplinary purposes of the occurrence of
the conduct in question. 10 The respondent may not retry the issue
of guilt, but ordinarily may introduce evidence in mitigation or
explanation of the offense.1 Also, for disciplinary purposes, a
plea of nolo contendere is generally treated as a guilty plea and
the resulting disposition as a conviction.1
If the disciplinary charges involve criminal conduct for which
the respondent has not been prosecuted, counsel must make an
informed decision whether the respondent should run the risk
that his reply to the charges will incriminate him or whether he
should invoke his privilege against self-incrimination. As pre-
viously noted, imposition of discipline may not be based solely
upon assertion of the privilege.313 But, the respondent who asserts
that privilege will not be able to argue that his cooperation with
the disciplinary authorities should mitigate the discipline.
A conviction for either a felony or a misdemeanor may be
ground for discipline, though some jurisdictions require that a
misdemeanor conviction involve moral turpitude. 314
Of course, if a proved crime involves moral turpitude, disbar-
307. E.g., Schmid v. Stae, 121 Ga. App. 700, 175 S.E.2d 87 (1970); In re Sarbone, 63
N.J. 94, 304 A.2d 734 (1973).
308. E.g., In re Schwarz, 51 Ill. 2d 334, 382 N.E.2d 689 (1972).
309. E.g., In re Beck, 246 Ind. 141, 342 N.E.2d 611 (1976); In re Prisock, 244 Miss.
417, 143 So. 2d 434 (1962). See also Branch v. State, 120 Fla. 666, 162 So. 48 (1935)
(holding tht a disbarred lawyer is not automatically readmitted upon being pardoned);
Annot., 59 A.L.R.3d 466, 469 (1974).
310. E.g., In re Alkow, 64 Cal. 2d 838, 415 P.2d 800, 51 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1966); In re
Funo, 52 Ill. 2d 307, 288 N.E.2d 9 (1972); In re Carrol, 406 S.W.2d 845 (Ky. 1966); Florida
Bar v. Jenkins, 254 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 1971). Compare In re Sauer, 390 Mich. 449, 213
N.W.2d 102 (1973) (disciplinary action may be taken on a conviction even though the
conviction is on appeal) with In re Ming, 469 F.2d 1352 (7th Cir. 1970) (a conviction is
not final until direct appeals are exhausted).
311. E.g., In re Andros, 64 Ill. 2d 459, 356 N.E.2d 513 (1976); Louisiana State Bar
Ass'n v. Loridans, 338 So. 2d 1338 (La. 1976).
312. E.g., In re Snook, 94 Idaho 904, 499 P.2d 1260 (1972); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n
v. Edwards, 322 So. 2d 123 (La. 1975); Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Agnew, 271 Md. 543,
318 A.2d 811 (1974); In re Queenan, 62 N.J. 579, 287 A.2d 3 (1973).
313. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) (holding that assertion of the privilege in
itself cannot be penalized with discipline).
314. E.g., In re Snook, 94 Idaho 904, 499 P.2d 1260 (1972); Kentucky State Bar Ass'n
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ment or other severe discipline is probable, 315 but definitions and
severity of criminal conduct vary greatly from one jurisdiction to
another.
Counsel should, therefore, examine the criminal conduct in-
volved with a view toward demonstrating why, even if proved, it
does not show the respondent's unfitness to practice law, or at
least not a permanent unfitness.
If a lawyer is to serve a jail or prison term, it will probably
be in his interest to reach a disposition of any disciplinary matter
before execution of the sentence so that any period of disbarment
or suspension will run concurrently with his incarceration, when
he cannot practice law anyway.
3. Conduct Involving.Moral Turpitude.-The courts have
almost universally held that any action involving "moral turpi-
tude" will justify discipline, irrespective of whether the conduct
violates a specific statute or provision of the Code.3 16 Agreenient
is not so widespread, however, on what moral turpitude is, or
what conduct shows it. Respondent's counsel should be prepared
to argue that moral turpitude indicates very serious transgres-
sions indeed, and the label should not lightly be attached to
relatively innocuous acts, even criminal acts. Moral turpitude has
been defined as an act of "baseness, vileness or depravity in the
private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow men, or
to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule
of right and duty between man and man. '31 7 Theft, deceit, and
other forms of dishonesty, especially when they violate a lawyer's
fiduciary duties to a client, are generally found to involve moral
turpitude, even if little or no actual damage occurs.3 1 1 Serious
crimes, even unrelated to the practice of law, without injury to
315. DR 1-102(A)(3) forbids lawyers to engage in "illegal conduct involving moral
turpitude."
316. E.g., Grievance Comm. of Hartford County Bar v. Broder, 112 Conn. 263, 152
A. 292 (1930).
317. In re McNeese, 346 Mo. 425, 142 S.W.2d 33 (1940); Tradue & General Ins. Co.
v. Russell, 99 S.W.2d 1079, 1084 (Tex. Ct. App. 1936); cf. Wallis v. State Bar, 21 Cal. 2d
322, 131 P.2d 531 (1943) (anything contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals).
Cases such as these illustrate the considerable variation in the definitions of moral turpi-
tude. Courts that use a broad and loose standard, like that in the Wallis decision, should
be encouraged to apply a more accurate and fair definition similar to the one set forth in
the text.
318. E.g., Stephens v. State Bar, 19 Cal. 2d 580, 122 P.2d 549 (1942) (recognizing
dishonesty and moral turpitude as separate but equally serious offenses). But cf. In re Doe,
95 F.2d 386 (2d Cir. 1938) (apparently limiting disbarable conduct to such egregious
professional conduct as subornation or perjury, bribery of jurors, forgery, and embezzle-
ment of client funds).
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any client, and- without elements of deceit, are usually found to
demonstrate moral turpitude.319 The condition, however, is not
necessarily a permanent one, and rehabilitation may be shown to
avoid discipline or to support reinstatement. 31 Moreover, it has
been observed that the concept of moral turpitude depends upon
the state of public morals and thus may vary according to the
times.32'
In some situations it may be unavoidable and even produc-
tive to concede moral turpitude at the time of the offense, when
the conduct is so evil that to argue the point would render the
entire defense unworthy of belief and the only goal is to prevent
permanent disbarment by emphasizing contrition and laying the
groundwork for future reinstatement on the grounds of rehabilita-
tion. In practice, the question of moral turpitude becomes most
important in the marginal cases and ambiguous situations-for
example, petty theft, drunk driving, failure to file tax returns
overzealous representation, and commingling of funds without
misappropriation.3 22 Defining the phrase as synonymous with
319. E.g., In re Rothrock, 16 Cal. 2d 449, 106 P.2d 907 (1940). But cf. In re Burch, 73
Ohio App. 97, 54 N.E.2d 803 (1944) (moral turpitude does not necessarily exist merely
because a crime has been committed).
320. E.g., Wetllin v. State Bar of Cal., 24 Cal. 2d 862 151 P.2d 255 (1944) (noting
that the courts are interested in the "regeneration" of disbarred lawyers); In re Smith,
220 Minn. 197, 19 N.W.2d 324 (1945).
321. E.g., In re Hatch, 10 Cal. 2d 147, 73 P.2d 885 (1937). This is a most important
principle of which respondent's counsel to be aware, since it may enable him to avoid
damaging precedent or to avoid discipline that has become acceptable by usage or legisla-
tion.
322. The variety of conduct that courts have found to involve moral turpitude vel non
are so numerous that an exhaustive review is beyond the scope of this article. A selection
of interesting examples follows: Segretti v. State Bar, 15 Cal. 3d 878, 544 P.2d 928, 126
Cal. Rptr. 793 (1976) (deceitful activities on behalf of the reelection of the President of
the United States, two years suspension and probation for three subsequent years); Paine
v. State Bar of Cal., 14 Cal. 2d 150, 93 P.2d 103 (1939) (misleading probate court without
damage, six months suspension); Johnson v. State Bar of Cal., 10 Cal. 2d 212, 73 P.2d
1191 (1937) (contempt, disbarred); In re Hatch, 10 Cal. 2d 147, 73 P.2d 885 (1937) (convic-
tion for authorizing, directing, or aiding the unlawful sale of securities, suspension); Wood
v. State Bar of Cal., 6 Cal. 2d 533, 58 P.2d 1280 (1936) (writing check on account with no
funds, six month suspension); In re Ellis, 371 Ill. 113, 20 N.E.2d 96 (1939) (improper
campaign contributions paid from corporate client's fee to tax official, two year suspen-
sion); In re Maley, 363 1ll. 149, 1 N.E.2d 495 (1936) (intoxication in court, six months
suspension); In re McNeese, 346 Mo. 425, 142 S.W.2d 33 (1940) (sale of opium, disbarred);
In re Faubion, 101 S.W.2d 103 (Mo. App. 1937) (prosecutor's sexual misconduct with
defendant's wife influencing disposition of defendants case, three months suspension); In
re Appel, 260 A.D. 925, 23 N.Y.S.2d 58 (1940) (false statement on marriage license appli-
cation, one year suspension); In re Enright, 160 Or. 313, 85 P.2d 359 (1938) (driving while
intoxicated, six months suspension); In re Pearce, 103 Utah 22, 136 P.2d 969 (1943)
(conspiring to maintain houses of ill fame and gambling, disbarred); State Bd. of Law
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depravity and vileness may avoid attachment of the damaging
label.
If disbarment or lengthy suspension is unavoidable, counsel
may be able to agree upon a stipulated disposition that excludes,
at least, any explicit finding of moral turpitude, even though the
presence or absence of the label will not be controlling at the time
of application for reinstatement.
4. Misconduct Unrelated to the Practice of Law.-
Discipline can be and often is imposed for conduct unrelated to
the practice of law, and it is no defense that the transgression.
was not committed in the respondent's professional capacity23
As previously noted, not only are competency and honesty in
professional activities required of members of the bar, but a "fair
character" generally is expected as well. Despite some occa-
sional exceptions, lawyers have historically thought of themselves
as rather special ornaments of civilization, and the organized bar
has been rather consistently jealous of that image.24 The question
ultimately comes down to the troublesome philosophical one:
Can a bad man be a good lawyer?-or judge? The query seems
largely irrelevant, but too intriguing and persistent to ignore. Can
a bad man be a good surgeon?-or poet? Of course. Some of the
best have been. If we concede that proved dishonesty disqualifies
because of a lawyer's considerable fiduciary power over client's
assets and his ability to taint the administration of justice in
actual cases, and we eliminate proved liars and thieves and
cheats, then it seems the bar ought to go no further, and, with
perhaps a few exceptions, we serve neither the bar nor the public
by eliminating members whose misbehavior is neither profes-
sional nor dishonest. "Moral turpitude" is after all a hopelessly
vague and unmanageable criterion for evaluating fitness. No one
knows what it means-or rather everyone knows what it means
to him, and to everyone it means something different. So we
ought not to disbar for nonprofessional conduct not involving
dishonesty, reserving only extreme exceptions, such as Wall, who
Exam. v. Spriggs, 61 Wyo. 70, 155 P.2d 285 (1945) (writing pamphlet critical of supreme
court, six months suspension).
323. E.g., Supreme Court Comm. on Professional Conduct v. Jones, 286 Ark. 1106,
509 S.W.2d 294 (1974) (per curiam) (wilfully and knowingly attempting to evade payment
of taxes); In re Bogart, 9 Cal. 3d 747, 511 P.2d 1167, 108 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1973) (conduct
committed before lawyer was admitted to the bar); Florida Bar v. Hefty, 213 So. 2d 422
(Fla. 1968) (sexual misconduct with stepdaughter); In re Wilson, 247 Ind. 409, 216 N.E.
2d 555 (1966) (per curiam) (misconduct as city councilman).
324. See generally J. AUERBACH, note 13 supra.
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committed murder all but literally on the courtroom steps.32 We
ought not, but we do and we shall.
This does not mean, however, that it is a matter of indiffer-
ence whether the misconduct was committed in the respondent's
capacity as a lawyer. If it was, it will more directly show his
unfitness to practice law. Conversely, if the act was entirely apart
from the respondent's practice, it will less logically point to the
necessity of his removal from the profession. This is an area in
which respondent's counsel faces a particular challenge; it is im-
portant to place the focus where it should always be-on the
question of whether the respondent will be a capable and honor-
able lawyer, not whether for other reasons he may invite disap-
probation upon himself and, therefore, upon the profession.
32 1
5. Violations of Fiduciary Duties.-As might be expected,
a lawyer's violation of the fiduciary duties he owes to clients will
usually result in relatively severe discipline, even if it is not crimi-
nal or actually damaging.2 It may be as serious as theft of a
client's funds or as minor as delay in handling a matter. Since
breach of a fiduciary duty reflects directly upon the respondent's
fitness to practice law, it is a frequent ground of disbarment or
lengthy suspension. Conflicts of interest might be classified under
this heading since they, by definition, are harmful only as they
defeat or dilute a lawyer's fiduciary duty to the client.328 Here,
too, should be included the charging of exorbitant fees,3 29 since
the lawyer who gouges the client does so by exploiting the client's
relative ignorance of what is proper, when it is the lawyer's very
expertise in such matters for which the client is contracting and
relying upon the lawyer. Commingling, 30 misappropriation of,
325. Sydney J. Harris has said, "Bar associations are notoriously reluctant to disbar
or even suspend a member unless he has murdered a judge downtown at high noon, in
the presence of the entire Committee on Ethical Practices." Quoted in M. BLOOM, THE
'TRouBLE wrrm LAWYERS 157 (1968).
326. The Supreme Court seems to have placed the emphasis on this focus in cases
dealing with admission to practice. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (holding that
otherwise qualified persons cannot be excluded from the profession because they are not
citizens); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (reversing rejection if
a bar applicant on the basis of previous Communist party membership).
327. E.g., In re Greer, 52 Ariz. 385, 81 P.2d 96 (1938); Heavey v. State Bar, 17 Cal.
3d 553, 551 P.2d 1238, 131 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1976).
328. E.g., In re Glover, 176 Minn. 519, 223 N.W. 921 (1929); In re Blatt, 42 N.J. 522,
201 A.2d 715 (1964).
329. E.g., Nebraska State Bar v. Richards, 165 Neb. 80, 84 N.W.2d 136 (1957) (disci-
pline may be imposed for charging excessive fees). DR 2-106 forbids "clearly excessive"
fees and sets forth certain general criteria for making fee determinations.
330. DR 9-102 directs that the identity of client's funds and property shall be pre-
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and failure to pay over client's funds also33' fall into this area and
cover a broad spectrum of discipline depending upon whether the
conduct was merely inadvertent, outright fraudulent, or anything
in between.332
6. Injury to Clients and Others.-A large percentage of the
more serious disciplinary cases involve theft, misappropriation,
commingling, and other mishandling of clients' funds to their
detriment. To these cases we may add instances of neglect or
incompetence that cost the clients all or part of the reasonable
expectations of their lawsuits. Add for good measure those fairly
frequent cases that involve, often only secondarily or tangen-
tially, disgruntled creditors of the respondent, from court report-
ers to grocers, from miscellaneous recipients of rubber checks to
the Internal Revenue Service. Very frequently a money settle-
ment of some sort is involved in the disciplinary case, and from
this flows a congeries of considerations. At the outset, remember
that the absence of actual injury, monetary or otherwise, is in
itself not a defense to discipline.33 Also, repayment of moneys
wrongfully taken,334 even the client's complete satisfication, will
not foreclose disciplinary proceedings. 3= A client cannot control
disciplinary proceedings any more than the victim in criminal
matters can dictate whether there will be a prosecution. Never-
theless, restitution can be a most important factor either in pre-
venting or resolving a charge of unprofessional conduct, and the
matter requires close scrutiny and great care.
Respondent's counsel should be certain to extract from the
client hip full financial picture, because it will probably be to his
advantage to be able to offer full or partial restitution of any
financial losses, whether to clients or others. But two important
served. Dishonest intent need not be shown to justify discipline for commingling. In re
Bloom, 39 IIl. 2d 250, 234 N.E.2d 775 (1968).
331. E.g., In re Braun, 249 A.D. 324, 292 N.Y.S. 376 (1937); In re Forman, 321 Pa.
47, 184 A. 75 (1936). DR 9-102(B)(4) specifically requires prompt delivery to the client of
his funds or other property.
332. Here carelessness or faulty bookkeeping will not excuse such an offense. E.g.,
In re Banner, 31 N.J. 24, 155 A.2d 81 (1959). Nor is good faith per se a defense. Silver v.
State Bar, 13 Cal. 3d 134, 518 1157, 117 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1974).
333. E.g., New York State Bar Ass'n v. Long, 352 N.Y.S. 2d 159 (1974); In re Hen-
drick, 229 A.D. 100, 241 N.Y.S. 50 (1930).
334. E.g., Smiley v. Board of Comm'rs of Ala. State Bar, 286 Ala. 216, 238 So. 2d
716 (1970); Maggart v. State Bar, 7 Cal. 2d 945, 61 P.2d 451 (1937) (reliayment under
pressure entitles respondent to no leniency).
335. E.g., In re Campbell, 108 Ariz. 200, 495 P.2d 131 (1972); Narlian v. State Bar,
21 Cal. 2d 876, 136 P.2d 553 (1943).
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dangers must be remembered. First, neither respondent nor his
counsel should ordinarily make an ex parte approach to a
"victim" who has threatened or made an ethics complaint with
an offer of payment lest this be construed as an improper attempt
to forestall prosecution-in a word, bribery. Still the respondent
does owe the client money, and the client does deserve to be paid,
and there is no inescapable reason that the disciplinary machi-
nery need be activated to accomplish this. If the injured client
has other counsel the approach should, of course, be through him.
If he does not, respondent's counsel is well advised to obtain other
legal advice and inform another member of his firm or indepen-
dent counsel of his intention to repay the injured party, so that
if this issue arises neither the respondent nor counsel is left with
no defense except denial of wrongdoing. If the money was wrong-
fully taken, it would be improper to condition its return upon the
client's agreement not to press a complaint. But these can be very
difficult and ambiguous situations, and when the client-victim
initiates the offer to withhold complaint on condition of repay-
ment, the respondent need not refuse to enter such a bargain. The
promise not to prosecute is doubtless unenforceable in any case.33
Second, a program of repayment should be realistic and not
commit the respondent to impossible obligations that will con-
tinue the very problems that led to his wrongdoing and will vir-
tually force him into future questionable conduct. Respondents'
financial affairs are often extremely complicated, and one of
counsel's most useful functions can be to make some order of the
chaos and to resolve if possible all potential problems, ethical and
financial, in a single proceeding.
7. Conduct Showing Disrespect for Judges and the
Courts.-Since one of the purposes of Disciplinary Rules is to
protect the administration of justice and the appearance of jus-
tice, discipline is often imposed for conduct that might be the
equivalent of contempt of court, whether in the form of disres-
pectful remarks or writings,33 or disregard for, or disobedience of,
336. In re Craven, 204 La. 486, 15 So. 2d 861 (1944) (misconduct of offices of the court
cannot be settled privately to prevent official investigation); Louisville Bar Ass'n v. Hub-
bard, 282 Ky. 734, 134 S.W.2d 773 (1940).
337. E.g., People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Standidge, 333 Ill. 361 164 N.E. 844
(1928) (suspension for accusing appellate judges of corruptly making false findings); In re
Bevas 225 A.D. 427, 233 N.Y.. 439 (1929) (discipline for "scandalous utterances" about
judge); State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 126 Okla. 86, 258 P. 744 (1927) (suspension
for false article critical of court); Gross' Case, 318 Pa.143, 177 A. 767 (1935) (disbarment
for reading document in court impugning court's integrity). But cf. In re Minnis, 56 S.
Ct. 504 (1936) (order to show cause discharged when lawyer apologized for filing offensive
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court orders.33' It is well settled, however, that the inherent power
to punish for contempt and the inherent power to disbar are not
coterminous. Neither the grounds nor the procedural require-
ments for one are necessarily the same as for the other.33' In both,
however, the lawyer's duty to represent a client zealously often
collides with his duty to respect and to preserve respect for the
courts, and conduct in this area gives rise to some of the more
troublesome disciplinary cases."'
Under this head may be classified such matters as suborning
perjury,3"' bribery,"4 2 abuse of process, 3' jury tampering, " ' assist-
ing a client to defeat justice,345 aiding the unauthorized practice
of law, and any other conduct that taints the proper operation of
the judicial process.
8. Neglect. -Neglect and delay in handling clients' affairs
are frequent sources of discipline, although there is sharp disa-
greement concerning whether such matters are properly a concern
of disciplinary authorities.34 Often investigation of a case of neg-
brief); In re Ades, 6 F. Supp. 467 (D. Md. 1934) (lawyers may not be punished for
criticizing courts so long as the criticism is not false of malicious); In re Huppe, 92 Mont.
211, 11 P.2d 793 (1932) (suspension not proper for calling judge "arrogant jackass" in letter
absent proof the lawyer intended the statement to be circulated).
338. E.g. Pettiford v. State, 235 Ga. 622, 221 S.E.2d 43 (1975) (failure to comply with
court's order justifies disbarment); In re Daly, 284 Minn. 567, 171 N.W.2d 818 (1969)
(deliberately advising someone to disobey an order df the state supreme court constitutes
contempt and suspension is justified); In re Castellano, 46 A.D.2d 792, 361 N.Y.S.2d 23
(1974) (conviction of contempt justifies censure); Ohio State Bar Ass'n v. ilman, 45 Ohio
St. 2d 159, 342 N.E.2d 688 (1976) (violation of court order forbidding attorney to practice
law justifies disbarment).
339. There are important distinctions between the grounds and proceedings for con-
tempt and those for discipline. See, e.g., Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399 (1955)
(a lawyer is not an "officer of the court" as used in the contempt statute, 18 U.S.C. §
401(a)); cf. In re Hanson, 134 Kan. 165, 5 P.2d 1088 (1931).
340. See, e.g., Loza v. State, 263 Ind. 124, 325 N.E.2d 173 (1975). See M. Freedman,
supra note 64, at 9-24.
341. Use of false or perjured testimony is, of course, condemned. Geders v. United
States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976); In re Troy, 505 F.2d 746 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
982 (1975).
342. But cf. In re Chase, 51 A.D.2d 833, 379 N.Y.S.2d 551 (1976) (an offer to repay
mishandled funds was found not to be professional misconduct).
343. E.g., In re Sarelas, 360 F. Supp. 794 (N.D. Ill. 1973), affl'd, 497 F.2d 926 (7th
Cir. 1974).
344. E.g., In re Osborn, 376 F.2d 808 (6th Cir. 1967).
345. E.g., Loza v. State, 263 Ind. 124, 325 N.E.2d 173 (1975); Smith v. State, 523
S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1975).
346. See DR 6-101(A)(3) (addressing the issue of competency generally; Annot., 96
A.L.R. 2d 823 (1964). See also Committee on Professional Respondibility, Committee
Report: The Disposition of Cases of Professional Incompetence in the Grievance System,
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lect reveals other similar instances,3 7 and other problems such as
ill health, alcoholism or other chemical dependency, or financial
difficulties that have caused the lawyer to take on more work than
he can handle. Publication of news regarding a disciplinary pro-
ceeding against a named lawyer often can bring forth new com-
plaints from other clients as well. Such cases may also involve
merely poor communications between lawyer and client, though
it is common, too, for the lawyer to misrepresent the status of a
neglected case, which elevates mere neglect into deceitY48
Many neglect cases are quickly remedied after a communi-
cation from disciplinary authorities and result in no public or
published action. But even private warnings or reprimands in
this area can return to haunt the lawyer in later disciplinary
proceedings.
The wrongful withdrawal from employment without ade-
quately protecting and preserving the client's rights and remedies
may be seen as a form of neglect.35 It is one that often involves
fee disputes.351
Neglect is, of course, a common ground for civil malpractice
litigation,3  and because of the existence of this remedy, as well
as the limited resources of disciplinary agencies, it is quite argua-
ble that a civil action is the better forum for resolution of neglect
allegations. At the same time, however, removal of neglect cases
from the realm of discipline might encourage substantially more
malpractice litigation and thus is not necessarily good for the
individual lawyer or the profession.
9. Incompetence: Lack of Physical or Mental
Capacity. -Closely related to the problems of neglect and delay
is the question of a lawyer's competence, which may result from
32 REc. ASS'N B. Crry N.Y. 130 (1977).
347. E.g., Schulman v. State Bar, 16 Cal. 3d 631, 547 P.2d 447, 128 Cal. Rptr. 671
(1970); Ridley v. State Bar, 6 Cal. 3d 551, 493 P.2d 105, 99 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1972).
348. E.g., In re Parise, 53 A.D.2d 272, 385 N.Y.S.2d 805 (1976).
349. E.g., People v. James, 180 Colo. 133, 502 P.2d 1105 (1972).
350. EC 2-32:
A lawyer should not withdraw without considering carefully and endeavoring to
minimize the possible adverse effect on the rights of his client. . . [and should
give] due notice of his withdrawal, suggesting employment of other counsel,
delivering to the client all papers and property to which the client is entitled,
cooperating with counsel subsequently employed. ...
Id. See also DR 2-110.
351. EC 2-32: "Further, he should refund to the client any compensation not earned
during the employment."
352. See generally R. MALLEN & V. Lavrr, supra note 242 at § 82.
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ignorance, ill health, or a combination of such factors. Each such
case involves potential malpractice liability, and respondent's
counsel must keep an eye on the civil consequences of what he
does in the disciplinary action. At the same time, moral turpitude
is ordinarily not involved,353 and often strongly in favor of leniency
conditioned upon resolution of the physical, mental, or intellec-
tual defect. The dispositions of such cases are as various as the
physical and mental illnesses to which men are prey, and respon-
dent's counsel can often be most creative in fashioning programs
for the disabled lawyer.
10. Lack of Expertise.-Lawyers are not only expected to
be able to handle clients' affairs competently, but to know when
they cannot, and to obtain assistance in those situations. 54 Given
the extraordinary diversity of the law, the proliferating volume of
statutes, regulations, and judicial opinions, and the trend toward
greater and more narrow specialization, it is not surprising that
more and more lawyers are truly capable of handling fewer and
fewer matters with extreme expertise. Even a healthy, honest,
and diligent lawyer may badly mishandle a case, and it is in this
area, of course, that the disciplinary function interacts most inti-
mately with problems of the malpractice action.355 Arguably such
matters should not concern disciplinary authorities at all, but be
left to education and admissions bodies and civil litigation.
Some courts have construed a lawyer's youth35 or inexperi-
ence 357 as a mitigating factor in such cases. And it has been held
that a lawyer's mere ignorance of the law is not ground for disci-
pline if he acted in good faith.358
11. Advertising and Solicitation.-The Code deals at
length with advertising and solicitation,359 but in the wake of the
Supreme Court's recent and continuing expedition into this
353. E.g., In re Fahey, 8 Cal. 3d 842, 505 P.2d 1369, 106 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1973) (psy-
chological problems may negate element of improper intent or moral turpitude).
354. DR 6-101(A): "A lawyer shall not: (1) handle a legal matter which he knows...
he is not competent to handle, without associating with him a lawyer who is competent
to handle it."
355. See R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, supra note 242, at §§ 7-8.
356. E.g., Hall v. State Bar, 12 Cal. 2d 462, 85 P.2d 870 (1939); In re Cummings, 201
La. 439, 9 So. 2d 614 (1942); In re Shenker, 162 Or. 681, 94 P.2d 724 (1939).
357. E.g. In re Sonderlick 265 A.D. 394 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1943), affld, 292 N.Y. 555, 54
N.E.2d 684 (1944).
358. Friday v. State Bar, 23 Cal. 2d 501, 144 P.2d 564 (1944).
359. ABA CODE, CANON 2. This Canon was revised by the American Bar Association




South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 8
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol30/iss2/8
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
area,10 it is not profitable to say very much about what the law
now is. When such issues arise, however, respondent's counsel
should examine carefully not only the protection of free speech,
but the lawyer's -duty to inform the public and to make legal
services available as justification or mitigation of any alleged
improper actions. 6 Professor Freedman has argued that advertis-
ing and solicitation should not only be eliminated as grounds for
disbarment, but because of their benefits to certain potential
litigants should be encouraged. The Code, he writes, "takes a
schizophrenic position on solicitation and advertising.""3 ' An-
other, and perhaps better, view is that advertising and solicita-
tion should be grounds for discipline only when there is either
injury or violation of some other Disciplinary Rule or statute, or
when the advertising or soliciting is demonstrably false or mis-
leading, for only in these cases can sanctions have a beneficial
effect.
C. Collateral Consideration
It has been previously noted that the treatment of a given
instance of conduct in the criminal courts usually has no auto-
matic effect upon its use for disciplinary purposes, but that the
disposition in the other forum will carry some and perhaps great
weight with the disciplinary authority. Certain other collateral
aspects and consequences of misconduct and discipline arise with
some frequency and deserve brief mention.
1. Conduct Remote in Time; Statutes of Limitations,
Laches, and Staleness.-It is no defense to a disciplinary charge
that a statute of limitations prevents criminal prosecution for the
same conduct,6 3 and generally there are not statutes of limita-
tions for ethical violations.6 ' Likewise, there is no defense of
laches.365 At the same time, however, if the misconduct is very
360. See cases cited and discussed in note 55 supra.
361. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350
(1977).
362. Freedman, Advertising and Soliciting: The Case for Ambulance Chasing, in
VERDIcrs ON LAWYERS 100 (R. Nader & M. Green eds. 1976).
363. E.g., United States v. Parks, 93 F. 414 (C.C.D. Colo. 1899); Inre Bailey, 30 Ariz.
407, 248 P.29 (1926); In re Weed, 26 Mont. 507, 68 P. 1115 (1902); North Carolina State
Bar v. Temple, 2 N.C. App. 91, 162 S.E.2d 649 (1968).
364. E.g., In re Bossov, 60 Ill. 2d 439, 328 N.E.2d 309 (1975) (statute of limitations
held inapplicable to disciplinary proceedings); In re Tracy, 197 Minn. 35, 266 N.W. 88
(1936) (holding statute of limitations in disbarment proceedings an unconstitutional inva-
sion by the legislature of the judiciary's exclusive power to regulate the profession).
365. E.g., Bar Ass'n v. Posner, 275 Md. 250, 339 A.2d 657 (1975).
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remote in time the analogy to statutes of limitations may be
useful, and the argument that these should be no more a perpet-
ual threat of discipline than of criminal prosecution."' Unfair-
ness, amounting perhaps to a denial of due process, may arise in
prosecuting a very old charge if the respondent's memory has
faded, witnesses have died or moved, or documents have been lost
or destroyed."6 7 Delay in accusation may also reflect on the credi-
bility of the complainant. 6
If the alleged misconduct predated a change in the Canon
Disciplinary Rules, or judicial construction of professional re-
sponsibility, imposition of discipline. may be ex post facto. 69 Or
the moral or legal "climate" may have changed so that what is
today condemned was acceptable or at least not ordinarily prose-
cuted at the earlier time, or vice versa."' 0 Moreover, if the miscon-
duct was long ago it may be relatively easy to show rehabilitation
by the time of the disciplinary proceedings, assuming the respon-
dent's conduct has been exemplary in the meantime, 3 ' and espe-
cially if he corrected any damage that might have been done by
his wrong.
2. Conduct Adjudicated in Different Proceedings; Double
Jeopardy, Res Judicata, Collateral Estoppel.-Aside from the
general rule that criminal convictions are conclusive in discipli-
nary proceedings of the facts underlying them because they were
proved by the high standard beyond a reasonable doubt, there are
no automatic consequences in disciplinary proceedings of adjudi-
cation of the same facts in other proceedings, or vice versa. As
366. But cf. Caldwell v. State Bar, 13 Cal. 3d 488, 531 P.2d 785, 119 Cal. Rptr. 217
(1975) (despite nine year delay and death of respondent's wife, the disciplinary action was
not foreclosed); In Re Bossov, 60 Ill. 2d 439, 328 N.E.2d 309 (1975) (nine year delay was
not found dispositive in view of length of record and respondent's numerous requests for
continuances); In re Weinstein, 254 Or. 392, 459 P.2d 548 (1969) (twenty seven month
delay after filing of charges against the accused was held not to be an unreasonable delay
when protection of the public was of prime concern as in disciplinary proceedings).
367. Tennessee Bar Ass'n v. Berke, 48 Tenn. App. 140, 344 S.W.2d 567 (1960) (doc-
trine of laches held applicable when during a nine year delay, not attributable to the fault
of respondent, the accused sustained a good reputation as a lawyer). Compare In re
Ratner, 194 Kan. 362, 399 P.2d 865 (1965); In re Williams, 233 Mo. App. 1174, 128 S.W.2d
1048 (1939); and State v. Haggerty, 241 Wis. 486, 6 N.W.2d 203 (1942) (taking staleness
of conduct into account) with In re Farris, 229 Or. 209, 367 P.2d 387 (1961) (holding that
disbarment proceedings were not barred by the doctrine of laches).
368. Yokozeki v. State Bar, 11 Cal. 3d 436, 521 P.2d 858, 113 Cal. Rptr. 602 (1974).
369. Kelson v. State Bar, 17 Cal. 3d 1, 549 P.2d 861, 130 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1976).
370. The recent developments in advertising are an example. See In re Hatch, 10 Cal.
2d 147, 73 P.2d 885 (1937), for the proposition that the concept of moral turpitude changes
with the state of public morals.
371. E.g., In re Kreamer, 14 Cal. 3d 524, 535 P.2d 728, 121 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1975).
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Professor Wolfram points out elsewhere in this issue,3' 2 no case
appears to have given res judicata effect to a disciplinary finding
in a later civil lawsuit, and at least one court has observed that
such an effect would undermine the right to jury trial.13 It might
be observed, however, that since the burden of proof in discipli-
nary matters is ordinarily clear and convincing evidence, or a
similar standard higher than a mere preponderance, proof of a
disciplinary charge could logically be accepted in a later civil
action, though a failure of proof could not; and, conversely, the
failure to prove an operative fact in a civil lawsuit with its lower
burden of proof could be conclusive in a later disciplinary action.
If we accept the widespread pronouncement that discipline
is neither criminal nor penal,314 then the double jeopardy pro-
scription of the Constitution will not bar discipline after a crim-
inal conviction or a civil judgmentY5 If, however, we take the
Ruffalo language seriously and agree that discipline is punitive
and at least quasi-criminal,37 then an argument for double jeop-
ardy can be made. Apparently, no case has so held; and it may
well be that pursuit of this argument will only weaken the disci-
plinary respondent's pursuit of the constitutional protection
attached to a criminal proceeding, since it would follow that dis-
cipline could not follow a criminal conviction or vice versa.
It has been held that the record of a civil lawsuit in which
the misconduct occurred is admissible in the disciplinary pro-
ceeding;377 and a lawyer's testimony in another proceeding is gen-
erally admissible against him for disciplinary purposes,378 but at
least one court has held that evidence of a criminal acquittal on
the same conduct is not admissible.37
3. The Effects of Discipline in One Jurisdiction upon the
Right to Practice Elsewhere. -There is great divergence among
372. Wolfram, The Code of Professional Responsibility as a Measure of Attorney
Liability in Civil Litigation, 30 S.C.L. REv. 281, 298 (1979).
373. Rachel v. Hill, 435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970).
374. See cases cited in notes 83-94 and accompanying text supra.
375. E.g., Bluestein v. State Bar, 13 Cal. 3d 162, 529 P.2d 599, 118 Cal. Rptr. 175
(1974).
376. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550-51 (1968). Accord, In re Jacques, 401 Mich. 516,
258 N.W.2d 443 (1977) (some but not all criminal protections are available).
377. E.g., In re Ebbs, 150 N.C. 44, 63 S.E. 190 (1908); cf. People ex rel. Chicago Bar
Ass'n v. Amos, 246 Ill. 299, 92 N.E. 857 (1910) (record of the prior action is not in itself
sufficient).
378. E.g., In re Ellis, 371 Ill. 113, 20 N.E.2d 96 (1939).
379. In re O'Brien, 95 Vt. 167, 113 A. 527 (1921). See generally Annot., 161 A.L.R.
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the jurisdictions concerning the effect they will give imposition of
disbarment or discipline of members of their bars in other juris-
dictions.8 0 If a general rule is to be discerned, it is probably that
the actions of another disciplinary authority will be given careful
consideration but not automatically binding effect.3 1 Some
courts, however, have felt compelled to follow another jurisdic-
tion's lead under the full faith and credit clause of the Constitu-
tion.2
The Supreme Court has held that state disciplinary rulings
are not binding upon federal courts, which must make their own
judgments. The Court has held, however, that as a general rule a
federal court should depart from a state's action only when due
process of the interests of justice require. 3 ' As with the neglected
Ruffalo decision, the Supreme Court's words in this regard have
not enjoyed universal deference in the lower courts." 4 At least one
state court, however, has refused to discipline solely on the basis
of a federal disbarment."
Since many lawyers are admitted in at least one state and
in federal court, respondent's counsel should search carefully for
each jurisdiction's policy in this regard. The secondary effect of
discipline may be of equal or even greater concern than the disci-
pline imposed in the first jurisdiction to act.
D. The Character, Motivations, and Position of Respondent as
They Relate to the Misconduct
Both the gravity of the wrong and the nature of the discipline
may be appreciably affected by the state of mind and intentions
of the respondent, the reasons for his act or omission, as well as
his general character, conduct, and reputation. For good or ill the
following factors will often play a part.
1. The Respondent's Prior Disciplinary Record.-As in
380. See J. CLARK & C. WOLFRAM, PROFEssIoNAL RESPONSIMUTY 108-15 (1976).
381. E.g., Florida Bar v. Wilkes, 179 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1965), cert. denied sub nom.,
Wilkes v. Florida Bar, 890 U.S. 983 (1968).
382. E.g., In re Leverson, 195 Minn. 42, 261 N.W. 480 (1935); Copren v. State Bar,
64 Nev. 364, 183 P.2d 833 (1947).
383. Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278 (1957).
384. Compare In re Abrams, 521 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1962) and In re MacRay, 298 F.
Supp. 170 (D. Alas. 1969) with In re Rhodes, 370 F.2d 411 (8th Cir. 1967) and In re Alker,
307 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1962).
385. In re Conley, 188 Minn. 575, 248 N.W. 41 (1933). See generally Note, The
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criminal cases, the accused's previous record can and usually will
be used against him at least for purposes of disposition, if not as
evidence of culpability for the offense on trial.38 Unlike the crimi-
nal jury trial, in disciplinary matters the fact-finding body is
ordinarily the same as it was in any previous proceedings; though
the personnel may change, the disciplinary body need only refer
to its own records to learn respondent's record. Some jurisdictions
specifically provide for the use of a previous record against res-
pondent. 8 ' If the respondent has no record, this fact, of course,
should be urged by respondent's counsel as a favorable factor. 88
If there is a previous record, a number of considerations may
come into play.
If respondent is on probation at the time of the new offense,
he will ordinarily be hard put to avoid suspension or worse. This
is particularly true if the previous offense is similar to the new
one, since he obviously has not learned the necessary lesson from
the prior proceeding and probation has not been successful. It
may be, however, that even this can be turned to advantage, or
at least mitigated, if it can be demonstrated that the original
probationary conditions are, in effect, at fault rather than respon-
dent. When, for example, the offense is neglect of client's affairs
and respondent is an alcoholic, but this condition was not diag-
nosed or not properly accounted for in the previous proceedings,
it may persuasively be argued that a proper and well-supervised
treatment program is more suitable than suspension or disbar-
ment. Similarly, if the problem is financial, failure to pay taxes
or to pay creditors who were the complainants in the previous
proceeding, it may be that the original terms of payment or resti-
tution were impossible or unrealistic and more suitable arrange-
386. E.g., Selznick v. State Bar, 16 Cal. 3d 704, 547 P.2d 1388, 129 Cal. Rptr. 108
(1976).
387. E.g., MINN. R. ON LAwYERS' PROFESSIONAL RESPONsiBIry 19(b):
(1) Conduct previously considered. Proceedings under these Rules may be
based upon conduct considering in previous lawyer disciplinary proceedings that
discipline was not warranted or that the proceedings should be discontinued
after the lawyer's compliance with conditions.
(2) Previous finding. A finding by a Panel or equivalent or by a court in
the previous proceedings that a lawyer committed conduct warranting repri-
mand, probation, suspension, disbarment, or equivalent is, in proceedings under
these Rules, prima facie evidence that he committed the conduct.
(3) Previous discipline. The fact that the lawyer received reprimand, pro-
bation, suspension, disbarment, or equivalent in the previous proceedings is
admissible in evidence in proceedings under these Rules.
388. E.g., Toll v. State Bar, 12 Cal. 3d 824, 528 P.2d 35, 117 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1974);
In re Weaks, 274 Ky. 194, 118 S.W.2d 525 (1938).
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ments may be offered as an alternative. Obviously, it will help if
the respondent or his counsel, rather than a complainant, brought
the problem to the board.
If the previous offense (for example, neglect of cases) is en-
tirely different from the new one (for instance, commingling of
funds) there will not be such an obvious implication that the
respondent committed the new wrong while on clear notice of its
impropriety. But if the offenses are identical or similar, and seri-
ous, involving moral turpitude, counsel will be wise to prepare the
respondent to accept a suspension as an alternative to disbar-
ment, rather than striving unrealistically for continued proba-
tion. Urging continued probation may tend to show, or be con-
strued by the disciplinary authority as showing, an insufficient
realization of the seriousness of the misconduct, which in itself
may call for sterner measures.
Quite often lawyers react inappropriately to their first en-
counter with disciplinary authorities and thus create unnecessary
complications for later proceedings. Often the respondent does
not retain counsel, admits wrongdoing without adequate explana-
tion, accepts conditions or probation without sufficient study or
objective evaluation of his ability to comply, and proceeds to
violate those conditions because he has not addressed or solved
the problem that led to the misconduct. Relatively minor derelic-
tions are often the result of intractable character traits or persist-
ent conditions, such as impecuniousness or alcoholism, both of
which are mutually sustaining with other problems such as mari-
tal discord and overwork." 9 A probationary period during which
these are not resolved is not a "good deal" for the respondent, but
often an invitation to disaster. Respondent's counsel must, with-
out being patronizing or officious, diagnose these problems and
protect the respondent so far as possible from recurrence. If the
respondent already has a record, then it may be possible to dem-
onstrate that the repeated offenses were beyond his control, but
will be arrested by a newly proposed and more efficacious proba-
tionary period. It is often a matter of saving the respondent, and
at the same time his family, clients, and creditors, from him-
self.8 0
In summary, a prior record is an obstacle, but not an auto-
matic basis for suspension or disbarment.
389. E.g., In re Nesselson, 35 Il. 2d 454, 220 N.E.2d 409 (1966).
390. See, e.g., In re Boyle, 47 N.J. 58, 219 A.2d 329 (1966).
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2. The Respondent's Good Works, Distinguished Service,
and Character.-The converse of a bad prior record is, of course,
a good record, and this may go beyond a mere lack of previous
discipline. If the respondent has given unusual service in public
office, to the bar or other organizations, to indigent clients, or
otherwise, this should militate in his favor. 9' If his continued
service depends on retention of his license to practice law, this is
clearly a reason for avoiding suspension or disbarment. Even if
his good works are totally unrelated to the law, however, for in-
stance, to a church, or a charitable organization, this should be
demonstrated as evidence of his good character. It may be that
the time or money devoted to other laudable purposes, for exam-
ple, to indigent clients, caused or contributed to the misconduct
such as neglect of other files, which would clearly mitigate culpa-
bility.
No matter what the type of misconduct, counsel should ex-
plore with respondent any source of favorable character evidence
and prepare to call witnesses or introduce letters or affidavits to
this effect.32 Two caveats, however, should be made. First, bar
counsel's right to cross-examine may enable him to exclude hear-
say evidence. Second, by putting the respondent's character in
issue counsel may open the door to damaging matters otherwise
inadmissible. 393
3. Illness: Physical or Mental.-An illness of one sort or
another very often lies behind, or among, the elements of miscon-
duct, at least if "illness" is defined broadly to include such things
as alcoholism and other chemical dependencies, neuroses as well
as psychoses, senility, cancer, heart ailments, and other debilitat-
ing diseases that may not affect a lawyer's mental capacity for his
tasks, but diminish his physical stamina.
Sickness as such is not a defense to a disciplinary charge, 34
though quite clearly its role may have several effects in the pro-
ceeding. It may negative the element of intent and thus militate
391. E.g., Florida Bar v. Goodrich, 212 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1968).
392. E.g., In re Landon, 319 S.W.2d 553 (Mo. 1959).
393. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948) (admissibility of rebuttal
to character evidence in a criminal case).
394. E.g., In re Duggan, 17 Cal. 3d 416, 551 P.2d 19, 130 Cal. Rptr. 715 (1976)
(psychosis); Iowa State Bar v. Toomey, 236 N.W.2d 39 (Iowa 1975) (illness not affecting
the mind); In re Chmelik, 203 Minn. 156, 280 N.W. 283 (1938) (lack of mental ability);
Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Edwards, 11 Ohio St. 2d 171, 228 N.E.2d 626 (1967) (lack of mental
ability); In re Walker, 254 N.W.2d 452 (S.D. 1977) (alcoholism).
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against the existence of moral turpitude; 395 it may be quite reme-
diable and thus foreclose the need for disciplinary sanctions, sub-
stituting instead medical supervision;39 it may impose severe fin-
ancial burdens on the lawyer that in turn may tempt him toward
defalcation; it will almost certainly command a certain sympathy
from the disciplinary authority,"' provided it is a genuine illness
and not crassly exploited for the very purpose of arousing sym-
pathy.
Alcoholism is doubtless the most common medical affliction
of lawyers, almost, as reputedly with poets, an occupational haz-
ard. Respondent's counsel must be alert to detect its presence.
Drunkenness will often not readily be admitted and will not auto-
matically engender sympathy. It may indeed have the opposite
effect on anyone uninitiated in the science and subtleties of alco-
holism and may be seen as misconduct in itself. Courts and legis-
latures have recently begun to remove the criminal label from
alcoholism and its effects, 98 and some jurisdictions at least have
made accommodation for it in their disciplinary procedures. Min-
nesota, for example, has a provision for the stay of proceedings
provided the lawyer complies with specified reasonable condi-
tions."9 While it does not explicitly mention alcoholism, this rule
allows postponement of disciplinary proceedings until alcoholism
can be diagnosed, treated, and perhaps arrested; and it may allow
a continuation of or a return to practice without public humilia-
tion.
Advanced age may be taken as a mitigating factor in appro-
priate cases,"' and an occasional decision recognizes things such
as personal and financial problems as mitigating. 01
4. The Respondent's Reliance Upon Legal Advice or Re-
search; Ignorance, Mens Rea, and Good Faith.-Occasionally
misconduct will be alleged when the lawyer had foreseen the pos-
sible ethical problem and either researched the question himself
or sought independent legal advice." 2 His perception and antici-
395. E.g In re Fahey, 8 Cal. 3d 842, 505 P.2d 1369, 106 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1973).
396. E.g., In re Sherman, 58 Wash. 2d 1, 363 P.2d 390 (1961). Contra, St. Pierre's
Case, 113 N.H. 198, 304 A.2d 88 (1973) (addiction to drugs prescribed by physician).
397. E.g., In re Beaubian, 257 A.D. 962, 12 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1939).
398. E.g., Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 651 (1968); State v. Fearon, 283 Minn. 90, 166
N.W.2d 720 (1909); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 340.961 (West 1977).
399. MiNN. R. ON PROFESSIONAL RasPONSmLrry 9(d).
400. E.g., In re Williams, 202 La. 234, 11 So. 2d 540 (1942); In re Williams, 233 Mo.
App. 1174, 128 S.W.2d 1098 (1939).
401. See, e.g., In re Kinslow, 24 A.D.2d 331, 266 N.Y.S.2d 190 (1966).
402. E.g. Sheffield v. State Bar, 22 Cal. 2d 627, 140 P.2d 376 (1943).
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pation of the problem, and attempt to resolve it correctly, will
usually be in his favor, especially if he acted according to the
advice he received. This will not necessarily be an absolute de-
fense, however,"0 3 and if the respondent acted against the advice
he was given, it may militate against him."4 If he did so in good
faith this should not be held against him, at least if reasonable
men could differ on the proper course of action.
In many cases the act will have been done in good faith, or
at least in ignorance of the specific ethical prohibition allegedly
violated. This, too (good faith more than ignorance, of course),
should mitigate the offense, since if nothing else it should negate
moral turpitude."' As in other areas, however, including criminal
liability, a lawyer may not escape consequences if he deliberately
closes his eyes to what he should reasonably know is improper.0 0
All of these matters relate ultimately to the question of intent,
mens rea, and as in most endeavors there is a reluctance to punish
the merely misguided or even negligent act.0 7 In such cases, a
prospective ruling, a warning, or probation will often be espe-
cially appropriate dispositions. The same may be true when the
misconduct has been customarily accepted in the legal com-
munity.0 '
5. Conflicting Duties.-It is not uncommon for adherence
to one ethical obligation to require violation of another: the duty
to disclose a fraud upon a court may require breach of the
attorney-client privilege, and prohibited advertising may provide
important information and legal services to those who otherwise
lose their remedies.0 9 In such situations one element of the ethical
Code may become a defense to violation of another, particularly
when an informed and conscientious decision was made by a
respondent aware of the conflicting loyalties, especially when the
choice resulted in no profit or benefit to the respondent himself.
These situations require careful balancing of two or more impor-
403. Id.; Hall v. State Bar, 12 Cal. 2d 462, 85 P.2d 870 (1938) (inexperienced col-
league).
404. E.g., LaDuca, 62 N.J. 133, 299 A.2d 405 (1973).
405. Contra, Jackson v. State Bar, 15 Cal. 3d 372, 540 P.2d 25, 124 Cal. Rptr. 185
(1975) (ignorance of ethical duty no defense to its violation and does not negate moral
turpitude).
406. See, e.g., Inre Schneider, 22 A.D.2d 231, 254 N.Y.S.2d 836 (1964);InreAronson,
18 A.D.2d 53, 238 N.Y.S.2d 333 (1963); In re Droker, 59 Wash. 2d 707,370 P.2d 242 (1962).
407. See, e.g., In re Hughes, 186 Minn. 204, 242 N.W. 711 (1932).
408. In re Esquire, 267 A.D. 780, 45 N.Y.S.2d 472 (1944). Contra, In re Finley, 261
N.W.2d 841 (Minn. 1978); In re Wines, 370 S.W.2d 328 (Mo. 1963).
409. See generally M. FREEDMAN, note 64 supra; J. LIEBERMAN,NoTE 55 supra.
19791]
77
Nordby: The Burdened Privilege: Defending Lawyers in Disciplinary Proceed
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REvIEw
tant interests. An intelligent evaluation of the consequences of
acting other than as the respondent did might persuasively show
the subordinate importance of the allegedly violated rule. To do
this effectively, of course, respondent's counsel will need a thor-
ough knowledge of not only the Canons and Disciplinary Rules,
and the Ethical Considerations and policies underlying them, but
of considerations that may not be explicitly reflected in the Code
at all.
Monroe Freedman has been the leading voice in what might
be termed with, of course, no pejorative connotations attached,
extreme adherence to one ethical duty at the expense of another.
His Lawyers' Ethics in an Adversary System is provocative, per-
suasive, and arguably indispensible for lawyers confronted with
such dilemmas. This manner of argument has recently been legi-
timatized to a considerable degree by the Bates decision, 10 which
among other things vindicated the importance of providing legal
services at the expense of the traditional prohibition against law-
yer advertising. In this regard, too, it is notable that the respon-
dents in Bates deliberately and knowingly violated the Code.,"
The opinion thus also represents, if tangentially, approval of con-
scientious violation of the Code in some circumstances. A viola-
tion, however, is not excused simply because a client or "victim"
encourages, condones, or forgives it.41
6. The Respondent's Profit or Loss from His Wrong-
doing.-For several reasons it may be important whether the
respondent profited from his misconduct. Initially, profit or an
expectation of gain will provide a motive that, though not an
essential element of proof, will make the alleged misdeed more
probable and perhaps less justifiable. Theft is, of course, the
clearest and most common example. The need for and use of the
gain will also be significant: a mere spendthrift or gambler who
needs money to forestall lawsuits will deserve less sympathy, for
example, than a pennyless lawyer whose child requires expensive
medical treatment.
413
410. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977). Also, it is noteworthy that a
move to discipline Freedman for his views was begun, but came to naught. M. FREEDMAN,
supra note 64, at viii.
411. 433 U.S. at 358.
412. Bryant v. State Bar, 21 Cal. 2d 285, 131 P.2d 523 (1943); People ex rel. Colorado
Bar Ass'n v. Hillyer, 88 Colo. 428, 297 P. 1004 (1931); In re Cosgrove, 262 A.D. 887, 28
N.Y.S.2d 821 (1914); cf. Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. Smith, 503 S.W.2d 482 (Ky. 1973)
(action held unethical although condoned by judge).
413. E.g., Egan v. State Bar, 10 Cal. 2d 458, 75 P.2d 67 (1938); In re Boyle, 47 N.J.
58, 219 A.2d 329 (1966).
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On the other hand, it will ordinarily be greatly to the respon-
dent's advantage if he did not profit or expect to profit, or if he
actually lost, as a result of the misdeed. He may, for example,
have neglected or mishandled files because he devoted inordinate
amounts of time to bar functions or charitable or other commend-
able duties."4 He, or more accurately both he and his client, may
have been victimized by the superiority or sharp practice of ad-
verse counsel. Or, as is so often the case, he may have been merely
inept, indolent, disorganized, or ill, lacking any evil or self-
serving motive.4"5 These things may be serious enough in them-
selves to warrant discipline, but they are, or should be treated
quite differently from and less severely than cupidity or deceit or
any of the innumerable combinations of those two traits.
Finally, if the respondent was improperly enriched, that will
doubtless have to be calculated into the disposition. Although
injury to a client or others is damaging to the accused, it can be
quite logically and persuasively argued that his ability to make
restitution will be drastically curtailed by his removal from prac-
tice. Ironically, the larger the sum the more force this poit
has. ' 6 While this should not be taken to suggest that theft is an
improper or improbable ground for disbarment, it is true that
the victims of misappropriation deserve to be made whole by
the respondent, and in most cases he will be best equipped to
do this by pursuing his profession." '
7. The Respondent's Voluntary Disclosure of the Miscon-
duct: Voluntary Restitution or Other Remedial Measures.-If the
respondent came forward and voluntarily disclosed his violation
before it was otherwise discovered or about to be discovered,
this will ordinarily weigh appreciably in his favor," ' since the very
act of disclosure tends to demonstrate rehabilitation. Even ab-
sent voluntary disclosure to disciplinary authority, the respon-
dent may have repaired any damage of his wrong, such as by
repaying misappropriated funds, reimbursing exorbitant fees, or
completing neglected business. There is danger, however, that
remedial steps may be construed as attempts to conceal the mis-
414. See, e.g., In re Donovan, 108 N.H. 34, 226 A.2d 779 (1967).
415. Id.
416. The misappropriation of only small sums is not defense. In re Ruderman, 32
A.D.2d 504, 304 N.Y.S. 2d 417 (1969).
417. See, e.g., In re Wholey, 110 N.H. 449, 270 A.2d 609 (1970); In re Boyle 47 N.J.
58, 219 A.2d 329 (1966).
418. E.g., Pickering v. State Bar, 24 Cal. 2d 141, 148 P.2d 1 (1944); Committee on
Professional Ethics v. Sylvester, 221 N.W.2d 803 (Iowa 1974).
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conduct amounting perhaps even to bribery, especially when the
respondent has reason to believe his misdeed is about to be dis-
covered." ' The cure in such a case may be worse than the disease,
and such steps should be undertaken with the greatest caution to
avoid even the appearance of impropriety. At the same time,
however, if someone has been damaged, restitution should not be
avoided simply because of the possibility of misinterpretation. In
this type of situation, it may be wise for respondent's counsel to
seek advice, hypothetically if necessary, from disciplinary counsel
or another lawyer. Failure to repay because the respondent feared
the improper appearance might be created will, of course, proba-
bly not be received as a good excuse.
8. The Problem of the Sole Practitioner.-Two facts have
for many years conspired to describe one of the more unpresenta-
ble aspects of lawyer discipline. First, charges of misconduct are
most often brought against sole practitioners, members of small
firms, or groups of loosely associated lawyers. Second, discipli-
nary committees and boards have historically been composed
largely of more or less senior members of large and well-
established firms. 20 At least the appearance of unfairness is pre-
sented here, suggesting a discriminatory elitism in disciplinary
enforcement, although there are some quite good reasons why
both of these conditions developed.
The sole practitioner is more likely to run afoul of several
provisions of the Code simply by virtue of practicing alone. He
does not have other lawyers immediately available to handle mat-
ters when he is too busy to attend to them, nor does he ordinarily
have the breadth of expertise that a law firm has collectively. He
often does not have the financial resources to remove temptation
during hard times or to enable him to decline to take new cases
when he is already overextended. He does not have the de facto
supervision of partners and associates. In other words, he often
has reasons for cutting comers on his work, or for being less than
entirely straightforward in handling money, that do not affect
members of law firms. Moreover, just as the solitary practice
provides the motive for misconduct, it provides the opportunity,
since no one oversees his handling of cases or money.
It has also been suggested-and no one can say whether it is
419. Generally, restitution after discovery of the misconduct is no defense. E.g.,
Committee on Professional Ethics v. Sylvester, 221 N.W.2d 803 (Iowa 1974); State ex rel.
Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Hatcher, 452 P.2d 150 (Okla. 1969).
420. See generally J. AUEIwACH, supra note '13, at 43-52.
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true-that members of large law firms err as often as sole practi-
tioners, but because of their resources these firms are able to
suppress the misconduct, by correcting the error, or paying the
loss. Though this self-regulation may involve unethical conduct
in itself, there is no way to tell how often it occurs, and it is
probably irrelevant. It is of concern, however, in the context of
the general truth that members of disciplinary boards generally
come from large and distinguished law firms, for the appearance
of unfairness to the sole practitioner is, or should be, important.
It is perhaps natural that members of prestigious firms
should be nominated for duty on disciplinary boards, just as they
are for judgeships and other positions of honor. They have estab-
lished their credentials. Moreover, they have the time to do such
work, because they have back-up personnel in the firm. There is,
in other words, nothing improper per se in the widespread repre-
sentation of large firms on disciplinary bodies. Yet this practice
causes problems both of appearance and substance, and respon-
dent's counsel should be alert to them.
First, the member of the large firm who always has subordi-
nates to whom to delegate work and who has the financial stabil-
ity of the firm behind him may not be able properly to appreciate
the hectic professional life of the sole practitioner or the pressures
working upon him. In the situation, for example,.in which a res-
pondent has neglected a file or two, it may be perhaps too easy
for the senior member of a prosperous firm to say, "You shouldn't
have taken the cases if you didn't have time to handle them." Or
when commingling or even misappropriation of funds is the
charge, the prosperous lawyer will tend not to comprehend the
pressures that may have been at work on the sole practitioner.
For present purposes the point is this: respondent's counsel
should remember that, although the status of being a sole practi-
tioner does not excuse or justify unprofessional conduct, it may
go far toward explaining in a sympathetic way why it occurred.
Beyond that, it may suggest several aspects of the disposition.
The suspension or disbarment of the sole practitioner deprives his
clients of counsel, whereas a law firm could readily assign another
lawyer to those files; supervision and assistance can be ordered
as conditions of probation to minimize the likelihood of recur-
rence;42" ' and the respondent's finances can be examined and
overseen.
421. E.g., Florida Bar Ass'n v. Thorpe, 337 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1976).
1979]
81
Nordby: The Burdened Privilege: Defending Lawyers in Disciplinary Proceed
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Thus the sole practitioner may be made to appear rather
more favorably than other lawyers and as entitled to a second
chance. Important parts of counsel's role in these situations are,
first, to make the respondent aware of and receptive to the need
for supervision and other corrective measures and, second, to
impress the disciplinary board with the fairness and workability
of a probationary disposition designed to eliminate the causes of
the misconduct.
9. The Problem of the Judge.-In most jurisdictions today
a lawyer's becoming a judge does not preclude the lawyer-
disciplinary authorities from proceeding against him, for conduct
committed earlier before or after he became a judge.422 Yet several
important factors set these cases apart.
First, the enormous importance of an independent judiciary
free from threat of harassment and intimidation, free to act cou-
rageously without fear of consequences, makes it essential that
judges not be subject to easy accusation and conviction. The
Supreme Court has quite recently recognized this in bestowing a
virtually impregnable immunity from civil liability upon judges,
even for malicious unwarranted actions.12 This consideration in
and of itself, apart from the merits of alleged misconduct, argues
strongly against the discipline of any lawyer who is a sitting
judge, except in the most extreme cases.42 4
Second, since lawyer discipline is an inherently judicial func-
tion, but judicial appointment and removal is ordinarily execu-
tive or legislative, problems of violating the separation of powers
doctrine arise when the judiciary moves for discipline in this
area. 421 Ironically, just as the judiciary may be accused of usurp-
ing executive or legislative power in removing a judge, it may be
accused of self-protectiveness if its disposition of a complaint
against a judge does not appear harsh enough, and this in turn
may lead it to unfairly harsh results.
All in all it would seem best to reserve the authority to disci-
422. E.g., Gordon v. Clinkscales, 215 Ga. 843, 114 S.E.2d 15 (1960); In re Holland,
377 Ill. 346, 36 N.E.2d 543 (1941); State ex reL. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Conover, 166
Neb. 132, 88 N.W.2d 135 (1958); In re Pazlinghi, 39 N.J. 517, 189 A.2d 218 (1963). Disbar-
ments often results more or less automatically in removal from the bench, since judges
are ordinarily required to be lawyers. E.g., In re Troy, 364 Mass. 15, 306 N.E.2d 203 (1973).
423. Stump v. Sparkman, 98 S. Ct. 1099 (1978).
424. E.g., In re Troy, 364 Mass. 15, 306 N.E.2d 203 (1973) (extreme misconduct
including perjury and carrying on an illegal business venture.
425. Id. The Tay court recognized an inherent power in the judiciary to regulate
itself. 306 N.E.2d at 206-08.
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pline judges to an agency altogether independent of the judicial
branch, and to deny any authority over sitting judges to the
lawyer-disciplinary authority. Only this way can the twin dangers
of intimidation of judges and of the disrespect arising from appar-
ent self-protection be avoided.426
E. The Respondent's Attitude and Behavior in the Disciplinary
Proceedings
More perhaps than in any other form of litigation the con-
duct of the respondent in the proceeding itself is often a factor
contributing appreciably to the result in disciplinary proceedings.
It is of surpassing importance that counsel explain this to the
respondent and it be kept in mind in making each decision. Al-
though general rules are not likely to be very accurate in discipli-
nary matters, it can be said that (1) very often a respondent will
be rewarded for his cooperation, candor, and contrition, and (2)
although less frequently, because of the implicit violation of the
fifth amendment as construed in Spevack v. Klein,4 he may be
penalized for the absence of these qualities.
It certainly is fair to say that in every case, even those in
which the merits of the factual allegations are directly and com-
pletely disrupted, respondent and his counsel should exhibit re-
spect for the disciplinary authorities and cooperate with them to
the extent that no corresponding disadvantage results. If nothing
else favorable can be said for the respondent, it should at least
be possible for the disciplinary body to note that he behaved
professionally in the disciplinary process. Conversely, it is disas-
trously ironic for a respondent exonerated of the charged miscon-
duct to be disciplined for his behavior in arriving at that result.
1. Cooperation in the Disciplinary Process; Assertion of
Technical Rights and Defenses. -Lawyers accused of misconduct
are usually angry or frightened, and are very often both. These
understandable but unproductive reactions in turn very often
lead to one or more immediate errors that complicate the whole
course of the proceedings: an irate call, or what is worse, a letter,
to the complaining client, or a suspiciously conciliatory call with
perhaps a offer payment, owing or otherwise; an aggrieved call to
the disciplinary authority, or a contrite and self-incriminating
426. See generally C. ASHMAN, THE FINEST JUDGES MONEY CAN Buy (1973); J.
GOULDEN, THE BENCHWARMERS (1974); D. JACKSON, JUDGES 204-06, 392-95 (1974).
427. 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
19791
83
Nordby: The Burdened Privilege: Defending Lawyers in Disciplinary Proceed
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
one; or deposit of the complaint letter in the wastebasket with the
hope that, like all bad things, it will go away.4" As noted at the
outset, one of counsel's most important functions is to explain the
disciplinary process and law to the respondent to dispel, if possi-
ble, the fear and anger, and, above all, to place himself as a buffer
between the respondent and the disciplinary authority.
For-irrelevant as it may seem to a lawyer's mind-an important
ingredient in the final disposition of the charge will be respon-
dent's performance in the disciplinary proceeding itself. For this
reason any respondent, any, at least charged with relatively seri-
ous misconduct, whether the charge is true or unfounded, is badly
in need of informed and disinterested counsel.
This is not to say that the respondent should be advised to
be obsequious or to kowtow to a disciplinary martinent, or that
he should with alacrity cooperate in his own destruction; on the
contrary, counsel can protect and effectively assert rights, which
asserted by respondent himself would appear merely self-serving,
and indeed rights of which respondent may be altogether una-
ware.
Moreover, there will be cases in which for reasons of self-
incrimination or otherwise the respondent cannot wisely cooper-
ate fully; but if the fifth amendment is to be asserted, or other
procedures resisted or challenged, this should be done after care-
ful evaluation of the consequences and explicitly on the advice of
counsel. The respondent is in a peculiarly bad position, for exam-
ple, to argue why the privilege against self-incrimination excuses
a failure to answer if the assertion is challenged on the ground
that the answer would not incriminate-he may well incriminate
himself in the very process of refusing to do so. 42 Nor will descrip-
tion of the respondent's excellent character and achievements be
very well received from his own mouth.
The cases show that cooperation with the disciplinary au-
thority, which is defined to include at least respectfulness, punc-
tuality, compliance with procedural rules, and, when possible,
candid and full disclosures, often is counted in the respondent's
favor."'0 Counsel, unlike the respondent himself, can achieve
428. A failure to respond to a disciplinary complaint is often construed as an admis-
sion of the charge. E.g., In re Hamm, 79 Wis. 2d 1, 255 N.W.2d 308 (1977).
429. See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951) (holding that a party assert-
ing the privilege against self-incrimination shall not be forced to defeat the privilege in
justifying and demonstrating its applicability).
430. E.g., Toll v. State Bar, 12 Cal. 3d 824, 528 P.2d 35, 117 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1974);
In re Cummings, 201 La. 439, 9 So. 2d 614 (1942); Ferris v. Oneida County Bar Ass'n, 31
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these objectives without corresponding disadvantages. It is ob-
viously important for counsel to be fully informed of the underly-
ing facts at once, since it is important to formulate at the outset
an approach to the case-full disclosure, partial disclosure, or no
disclosure. Most lawyers tend to think they can explain virtually
anything to almost anyone's satisfaction, and often enough a res-
pondent will explain himself out of one problem and into an-
other.43 '
A careful reading of Spevack v. Klein,43 and any progeny in
the respondent's jurisdiction, is essential to an understanding of
the competing interests and to making an informed decision on
how to proceed. Confidentiality rules may in some jurisdictions
prevent the use of incriminating statements, but this should not
be relied upon absolutely. Disciplinary files, nominally confiden-
tial or not, may be vulnerable to leak or subpoena. In any event,
the fifth amendment apparently does not prevent the use of un-
constitutionally obtained statements for impeachment.41
In each case counsel should open communications at once
with the disciplinary authority and explore areas of cooperation,
from waiver of objections to foundation for exhibits to a stipu-
lated disposition of the entire case. Even if agreement is not
achieved the effort will ordinarily have been worthwhile. Often it
will produce simplification of the case, discovery of relevant evi-
dence, and other benefits collateral to the merits of the alleged
misconduct.
2. The Problem of Repentence.-It has been long and
widely held that repentance for his wrong is an important and
even essential prerequisite to a respondent's right to continue or
resume the practice of law-the first step, as it were, on the path
to rehabilitation.43 4 Like cooperation, it is certainly a factor worth
establishing in appropriate cases. But, what of the responent who
is actually innocent of the illegal or unethical conduct? Must he
falsely, perjuriously, admit to an act he did not commit to estab-
lish his fitness to practice? No one would say so, of course, but
that is at least occasionally the practical effect of a rule requiring
A.D.2d 283, 297 N.Y.S.2d 280 (1969).
431. This indeed was the case in In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968), in which testi-
mony during the disciplinary proceeding revealed the conduct upon which the discipline
was ultimately based.
432. 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
433. See Harris v. United States, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
434. See generally In re Hiss, 368 Mass. 447, 333 N.E.2d 429 (1975), abandoning the
"repentance" requirement and reviewing cases on the subject in other jurisdiction.
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repentance. The rule presupposes that no conviction of the inno-
cent can occur, and from this it naturally follows that a protesta-
tion of innocence after conviction is itself wrong and false. Like-
wise, it follows as well that a respondent who testified to his
innocence committed perjury.
The important and recent decision of the Massachusetts
Court in In re Hiss4 explored these and other problems of the
repentance doctrine in an excellent opinion, holding that repent-
ance, and thus an admission of guilt, was not a prerequisite to
reinstatement of a lawyer disbarred following a perjury convic-
tion. The Hiss case, however, is unusual in several respects, not
the least of which was the enormous support for the petitioner
from distinguished persons, and should certainly not be read as
holding that repentance may never be considered as a factor in
disciplinary matters.3 Indeed many respondents are, or should
be, contrite, and they are entitled to have that considered in their
favor. The importance of the Hiss decision is simply that it re-
moves repentance as an essential element and recognizes that
occasionally a respondent may actually be wrongly convicted.
3. Restitution. -Many disciplinary cases involve misappro-
priation or other losses of money and property, and quite fre-
quently income tax deficiencies are the reasons for proceedings.
Obviously, repayment will be a consideration in the disciplinary
disposition, and often the parties will be able to agree upon terms.
Restitution is a common condition of probation or reinstatement.
A problem arises, however, when the question of restitution
arises before a disciplinary charge is filed or disposition made.
The misappropriating lawyer may simply have a change of heart
and wish to repay the money, or the victim of the theft may
threaten charges of unethical conduct unless repayment is made.
In such cases several conflicting interests can come into play: self-
incrimination, the appearance of bribery or improper influence on
a potential complaint, for example, would militate against repay-
ment; yet the victim is entitled to be made whole and the respon-
dent is legally and morally bound to do so.
Clearly counsel can play an important role in these situa-
tions. It is important that the respondent sought legal advice in
the first place and that any repayment undertaken was through
counsel and with his advice. By the same token, if a decision is
435. Id.
436. E.g., In re Brownstein, 253 A.D. 840, 1 N.Y.S.2d 725 (1938); In re Pennington,
73 Wash. 2d 601, 440 P.2d 175 (1968).
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made not to make payment, upon the advice of counsel, this as
well may be of importance if a disciplinary proceeding develops.
That the respondent considered making repayment and sought
legal advice upon the question will be in his favor. When the
defalcation has been disclosed and money is actually owing, res-
pondent's counsel should confer with disciplinary counsel about
the desirability, propriety, and method or repayment pending, or
by way of agreed disposition of, the disciplinary proceeding, so
that the victim may as promptly as possible be made whole with
no appearance of impropriety.
Difficult questions of the respondent's duty, if any, to report
his own misconduct or of the propriety of responding to extortion-
ate demands are beyond the scope of this article. But obviously
when money is legitimately owing, the respondent and his counsel
should be prepared to make a realistic offer to repay since this
will all but inevitably be part of the disciplinary disposition. The
respondent should also be prepared to refund fees paid in a case
he mishandled. 37
4. Rehabilitation.-If the respondent was suffering some
physical, mental, or moral deficiency at the time of the miscon-
duct, it will in most cases have to be remedied before he is allowed
to continue or resume practicing law. It will rarely be possible to
predict with accuracy the period of time or even the precise treat-
ment necessary to effect rehabilitation. But since time is very
much of the essence if the respondent's ability to earn his liveli-
hood is suspended in the interim, it is obviously desirable that he
begin that process and complete it at the earliest possible date.
Counsel's role can often be very important in this area in several
respects.
First, the respondent frequently will not have recognized the
real problem or source of the problem. With a careful mixture of
tact and ruthlessness counsel may, after a preliminary diagnosis,
be able to help the respondent recognize the problem that he
himself is a poor money manager, and his financial problems are
not entirely the fault of his wife, his teenage children, and infla-
tion; that he has more work than he can handle and simply must
decline new cases for a time or obtain assistance; that alcohol, or
some other illness, is responsible for a shortness of time or energy
or money; that he is out of touch with current developments in
the law; and that personal expenses cannot be paid out of a trust
437. E.g., In re Seannell, 260 A.D. 442, 23 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1940).
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account or client funds deposited in his own account, no matter
how innocent the motive. This is merely a selection of some of the
more frequent problems that respondents are unable or unwilling
to recognize, but that are often readily soluble once recognized.
When the misconduct occurred long ago the problem may
have been remedied before discovery and complaint. If so, reha-
bilitation may be complete before the disciplinary proceedings
begin and this, of course, will be an important point against sus-
pension or disbarment. If rehabilitation has not occurred, the
passage of time will be against the respondent, and prompt initia-
tion of the process is all the more important.
When the concern is with predicting the effect of disciplinary
disposition the most important consideration is simply to show
that rehabilitation has been completed or at least begun in a
realistic and promising way. This will have enormous bearing on
the disposition in all but the most serious and least serious
cases. 3s To rehabilitate is defined:
to restore to a condition of good health, ability to work or
the like
to restore to good operation or management...
to re-establish the good reputation, rights, or standing of. 3'
Each of these definitions, of course, supposes a preexisting satis-
factory condition to which the respondent has been restored, and
that is usually the case. Any lawyer who is and always has been
an unmitigated scoundrel will probably be permanently dis-
barred. In other words, there will usually be a point of reference
in the respondent's past to which one can point as the benchmark
for his fitness to practice. This approach will often appeal to the
respondent because, in a great many routine cases at least, the
ego of the lawyer in trouble has probably taken a rather severe
recent beating, which has usually made him highly defensive or
despondent. Allusion to that better time will tend both to restore
some self-respect and provide an attainable target for which to
aim. This is a very important and difficult aspect of disciplinary
proceedings. If a lawyer has actually gone physically, mentally,
or "morally" awry, and, therefore, genuinely needs correction, he
must first be made to recognize it without aggravating the condi-
tion and increasing his defensiveness. And without humiliating
him and undermining any desire to recover, he must then be
438. E.g., In re Graves, 347 Mo. 49, 146 S.W.2d 555 (1941).
439. RANDoi House DicIONARY oF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (unabridged 1973).
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shown what he can and should do to re-establish his fitness to
practice law and be persuaded to do it-preferably with enthusi-
asm. This done, or at least, begun respondent and counsel can
approach the proceeding positively, offensively, deferentially in
command, rather than abjectly.
All of this sounds extremely patronizing and superior, but it
is not meant to be. It would be utterly nonsensical and presump-
tuous to suggest that through these methods a respondent's coun-
sel can automatically turn his clients from quivering and craven
losers into born again, two-fisted advocates. But the point is im-
portant, for the disciplinary body will base its decision substan-
tially upon the degree to which it has been persuaded that it will
be safe for all the myriad and elusive interests involved to allow
the respondent to practice; to a great degree that persuasion must
come from the respondent himself, his attitude toward the mis-
conduct and the proceedings, and his efforts to remedy the prob-
lem; and the respondent's attitude will often depend greatly upon
counsel's ability to communicate a relatively true and full picture
of the considerations involved.
IV. CALCULATING THE EQUATION: THE CHALLENGE OF ARRIVING AT
A DIsPOSITION ACCOMMODATING MYRIAD COMPETING INTERESTS
One might conclude from all this that it is possible-indeed
one is tempted to try-to encode the factors involved, attach
values to each of them, feed them into a properly programmed
computer, and await the more or less accurate result:
Misappropriation - +5
Client's funds + ±2
Over $2,000 + ±3
Alcoholism + ±2
Repaid in full - -2
Respondent contrite - -1
Respondent Member AA = -1
No prior offenses - -1
+7
Plus seven on the predesigned scale of values indicates a two-year
suspension, stayed two years, with three months actual suspen-
sion, probation conditioned upon abstinence from alcohol and
suitable financial supervision. Next case.
That, of course, is not how it is done or likely to be done,
though there is a trend toward making criminal sentencing and
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parole decisions according to similar calculi.440 Nor is it suggested
that such a system would be desirable in disciplinary matters.
The appearance of uniformity achieved would doubtless mask an
actual unfairness in most cases. It would seem infinitely prefera-
ble always to strive for the right decision on the merits of individ-
ual cases, rather than to be influenced, except when all else is
equal, and it never is, by concern for the appearance of uniform-
ity:
To apply one general law to all particular cases, were to
make all shoes by one last, or to cut one glove for all hands,
which how unfit it would prove, every man can readily per-
ceive."'
It is not, of course, that simple. It is an ancient argument as old
as the notion of equity:
Equity is a roguish thing: for law we have a measure, know
what to trust to; equity is according to the conscience of him
that is chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower, so is equity.
'Tie all one as if they should make the standard for the measure
we call a foot, a chancellor's foot; what an uncertain measure
would this be? One chancellor has a long foot, another a short
foot, a third an indifferent foot, another a short foot, a third an
indifferent foot: 'tis the same thing in the chancellor's consci-
ence.442
These lofty concerns are mentioned only to underscore the
belief that in the area of lawyer discipline more than in most legal
endeavors one needs to be conscious both of the forest and the
trees. Ultimately each case must be decided on its own merits-it
is a truism, a clich6, but nonetheless true for that. Yet the
"merits" consist of a great many discrete interests of radically
varying importance, the application and evaluation of which in-
dividually will greatly influence the ultimate equitable calcula-
tion. To this end it is useful to detail at least some of the most
important factors, to have in effect a checklist of concerns of
which we should remind ourselves, so that we do not overlook or
undervalue any significant interest.
Precedents do not jrovide very much help. In the end we
440. See, e.g., Kortness v. United States, 514 F.2d 167 (Sth Cir. 1975).
441. W. LAMBARDE, ARCHEION 69 (1635).
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return to the purposes of discipline and ask simply how they will
be served by a given disposition, or what disposition will serve
them best, remembering that the appropriate discipline should
be the least severe sanction that will serve.
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